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Firearms Policy and the Black Community: 
An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy 
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON 
The heroes of the modern civil rights movement were more than 
just stoic victims of racist violence.  Their history was one of 
defiance and fighting long before news cameras showed them 
attacked by dogs and fire hoses.  When Fannie Lou Hamer revealed 
she kept a shotgun in every corner of her bedroom, she was 
channeling a century old practice.  And when delta share cropper 
Hartman Turnbow, after a shootout with the Klan, said “I don’t 
figure I was being non-nonviolent, (yes non-nonviolent) I was just 
protecting my family”, he was invoking an evolved tradition that 
embraced self-defense and disdained political violence.  The precise 
boundaries and policy implications of that tradition had always been 
debated as times and context changed.  But the basic idea that the 
community would support indeed exalt the man or woman who 
fought back in self-defense, even with, nay, especially with arms, has 
a far longer pedigree than the modern orthodoxy which urges 
stringent supply controls as the clearly best firearms policy for black 
folk.  Full consideration of this black tradition of arms raises serious 
questions about the practical wisdom and conceptual grounding of 
that modern orthodoxy. 
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Firearms Policy and the Black Community: 
An Assessment of the Modern Orthodoxy 
NICHOLAS J. JOHNSON∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“[A] Winchester rifle should have a place of honor in every Black home.”  
–Ida B. Wells Barnett, 18921 
 
“To get them you have to go through a bureaucracy that makes it  
difficult . . . . Nobody thinks we would have fewer shootings and fewer 
homicides if we had more relaxed gun laws.” 
–Eleanor Holmes Norton, 20102 
 
Guns are a scourge on the black community.  That is the conventional 
wisdom.  Black-on-Black gun crime imposes terrible costs.3   So it is no 
surprise that many in the Black community and most of the Black 
leadership endorse stringent gun control measures.  This translates into 
broad support for the most aggressive supply restrictions and gun bans like 
those recently overturned in Washington D.C. and Chicago.4   
Black mayors of big cities and Black legislators have overwhelmingly 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.  Thanks to Bob Kaczorowski, Shelia 
Foster, Marc Arkin, Russ Pearce, Howie Erickson, Dave Kopel, George Mocsary, Dan Richmond, Jack 
Krill, Nelson Lund, Bob Levy, Bob Cottrol, Don Kates, Steve Halbrook, Jack Krill, Alice Marie Beard, 
Robin Lenhardt, Tanya Hernandez and to the participants in the Fordham Law School Faculty 
Scholarship Retreat, for comments on drafts of this Article.  Tammem Zainulbhai provided excellent 
research and editing assistance. 
1 IDA B. WELLS, Southern Horrors: Lynch Law in All Its Phases, in SOUTHERN HORRORS AND 
OTHER WRITINGS 49, 70 (Jacqueline Jones Royster ed., 1997). 
2 Gary Fields, New Washington Gun Rules Shift Constitutional Debate, WALL ST. J., May 17, 
2010, at A1. 
3 See, e.g., Brief for NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290) at 1–2 
[hereinafter NAACP Amicus Curiae], available at http://www.gurapossessky.com/news/parker/docume
nts/07-29tsacNAACPLegal.pdf (stating and explaining that “[t]he effects of gun violence on African-
American citizens are particularly acute” and providing the example that how “all but two of the 137 
firearm homicide victims in the District were African Americans”). 
4 See McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the Second Amendment 
right to keep and bear arms for the purpose self-defense is applicable to state and local governments); 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 573–75, 635 (2008) (holding that a District of Columbia 
ban on handgun possession, as well as an effective ban on the use of firearms for defense in the home, 
violated the Second Amendment right to armed self-defense). 
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favored gun bans and restrictions that go substantially beyond prohibiting 
guns to criminals and the untrustworthy.5  The National Urban League is a 
sustaining member of the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, previously the 
National Coalition to Ban Handguns.6  The NAACP pressed a stringent 
gun control agenda in NAACP v. AccuSport,7 arguing that gun makers 
negligently supplied and marketed firearms that ravage poor Black 
communities.  In Chicago, Jessie Jackson advanced the point with protests 
of legal gun sales in the suburbs of Chicago.8  
In an amicus brief in District of Columbia v. Heller,9 the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (“NAACP”) urged the 
                                                                                                                          
5 In 1992, New York Congressman Major Owens introduced a joint resolution, “[p]roposing an 
amendment to the Constitution of the United States repealing the Second Amendment to the 
Constitution.”  H.R.J. Res 438, 102d Cong. (1992), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/D?d102:438:./list/bss/d102HJ.lst::.  In 1993, Owens proposed a separate Bill, explaining: 
Mr. Speaker, my bill prohibits the importation, exportation, manufacture, sale, 
purchase, transfer, receipt, possession, or transportation of handguns and handgun 
ammunition.  It establishes a 6-month grace period for the turning in of handguns.  It 
provides many exceptions for gun clubs, hunting clubs, gun collectors, and other 
people of that kind. 
H.R. Res. 302, 103d Cong. (1993), 139 Cong. Rec. 28527, 28533 (Nov. 10, 1993) (statement of Rep. 
Major Owens).  In 1999, Illinois Congressman Bobby Rush revealed:  
My staff and I right now are working on a comprehensive gun-control bill.  We 
don’t have all the details, but for instance, regulating the sale and purchase of 
bullets.  Ultimately, I would like to see the manufacture and possession of handguns 
banned except for military and police use.  But that’s the endgame. 
Evan Osnos, Bobby Rush; Democrat, U.S. House of Representatives, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 5, 1999, at C3 
(quoting Rep. Bobby Rush).  Mayor of Detroit, Dennis Archer, brought suit against a number of 
firearm manufacturers for negligent oversupply of guns in a manner injurious to the City of Detroit.  
Archer v. Arms Tech., No. 99-912658 NZ, 2000 WL 35624356 (Mich. Cir. Ct. May 16, 2000).  This 
claim was deemed barred by subsequent state legislation in Mayor of Detroit v. Arms Tech., Inc., 669 
N.W.2d 845, 854–55 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).  See Smith & Wesson Corp. v. City of Gary, 875 N.E.2d 
422, 424–25 (Ind. App. 2007) (explaining that in a case known as “Smith & Wesson II,” the city of 
Gary, Indiana alleged that the gun manufacturer Smith & Wesson knew that guns it sold to 
intermediaries would ultimately be sold illegally).  One of Gary’s early Black mayors, Richard Hatcher, 
was a strong advocate of stringent gun controls.  Hatcher stated in 1979 that he would not be approving 
any citizens’ concealed carry applications.  He said if they wanted to challenge his authority, they were 
welcome to take him to court.  Some of them did.  Kellogg v. City of Gary, 562 N.E.2d 685, 688 (Ind. 
1990).  
6 HARRY L. WILSON, GUNS, GUN CONTROL, AND ELECTIONS: THE POLITICS AND POLICY OF 
FIREARMS 145 (2007) (describing how the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence “was founded in 1974 as the 
National Coalition to Ban Handguns”); Member Organizations, COAL. TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE, 
http://www.csgv.org/about-us/member-organizations (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).   
7 271 F. Supp. 2d 435, 446–47 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (“The NAACP contends that . . . large numbers 
of handguns are available to criminals, . . . that their availability endangers the people of New York . . . 
and that defendants negligently and intentionally failed to take practicable marketing steps that would 
have avoided or alleviated the nuisance.”). 
8 Rev. Jesse Jackson Arrested at Gun Shop Protest, FOXNEWS.COM (June 24, 2007), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,286412,00.html. 
9 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  
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Supreme Court to uphold the District’s gun ban.10  In the wake of the 
Court’s ruling that the District’s regulations violated of the Second 
Amendment, the author of the Association’s Heller brief has argued that 
diminishing Heller should be part of “any civil rights agenda.”11  This 
includes, for example, a proposal for limiting the constitutional right to 
keep and bear arms to enable isolated de jure gun prohibition in Black 
enclaves.12     
Within the broader Black community general support for stringent gun 
laws can be inferred roughly from party allegiance.  The Democratic Party 
has been a comfortable home for advocates of gun prohibition and 
stringent controls.13  No group of voters has been more loyal to the modern 
Democratic Party than Blacks.14   
Gun bans and other aggressive control measures promise a solution to 
the plague of gun violence, so in that sense, the modern orthodoxy is easy 
to understand.  But on reflection it is also quite odd.  First, because it is 
grounded on assumptions that are difficult to reconcile with the Black 
experience in America.  Second, because it directly contradicts traditional 
practice, policy, and philosophy of the Black leadership and the broader 
Black community.     
The modern orthodoxy is very difficult to square with the historic and 
well-earned Black distrust of the state.  A competent and benevolent state 
that supplants the need for self-help is a core assumption of stringent gun 
laws.15  But the assumption of government competence and benevolence—
                                                                                                                          
10 NAACP Amicus Curiae, supra note 3, at 4, 31. 
11 Michael B. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v. Heller and Communities 
of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133, 137 (2009). 
12 See id. 
13 For example, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 contained a 
provision, commonly known as the Assault Weapon Ban, which made it “unlawful for a person to 
manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic assault weapon.”  H.R. 3355, 103d Cong.  
§ 110102 (1994), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS-103hr3355enr/pdf/BILLS-
103hr3355enr.pdf; Brad Plumer, Everything You Need to Know About the Assault Weapons Ban, in 
One Post, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog
/wp/2012/12/17/everything-you-need-to-know-about-banning-assault-weapons-in-one-post/.  The bill 
passed with overwhelming Democratic support: 188 House Democrats voted for the bill, and 64 
against, while only 46 Republicans voted for it, and 131 against.  FINAL VOTE RESULTS FOR ROLL 
CALL 416 (1994), available at http://clerk.house.gov/evs/1994/roll416.xml. 
14 Since 1964, the percentage of blacks identifying with the Democratic Party has been 
consistently over 70%, and well over 80% of blacks have voted for the Democratic candidate in every 
Presidential election during that time.  Blacks and the Democratic Party, FACTCHECK.ORG (Apr. 18, 
2008), http://www.factcheck.org/2008/04/blacks-and-the-democratic-party/.  In the 2008 presidential 
election, Barack Obama won 95% of the black vote.  Reilly Dowd, Young African-Americans Support 
President Obama, but Turnout Not a Guarantee, ABCNEWS.GO.COM (Sept. 23, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/african-american-youth-standing-president-
obama/story?id=17274120#.UUt9Mr8Zfww. 
15 There are many manifestations of this.  One of the most evident was the legislation overturned 
in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).  Heller invalidated armed self-defense by 
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particularly competence and benevolence of state and local law 
enforcement—is foreign to the Black experience.  Blacks have justifiably 
distrusted the state and have suffered more than most groups from state 
failure and malevolence.  Even today, the Black community complains 
about the inability or unwillingness of state and local governments to serve 
and protect Blacks.  This includes biting criticism of local policing.16    
Moreover, in terms of practice and policy, armed self-defense has been 
an essential private resource for Blacks.  Not only have many in the 
leadership owned, carried, and used firearms for self-defense, as a matter 
of policy, Blacks from the leadership to the grassroots have supported 
armed self-defense by maintaining a crucial distinction between political 
violence (which was condemned as counterproductive to group 
advancement) and self-defense against imminent threats (for which there 
was no substitute).17 
This Article elaborates these critiques of the modern orthodoxy.  Part I 
shows that trusting the state for personal security is incompatible with the 
Black experience.  Part II shows that the modern orthodoxy is incompatible 
with traditional practice and policy.  Section A of Part II illustrates the 
tradition of firearms ownership and armed self-defense in the Black 
community.  Section B shows how traditionally, Blacks in the leadership 
and at the grassroots, sustained and supported armed self-defense as a 
matter of policy by insisting upon a fundamental distinction between 
private self-defense against imminent threats and collective political 
violence that was considered damaging to group goals.  Section B contends 
that this traditional support for armed self-defense was fundamentally a 
response to state failure and impotence which continues to this day.  This 
continuing state failure and impotence pose a fundamental challenge to the 
modern orthodoxy.  
The evident response to the arguments and implications of Part II is 
that practice and policy formed in the context of Black Codes; that Jim 
Crow and racist terrorism are no longer relevant.  Black support for 
stringent gun control, the argument goes, is dictated by modern concerns 
                                                                                                                          
outlawing handguns and requiring that sporting long guns be kept unloaded, disassembled and locked 
away separately from the ammunition. Heller, 554 U.S. at 574–75, 635; see also H. Richard Uviller & 
William G Merkel, Muting the Second Amendment: The Disappearance of the Constitutional Militia, in 
THE SECOND AMENDMENT IN LAW AND HISTORY 149, 176–77 (Carl T. Bogus ed., 2000) (claiming that 
the militia transformed into the National Guard); Dennis A. Henigan, Guns and the Judiciary, in GUNS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE MYTH OF SECOND AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR FIREARMS IN 
AMERICA 1, 14, 19 (1995) (arguing that the federally controlled National Guard has obviated the need 
the militia of the whole).   
16 See infra notes 472–74.  
17 See infra notes 269–70 and accompanying text (noting that Frederick Douglass advocated 
armed resistance to slave catchers). 
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about Black-on-Black violence in the urban underclass.18  Traditional 
worries about state failure or impotence, it is said, are outdated.  
Part III engages the “things have changed” defense of the modern 
orthodoxy.  Section A charts the departure of modern orthodoxy from 
traditional practice and policy.  Section B argues that the failure and 
inherent limits of government that fueled the traditional support for 
firearms ownership and armed self-defense remain salient.  Part III argues 
that Black political advances have not diminished the problems of 
imminent threats and finite resources that constrain government’s ability to 
protect Blacks from criminal violence.19  Part III concludes that the modern 
orthodoxy is philosophically at odds with the Black experience in America.  
Part IV argues that the modern orthodoxy rests on dubious assumptions 
about the risks and utilities of private firearms and submerges the 
legitimate self-defense interests of the sober mature members of the 
community.  Part IV invites reassessment of the modern orthodoxy with a 
keener focus on the interest of innocents.   
II.  STATE FAILURE AND THE BLACK EXPERIENCE 
We have done our level best . . . , we have scratched our head to figure out 
how we can eliminate the last one of them.  We stuffed ballot boxes.  We 
shot them.  We ARE NOT ASHAMED OF IT. 
–Ben “Pitchfork” Tillman,  
United States Senator from South Carolina, 191020 
 
The injustices endured by Black Americans at the hands of their own 
government have no parallel in our history, not only during the period of 
slavery but also in the Jim Crow era that followed.  
Jim Webb  
United States Senator from Virginia 
July 201021 
                                                                                                                          
18 See de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 167 (“In the District, . . . the handgun ban was a means 
chosen by an African-American electorate to prevent violence against its own members.”). 
19 Daisy Bates was President of Arkansas Conference of NAACP Branches.  DAISY BATES, THE 
LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK 47 (1963).  She and her husband were central figures in the 1957 
Little Rock Integration crisis.  They published a black newspaper, the Arkansas State Press, and 
editorialized against violations of the Supreme Court’s desegregation rulings.  See id. at 33, 49–50 
(describing how the Little Rock School Board resisted immediate integration despite the lack of 
violence at institutions that had been integrated).  Bates was advisor to the Little Rock Nine, when they 
attempted to enroll at Little Rock Central High School.  See id. at 62–65, 88–90 (Bates counseled the 
parents of black children before their enrollment, and organized their travel to the school).   
20 RAYFORD W. LOGAN, THE BETRAYAL OF THE NEGRO: FROM RUTHERFORD B. HAYES TO 
WOODROW WILSON 99–100 (1965) (alterations in original). 
21 See James Webb, Diversity and the Myth of White Privilege, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2010, at A17 
(arguing that affirmative action cannot be justified despite the unparalleled injustices suffered by black 
Americans).  
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Advocates of stringent supply-side, gun control oppose armed self-
defense on the view that personal security is best provided to a disarmed 
citizenry by armed agents of government.22  This dictates a dependency on 
the competence and benevolence of government at odds with the Black 
experience in America. 
Black distrust of the state is well earned.  The early parts of the story 
are self-evident.  There is general agreement that the enshrinement of 
slavery is a stain on the Republic.  It is a profound irony, that with so much 
ink spilled by the founding generation about the reasons to distrust 
government and the need for systemic restraints on government power, the 
constituency with the most glaringly evident reason to distrust the state 
was held in bondage.  
                                                                                                                          
22 The modern gun control movement has long argued that the only legitimate reasons for 
firearms ownership is sport.  While some have urged blanket disarmament, the primary focus has been 
on handguns, deemed generally non-sporting, might be banned.  Some organizations have urged a ban 
on firearms of all types.   
There is little sense in gun registration.  What we need to significantly enhance 
public safety is domestic disarmament . . . . Given the proper political support by the 
people who oppose the pro-gun lobby, legislation to remove the guns from private 
hands, acts like the legislation drafted by Senator John Chafee [to ban handguns], 
can be passed in short order. . . . Domestic disarmament entails the removal of arms 
from private hands. 
AMITAI ETZIONI & STEVEN HELLEND, COMMUNITARIAN NETWORK, THE CASE FOR DOMESTIC 
DISARMAMENT (1992), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~ccps/pop_disarm.html. 
Many in the movement have advocated regulations of the type recently enforced in Washington 
D.C. as a model of sensible gun control.  
A gun-control movement worthy of the name would insist that President Clinton 
move beyond his proposals for controls—such as expanding background checks at 
gun shows and stopping the import of high-capacity magazines—and immediately 
call on Congress to pass far-reaching industry regulation like the Firearms Safety 
and Consumer Protection Act introduced by Senator Robert Torricelli, Democrat of 
New Jersey, and Representative Patrick Kennedy, Democrat of Rhode Island.  Their 
measure would give the Treasury Department health and safety authority over the 
gun industry, and any rational regulator with that authority would ban handguns.  
Josh Sugarmann, Exec. Dir. of the Violence Pol’y Ctr., Dispense with the Half Steps and Ban 
Killing Machines, HOUS. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1999, at 45A. 
For the counterpoint, see David B. Kopel et al., The Human Right to Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. 
PUB. L. 43, 54–57, 159–164 (2007) (critiquing a report for the Human Rights Council prepared by 
Special Rapporteur Barbara Frey claiming that people have a human right to gun control under the 
theory that gun control legislation is part of the due diligence required by international law); see also 
Human Rights Council, Sub-Comm’n on Promotion & Prot. of Human Rights, Prevention of Human 
Rights Violations Committed with Small Arms and Light Weapons, 58th Sess., U.N Doc. 
A/HRC/Sub.I/58/27 (July 27, 2006) (prepared by Barbara Frey), available at http://www.poa-
iss.org/CASAUpload/Members/Documents/11@Frey%20Final%20Report%202006.pdf (arguing that 
self-defense is not a human right but that there is an international human rights law obligation to 
prevent “reasonably foreseeable private sphere violations carried out with small arms” in which States 
“must take steps to minimize armed violence between private actors”). 
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Under the system of constitutionally endorsed slavery, government at 
all levels was overtly hostile to Blacks.  We are familiar with the 
provisions of the original United States Constitution, the Supreme Court 
cases, and a century of delay in making good the promise of 
Reconstruction23 that might leave Blacks understandably ambivalent about 
the suggestion to entrust their lives to the state.24  But it is the details of 
physical threats to Black people at the grassroots that underscore the 
point.25    
                                                                                                                          
23 See, e.g., Lyndon B. Johnson, Remarks of the President to a Joint Session of Congress (Mar. 
15, 1965), in THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 208, 212 (Henry 
Steele Commager ed., 1972) (“A century has passed, more than a hundred years since equality was 
promised.  And yet the Negro is not equal.  A century has passed since the day of promise.  And the 
promise is unkept.”); see also Clayton E. Cramer, Nicholas J. Johnson & George A. Mocsary, “This 
Right Is Not Allowed by Governments that Are Afraid of the People”: The Public Meaning of the 
Second Amendment When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 823, 852–
54 (2010) (discussing the post-war legislation restricting freedmen’s access to guns). 
24 The validation of negro slavery in the “other Persons” and “such Persons” in Article I §§ 2 and 
9 of the original Constitution are familiar.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1.  So is the Supreme Court’s work in Plessy v. Ferguson, 
163 U.S. 537 (1896), which upheld the constitutionality of a state statute requiring separation of the 
races in train travel) and Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), which held that the black plaintiff 
was not a citizen and therefore was not entitled to sue.  Less well known are Hodges v. United States, 
203 U.S. 1, 9 (1906), which held that racist intimidation of Black laborers was outside the jurisdiction 
of federal courts, Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 585 (1883), which held the enhanced punishment for 
interracial fornicators constitutional, Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322–23 (1880), which held that 
all-white juries for Black defendants was constitutional, and United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 
559 (1875), which remanded with instructions to discharge the defendants after indictment of members 
of a white mob who attacked a largely unarmed group of freedmen. 
25 For the view that state malevolence and neglect exacerbated intra group violence by Blacks 
who were wary about entanglements with the white power structure, see, e.g., HORTENSE 
POWDERMAKER, AFTER FREEDOM: A CULTURAL STUDY IN THE DEEP SOUTH 173–74 (1939).  The 
contemporary response to this neglect stands in notable contrast to the modern complaints about 
incarceration of Black criminals.  Consider for example the efforts of the Black leaders from the 
Mississippi Delta on the Committee for Better Citizenship.  The goal of the Committee was to “ensure 
greater punishment for black criminals who committed offenses against blacks.”  DAVID T. BEITO & 
LINDA ROYSTER BEITO, BLACK MAVERICK: T.R.M. HOWARD’S FIGHT FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND 
ECONOMIC POWER 67–68 (2009).  Physician, entrepreneur, and Delta civil rights leader, T.R.M. 
Howard complained that failure of the state to punish Black-on-Black crime was another indictment of 
separate but equal, arguing that the “greatest danger to Negro life in Mississippi is not what white 
people do to Negroes but what the courts of Mississippi let Negroes of Mississippi do to each other.”  
Id. at 73 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Black-on-Black murder for example was likely to go 
unaddressed if the perpetrator lived on “a big plantation and is a good worker and especially, if he is 
liked by white people, the chances are that he will come clear of his crime.” Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  E. Franklin Frazier’s 1924 account strikes a similar cord.   
The main difficulty in the South today is that white people have not attained a 
conception of impersonal justice.  In the South a Negro who is the favorite of an 
influential white man can kill another Negro with impunity.  On the other hand, a 
white man can kill any Negro without any fear of punishment, except where he kills 
out of pure blood-thirstiness a “good nigger.”  The killing of a white man is always 
the signal for a kind of criminal justice resembling primitive tribal revenge. 
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The case for distrust was not so much different after slavery as before.  
As Freedmen attempted to establish themselves politically, they 
encountered violence at the hands of ex-confederates.  The disappointing 
government response is well chronicled.  Episodes in Memphis and New 
Orleans are illustrative.  In 1866 Blacks and white Republicans attempted 
to convene a state constitutional convention.26  
[At the convention hall] they were attacked and slaughtered 
by a mob led by the city police, a force largely made up of 
militant Confederate veterans. . . . The United States Army 
units stationed in New Orleans failed to take any effective 
action to protect the convention, and the Johnson 
administration in Washington ignored warnings that violence 
was likely.27   
Around the same time, white mobs in Memphis invaded the Black 
community.28  In the lead were prominent whites including the Tennessee 
Attorney General and a state judge.  Forty-six Blacks and two whites were 
killed.29 
One of the factors motivating the protections under the Freedman’s 
Acts and the Fourteenth Amendment was the deprivation of Black civil 
rights, including the right of Blacks to arm themselves for personal 
protection.30  There is some temptation to mark the Reconstruction Era as a 
hinge point where Blacks could look to Washington for protection against 
hostile state and local governments.  But by 1877, the Reconstruction 
experiment was nearly exhausted and compromised away.31  In the decades 
                                                                                                                          
E. Franklin Frazier, The Negro and Non-Resistance, 27 CRISIS 213, 213–14 (1924), reprinted in 
HERBERT APTHEKER, 3 A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES, 
449, 451 (1973). 
26 HERBERT SHAPIRO, WHITE VIOLENCE AND BLACK RESPONSE: FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO 
MONTGOMERY 5 (1988). 
27 Id. at 6. 
28 Id. at 7. 
29 Id. 
30 See Cramer, Johnson & Mocsary, supra note 23, at 855–59 (“There is solid evidence that both 
supporters and opponents of the Fourteenth Amendment viewed the Second Amendment as an 
individual right—and in some cases, the opposition to the Fourteenth Amendment was driven by fear 
that it would preclude the Black Code provisions from disarming the freedmen.”). 
31 As author David Levering Lewis observed:  
[By March of 1877,] the Republicans had frantically bartered just enough electoral 
votes in the bitterest, most corrupt election aftermath ever in order to hang on to the 
White House.  In accordance with a deal in large part struck at Wormley House, the 
deluxe Washington hotel owned (ironically) by a black man, Rutherford Hayes’s 
first act had been to call back most of the federal troops from the South while 
northern capitalists smacked their lips in anticipation of Congress’s voting lavish 
subsidies for more transcontinental railroads.  Henceforth, the white South would 
take care of its black people and the North would take care of most of the nation’s 
 
 2013] FIREARMS POLICY AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY 1501 
that followed, the party of Lincoln virtually abandoned Blacks, and Lily-
White Republicans curried favor with the former rebels.32  
Racist assaults on the Black community in Wilmington, North 
Carolina in 1898 illustrate that official complicity in racist violence could 
be good politics.  John Spenser Bassett of Trinity College in Durham noted 
the irony that the prime instigator of the Wilmington violence, Alfred 
Waddell, was subsequently elected mayor.33   
The Sheriff of Fulton County, Georgia, in the period following the 
Atlanta race riots of 1906, made clear his view of justice where Blacks 
were concerned: “Gentlemen, we will suppress these great indignities upon 
our fair wives and daughters if we have to kill every negro in a thousand 
miles of this place.”34  
Northern Blacks were not immune.  In August of 1900, white mobs in 
New York City rolled over Blacks with “police both encouraging and 
participating in the violence, after a violent conflict between a plainclothes 
policeman and the husband of a Black woman accused of soliciting.”35   
In many instances of brutality by the mob policemen stood 
by and made no effort to protect the Negros who were 
assailed.  They ran with the crowds in pursuit of their prey; 
they took defenseless men who ran to them for protection and 
threw them to the rioters, and in many cases they beat and 
clubbed men and women more brutally than the mob did.36  
In the Pulitzer Prize winning, Slavery by Another Name, Douglas 
Blackmon details the southern system of convict labor under which the 
state was a fundamental threat to Blacks.37  Blackmon captures the system 
this way: 
On March 30, 1908, Green Cottenham was arrested by the 
sheriff of Shelby County, Alabama, and charged with 
“vagrancy.” . . . After three days behind bars [he] was found 
guilty . . . and immediately sentenced to a thirty-day term of 
                                                                                                                          
business.  The Nation had said starkly what President Hayes had no need to say 
publicly about the African-American: “Henceforth, the nation, as a nation, will have 
nothing more to do with him.” 
DAVID LEVERING LEWIS, W.E.B. DU BOIS: BIOGRAPHY OF A RACE 163 (1993) (quoting ERIC FONER, 
A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION 245 (1990)). 
32 KENNETH W. GOINGS, “THE NAACP COMES OF AGE”: THE DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER 
21 (1990).  
33 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 73.  
34 JOHN DITTMER, BLACK GEORGIA IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: 1900–1920, at 131 (1977). 
35 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 94. 
36 Id. 
37 DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME:  THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK 
AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR II, at 8 (2009). 
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hard labor.  Unable to pay the array of fees assessed on every 
prisoner[,] . . . Cottenham’s sentence was extended to nearly 
a year of hard labor.  
The next day, Cottenham, the youngest of nine children born 
to former slaves in an adjoining county, was sold.  Under a 
standing arrangement between the county and a vast 
subsidiary of the industrial titan of the North—U.S. Steel 
Corporation—the sheriff turned the young man over to the 
company for the duration of his sentence.  In return, the 
subsidiary, Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Company, gave 
the county $12 a month to pay off Cottenham’s fine and fees.  
What the company’s managers did with Cottenham, and 
thousands of other black men they purchased from sheriffs 
across Alabama, was entirely up to them.38  
Blackmon chronicles the horrific treatment of Black men forced into 
this system throughout the south on charges like “idleness,” “using 
obscene language,”  “selling cotton after sun set” and “violating contract” 
with white employers in places where true crime was “almost trivial.”39  
By some modern sensibilities, the firearms charges that landed Blacks into 
this system were not trivial.  But that modern assessment is vexing here.   
Across the South, but nowhere more intensely than in 
Alabama, public campaigns were under way to ban the 
possession of firearms by any African American.  In an era 
when great numbers of southern men carried sidearms, the 
crime of carrying a concealed weapon—enforced almost 
solely against black men—would by the turn of the century 
become one of the most consistent instruments of black 
incarceration.  The larger implications of disarming black 
men, at a time when they were simultaneously being stripped 
of political and legal protections, were transparent.40 
In this context, the state earned not just Black distrust but fear.  As 
much as any racist terrorist, the state was simply a menace.41  Indeed, 
gauged by the number of direct victims of the convict labor system, the 
state was an even greater threat than terrorist groups like the Klan.   
[T]he records demonstrate the capture and imprisonment of 
                                                                                                                          
38 Id. at 1–2. 
39 Id. at 69, 79, 99. 
40 Id. at 81–82 (emphasis added). 
41 See id. at 99 (“At the end of the 1880s, thousands of black men across the South were 
imprisoned in work camps only for violations of the new racial codes, completely subjective crimes, or 
no demonstrable crime at all.”).   
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thousands of random indigent citizens, almost always under 
the thinnest chimera of probable cause or judicial process.  
The total number of workers caught in this net had to have 
totaled more than a hundred thousand and perhaps more than 
twice that figure.  Instead of evidence showing black crime 
waves, the original records of county jails indicated 
thousands of arrests for inconsequential charges or for 
violations of laws specifically written to intimidate blacks—
changing employers without permission, vagrancy, riding 
freight cars without a ticket, engaging in sexual activity—or 
loud talk—with white women. . . . Hundreds of forced labor 
camps came to exist, scattered throughout the south—
operated by state and county governments, large 
corporations, small-time entrepreneurs, and provincial 
farmers. . . .  Where mob violence or the Ku Klux Klan 
terrorized black citizens periodically, the return of forced 
labor as a fixture in black life ground pervasively into the 
daily lives of far more African Americans.42 
The idea that the state was a menace rivaling the Klan tempts a false 
dichotomy that obscures government complicity in the “private” terrorism 
of the lynch mob. “Not only did sheriffs and jailers often willingly turn 
Black victims over to the lynchers, but officers of the law frequently joined 
the mob.”43  The record is tragically thick with examples of almost 
unbelievable lynch mob barbarism and the striking failure of government 
to intercede.  A stark example is President William Howard Taft’s failure 
in 1911 even to acknowledge the NAACP’s special message requesting 
action in response to a particularly inventive lynching.44   The white 
citizens of Livermore, Kentucky dragged a Black man accused of killing a 
white from his jail cell to the town opera house, where the crowd paid 
admission to fire shots at him.  “Those who bought orchestra seats had the 
privilege of emptying their six shooters at the swaying form above them, 
but the gallery occupants were limited to one shot.”45 
The shameful record of government institutions at every level on this 
score is highlighted by the submission of the Universal Negro 
Improvement Association to the 1919, Paris Peace Conference.  In what 
                                                                                                                          
42 Id. at 7. 
43 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 31.  The claim that lynching was just a response to Black 
criminality is unconvincing.  Victims included the father of a boy who jostled white women, a man 
who beat a white in a fight, and the wife and son of an accused rapist.  See, e.g., DITTMER, supra note 
34, at 131–40 (describing examples of lynchings that were not the result of Black criminality and the 
effects the lynchings had on the communities). 
44 GEORGE C. WRIGHT, RACIAL VIOLENCE IN KENTUCKY, 1865–1940, LYNCHINGS, MOB RULE, 
AND “LEGAL LYNCHINGS” 118–19 (1990). 
45 Id.  
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sounds like the plea of modern refugees from barbaric, third world 
governments, the UNIA representative, prayed for intervention by the 
civilized world.  
We of North America, beg to lay before you the awful 
institutions of lynching and burning at the stake of our men, 
women and children by the white people of the country, 
which institutions are in direct contravention of the 
established codes of civilization.  We ask your help and 
interference in the stopping of these outrages, which cannot 
be regarded as national or domestic questions, but as 
international violations of civilized human rights.46 
Although official hostility to Blacks had often been a point of division 
between political parties, in some cases the stance was entirely bipartisan.   
In the run up to the 1921 Tulsa riots, Klansmen appeared on both the 
Democratic and Republican slates.47 
Black migration from the South to Northern industrial centers was 
often met with official hostility and government sanctioned violence.  The 
infamous 1917 race riot in East St. Louis, Illinois, incited by employment 
of Black strikebreakers, prompted investigation by a special congressional 
committee.48  It concluded that the police had become “part of the mob by 
countenancing the assaulting and shooting down of defenseless negroes 
and adding to the terrifying scenes of rapine and slaughter.”49    
A. Philip Randolph placed the failure of the state to protect Blacks in a 
broader context.  The root of the problem, he claimed, was capitalism 
itself.50  “Lynching will not stop until Socialism comes . . . when the 
                                                                                                                          
46 1 THE MARCUS GARVEY AND UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION PAPERS 228, 
308, 378–80 (Robert A. Hill ed., 1983). 
47 SCOTT ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921, at 22 
(1982) (“In the November 1922 elections . . . both the Republican and Democratic candidates for 
county attorney and sheriff were Klansmen.”). 
48 Ben Johnson et al., Report of the Special Committee Authorized by Congress to Investigate the 
East St. Louis Riots, in THE POLITICS OF RIOT COMMISSIONS 1917–1970, at 59, 59 (Anthony Platt ed., 
1971) (the congressional committee was appointed “for the purpose of making an investigation of the 
East St. Louis riots which occurred on May 28 and July 2, 1917”). 
49 Id. at 70.  
50 Randolph took a different approach from Black civil rights groups.  For example, in an analysis 
urging that lynching required an international response, the Messenger criticized,  
No, lynching is not a domestic question, except in the rather domestic minds of 
Negro leaders, whose information is highly localized and domestic.   The problems 
of the Negros should be presented to every nation in the world and this sham 
democracy, about which American’s prate, should be exposed for what it is: a sham, 
a mockery, a rape on decency, and a travesty on common sense.  When lynching 
gets to be an international question, it will be the beginning of the end.   
SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 171. 
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motive for promoting race prejudices is removed, viz., profits.”51  
Randolph argued that the reasons for government failure to protect Negros 
were inherent and could not be resolved by more words claiming a change 
in policy.  “Don’t be deceived by any capitalist bill to abolish lynching; if 
it became a law, it would never be enforced.  Have you not the Fourteenth 
Amendment which is supposed to protect your life, property, . . . and 
guarantee you the vote?”52  Randolph’s short-term remedy was reciprocal 
violence in self-defense.53  He reconciled this with the general program of 
pacifism, noting that pacifism controlled “only on matters that can be 
settled peacefully.”54 
The familiar claim that government officials were complicit in lawless 
violence against Blacks was underscored by the NAACP’s investigation of 
a 1926 lynching in Aiken, South Carolina.  The sheriff and the jailer had 
assisted the mob in removing three Blacks from a local jail to a nearby 
tourist camp, where, in front of a crowd of 2,000, they were killed.55  In 
attendance were members of the state legislature and other local 
politicians.56  The NAACP’s James Weldon Johnson argued that the 
federal government bore part responsibility.  The Senate’s refusal to act on 
the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill he claimed, “was equivalent to serving notice 
on the lynchers that they could pursue their pastime virtually 
unmolested.”57  Johnson’s mentor, Charles W. Anderson, leveled a similar 
criticism at Woodrow Wilson’s policy of segregating the federal 
workforce.  Wilson’s policy had “the reflex influence” of giving anti-
Negro elements across the country the feeling that they would not be 
punished by federal authorities.58  
The high-water mark of southern lynching is contestable.  On one 
view, it is measured by lynchings per year, with declining rates evidence of 
progress.  On another view, the impact is cumulative, with every new, 
dangling, burned corpse an affirmation that Blacks lived in a state of terror.  
The cumulative view reflects better the impact on the Black psyche and 
expectations.  “Translated from statistical abstraction, . . . perhaps most of 
the southern Black population, had witnessed lynching in their own 
                                                                                                                          
51 A. Philip Randolph & Chandler Owen, Lynching: Capitalism Its Cause, Socialism Its Cure, in 
BLACK PROTEST THOUGHT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 85, 90, 91 (August Meier et al. eds., 2d ed. 
1971). 
52 Id. at 91. 
53 Id. at 96. 
54 Id. at 97. 
55 I.A. NEWBY, BLACK CAROLINIANS: A HISTORY OF BLACKS IN SOUTH CAROLINA FROM 1895 
TO 1968, at 242–45 (1973); Walter White, The Shambles of South Carolina, CRISIS, Dec. 1926, at 72–
75, CRISIS, Jan. 1927, at 141–42.  
56 White, supra note 55, at 141–42.  
57 Id.; see also NAACP Column, CRISIS, Jan. 1927, at 141–42.  
58 1 CHARLES FLINT KELLOGG, NAACP: A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE 
ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE 166 (1967). 
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communities or knew people who had, knew the terror that struck the 
community when the mob was whipped to frenzy.”59  A cumulative 
assessment of Black distrust of the state undercuts modern claims that the 
tradition of distrust is no longer salient because things have changed.   
While the stereotypical Southern sheriff was a common locus of Black 
distrust, other officials contributed generously.  Witness the arguments of 
the prosecutor in the trial of Ward Rodgers, a white union activist arrested 
in Arkansas on charges of anarchy and blasphemy.  Rodger’s offense, the 
prosecutor argued, was teaching “niggers” to read and calling Black men 
“mister.”60    
More striking is the 1935 report of Robert Reed, a white volunteer who 
was arrested for attending a meeting of Black sharecroppers.  The meeting 
was broken up by armed whites.  They took Reed before a local judge who 
pressed him on why a white man was dealing with “niggers.”61 
He told us about how they had a lot of black politicians in 
Arkansas up until the turn of the century, and hundreds had 
been driven into the Mississippi River, and that a lot of lives 
were lost then, and the whole thing was likely to occur over 
again if we persisted in the sort of activities we were in.62 
As the United States entered World War II, Black soldiers found 
themselves instruments of a government they still had ample reasons to 
distrust and even fear.  In some cases that fear was compounded by 
hostility from white soldiers and superior officers.63  In other cases it was 
instigated by state and local authorities enforcing racist local norms.64  
                                                                                                                          
59 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 32. 
60 DAVID EUGENE CONRAD, THE FORGOTTEN FARMERS: THE STORY OF SHARECROPPERS IN THE 
NEW DEAL 157 (1965). 
61 H.L. MITCHELL, MEAN THINGS HAPPENING IN THIS LAND 63 (1979). 
62 Id. 
63 For example, Black Soldiers stationed at Marcus Hook, Pennsylvania encountered a notice 
from their white commander that “Any cases between white and colored males and females, whether 
voluntary or not is considered rape and during time of war the penalty is death.”  ROI OTTLEY, “NEW 
WORLD A-COMING”: INSIDE BLACK AMERICA 314 (1943).  At Fort Dix, New Jersey, a gun battle 
between Black troops and MP’s intent on enforcing southern Jim Crow customs led to three dead and 
five wounded.  Id. at 312–13.    
64 A Black member of the 94th Engineers Battalion stationed in Camp Custer Arkansas in 1941 
reported that a group of Black soldiers from the units abandoned maneuvers and fled for safety after 
being threatened by state troopers and armed civilians.  Id. at 310.   
As we were walking along the highway, . . . we saw a gang of white men with guns 
and sticks and white state troopers were with them.  They told us to get the hell off 
the road and walk in the mud at the side of the highway. . . . [T]he trooper told [our 
white Lieutenant] to get them blacks off the highway before [he] leave[s] ‘em [sic] 
laying there.  Then out of a clear blue sky the state trooper slapped the white 
lieutenant. 
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Florence Murray’s account of racial violence in the armed forces65 
describes the concerns that prompted protests by the NAACP about 
beating, mobbing, and lynching of Blacks in uniform on military bases and 
in host communities.66 
On the civilian front, Thurgood Marshall’s report of the government 
response to the 1943 Detroit riots67 fueled continuing Black distrust of the 
state.68  Marshall’s particular focus on the culture within the Detroit police 
department highlights a recurring complaint that still resonates in Black 
communities.69  A commission appointed by the Governor of Michigan 
was unsympathetic to Marshall’s view.70  But an assessment by a coalition 
including General William Gunther, the YMCA, and the Federal Council 
of Churches confirmed and condemned widespread police misconduct and 
abuse of Blacks.71  
On another count, reaction to the Detroit riots, even at federal level, 
was a source of worry.  On July 15, 1943, Attorney General Francis Biddle 
wrote to President Roosevelt,  
[T]hat careful consideration be given to limiting, and in some 
                                                                                                                          
Id. at 310–11 (internal quotation marks omitted).  After nightfall, the Black soldiers abandoned their 
maneuvers and fled the area by a variety of means calculated to avoid contact with local whites.  Id. at 
311.  
65 THE NEGRO HANDBOOK, 1946–1947, at 347–56 (Florence Murray ed., 1947) (describing, for 
example, the Port Chicago mutiny in 1944, the Freeman Field disturbance in 1945, the mutiny at 
Mabry Field in May 1944, the Fort Devens case in March 1944, and the disturbances in Guam). 
66 Id.; Harvard Sitkoff, Racial Militancy and Interractial Violence in the Second World War, 58 J. 
AM. HIST. 666, 674–79 (1971). 
67 Frustration with a neglectful or malevolent state was reflected in the build up to the 1943 
Detroit riots where “[a] slogan frequently heard among Blacks was ‘if you’ve got to die for democracy, 
lets die for it at home.’”  SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 312. 
68 See Thurgood Marshall, The Gestapo in Detroit, in RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 
140, 140–44 (Allen Day Grimshaw, ed., 1969) (“Much of the blood spilled in the Detroit riot is on the 
hands of the Detroit police department.”); WALTER WHITE & THURGOOD MARSHALL, WHAT CAUSED 
THE DETROIT RIOT? AN ANALYSIS 29–36 (1943) (“Some of the Negroes interviewed have refused to 
give details, and others have refused to sign statements for fear of reprisals from the local Police 
Department.”).  Marshall argued that there was sufficient evidence to convene a grand jury to 
investigate “the nonfeasance and malfeasance of the police as a contributing factor in the Detroit riots.”  
Id. at 29.  The actions of the police siding with white mobs to prevent Blacks form integrating the 
Sojourner Truth housing project justified the belief of “[w]hite hoodlums . . . that the Detroit police 
would act the same way in any future disturbances.”  Id.  
69 See, e.g., Evan Perez & Devlin Barrett, Police Officers Charged over Post-Katrina Deaths, 
WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870451890457536524328
2608862.html?KEYWORDS=new+orleans+police+shooting+Katrina (reporting on a “racially charged 
case” of white police officers in connection with shootings in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina that 
left mainly black victims dead or wounded, and which is viewed as “the most vivid and painful 
example of the confusion and lawlessness that pervaded the city after the storm”). 
70 See Marshall, supra note 68, at 141 (quoting Commissioner Witherspoon’s remarks defending 
the police); see also WHITE & MARSHALL, supra note 68, at 13 (explaining that the “investigating 
committee reported that there was no necessity of a Grand Jury investigation”). 
71 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 318–19.   
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instances putting an end to Negro migrations into 
communities which cannot absorb them, either on account of 
physical limitations or cultural background.  This needs 
immediate and careful consideration. . . . It would seem 
pretty clear that no more Negros should move to Detroit.72 
The particular worry about police culture is underscored by the 1946 
police shooting of the Ferguson brothers in Freeport, Nassau County, New 
York.73  The episode emphasizes the now familiar tension between Blacks 
and police that cannot be explained simply by reference to racist traditions 
of the Deep South.  At the time, Freeport “like other Long Island towns 
was an outpost of segregation and racial exclusion.”74  The Fergusons were 
war veterans,75 and they had been denied service by the manager of a local 
restaurant who called the police.76  By the time police arrived, the 
Fergusons had left the restaurant.77  They were later apprehended and, by 
some accounts, lined up and shot by police who claimed that one of the 
brothers pretended to be armed.78   The Ferguson’s were not armed and the 
aftermath precipitated a wave of protests, including the charge by the 
NAACP that “it is difficult to classify this double killing as anything but 
murder.”79  Prominent citizens called for an investigation, but no action 
was taken against the officers.80  Herbert Shapiro observes that the 
Freeport shooting, “demonstrated that responsible public officials would 
not readily be moved to act to restrain racist police officers.”81  
By 1947, President Truman’s Committee on Civil Rights reported that 
government involvement in the most egregious attacks on Blacks was 
attributable to state and local officials in the South:   
Punishment of lynchers is not accepted as the responsibility 
of state or local governments in these communities.  
Frequently, state officials participate in the crime, actively or 
passively.  Federal efforts to punish the crime are resisted. 
Condonaton of lynching is indicated by the failure of some 
local law enforcement officials to make adequate efforts to 
                                                                                                                          
72 Id. at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also EARL BROWN, WHY RACE RIOTS: 
LESSONS FROM DETROIT 3, 23 (1944) (criticizing Attorney General Biddle’s handling of the Detroit 
riots); Biddle Denies Migration Ban, CRISIS, Sept. 1943, at 280 (discussing Biddle’s denial of any plans 
to restrict “the migration of Negroes to war production centers”).  
73 SHAPIRO supra note 26, at 356. 
74 Id. at 355. 
75 Id. at 356. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
80 Id. at 356–57. 
81 Id. at 357.   
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break up the mob.  It is further shown by failure in most 
cases to make any real effort to apprehend or try those guilty.  
If the federal government enters a case, local officials 
sometimes actively resist the federal investigation.82   
Still, the report acknowledged that the Federal Government had 
important work left to do.83  It was explicitly critical of the Justice 
Department’s civil rights Section, Criminal Division.84  Without intending 
it, the Report “furnished evidence about the federal government’s 
complicity in subjecting [B]lacks to the continued threat of lynching, 
police brutality, and other forms of violence.”85  Later assessments of the 
FBI would underscore this point.86 
A multifaceted story of state malevolence unfolded in 1946 
surrounding an altercation in the Black community of “Mink Slide” in 
Columbia, Tennessee.  The initial conflict was between a white radio 
repairman, William Fleming, a Black woman customer, Gladys 
Stephenson and her son.87  For reasons that are disputed, Fleming kicked 
and slapped Stephenson.88  Her son came to her aid.89  Police arrived and 
arrested Stephenson and her son.90  A lynch mob formed at the courthouse 
but was thwarted when Stephenson and her son were secreted away.91  
Fearing the boil-over, the local Black community took up arms and 
prepared for an attack.92  The National Guard was called in.93  The Guard 
arrested over one-hundred Blacks, two of whom died while in custody.94  
Among the protests was the NAACP’s denunciation of the episode in The 
Crisis magazine.95  The conflict was evidence “that Negroes, even in small 
communities like Columbia where they were outnumbered almost three to 
                                                                                                                          
82 TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS: THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS 
20–23 (Charles Erwin Wilson, ed., 1947).  
83 See id. at 125–33 (explaining that the Civil Rights Section of the Department of Justice is “less 
effective and less self-assured” than it needs to be to sufficiently fulfill its purpose); see also infra notes 
84–87 and accompanying text (discussing the criticism of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights 
Section in failing to protect Blacks from continued violence). 
84 See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 370–71 (describing the report’s assessment of the Justice 
Department). 
85 Id. at 371. 
86 See, e.g., CHARLES EVERS & ANDREW SZANTON, HAVE NO FEAR: THE CHARLES EVERS STORY 
113–14, 130, 137 (1997).  
87 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 362. 
88 See id. (stating that Fleming kicked and slapped Stephensen during a dispute without explaining  
the cause of the dispute). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 See id. (“Fearing attack, members of the black community prepared to defend themselves.”). 
93 See id. (describing the conduct of the police and guardsmen). 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 363  
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one, do not intend to sit quietly and let a mob form, threaten, and raid their 
neighborhood.”96 
Thurgood Marshall, then an NAACP attorney, was assigned to 
represent those arrested by the National Guard.97  By some accounts, 
Marshall himself escaped lynching only because the Black community was 
already mobilized against mob violence.98  Marshall was arrested “on 
trumped-up charges of drunk driving.”99  Fearing for his life, fellow 
NAACP lawyers followed the arrest vehicle and alerted the community to 
the danger.100  Harry Raymond reported, “Thurgood Marshall was the 
intended victim . . . the lynchers failed to carry out their plan because they 
are [sic] cowardly men and they knew we had the entire Columbia Negro 
community mobilized behind us.”101   
Mississippi delta activist Reverend George Lee was less fortunate.  In 
1955, Lee was killed by a shotgun blast through his car window after 
receiving a written death threat to drop his name from the voting roll.  The 
sheriff dismissed the death as a traffic accident.102  Two Black doctors 
performed an autopsy and extracted lead buckshot from Lee’s face.  The 
sheriff insisted the lead was dental fillings torn loose by the crash.103  The 
NAACP appealed to Governor White to launch an investigation.  White 
responded that he did not answer letters from the NAACP.104 
Even after the Supreme Court declared “separate but equal” 
unconstitutional,105 federal enforcement of that proposition against violent 
opposition shows that Blacks were properly suspicious of the ability or 
willingness of the federal government to protect or serve them.  President 
Eisenhower’s ambivalent reaction to Brown v. Board of Education,106 the 
                                                                                                                          
96 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
97 See id. at 363–64 (explaining Marshall’s involvement in the case). 
98 Id. at 364. 
99 Id.  The episode also fostered alliances with progressives; it prompted the formation of a 
National Committee for Justice in Columbia, Tennessee, organized by Eleanor Roosevelt and a variety 
of notable supporters.  Id.; see also ROY WILKINS & TOM MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS 188–89 (1982). 
100 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 364. 
101 Id. 
102 JACK MENDELSOHN, THE MARTYRS: SIXTEEN WHO GAVE THEIR LIVES FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 
3–6 (1966).  
103 Id. at 6.  
104 BEITO & BEITO, supra note 25, at 108. 
105 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
106 Two years after Brown, Eisenhower said, “I think it makes no difference whether or not I 
endorse [Brown].”  RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF 
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 753 (1975).  He did not, however, 
explicitly oppose it, commenting that the important thing was to “help to bring about a change in spirit 
so that extremists on both sides do not defeat what we know is a reasonable, logical conclusion to this 
whole affair, which is recognition of equality of men.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also 
WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939–1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. 
DOUGLAS 120 (1980) (“Ike’s ominous silence on our 1954 decision gave courage to the racists who 
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threat of violent resistance to integration by Arkansas Governor, Orval 
Faubus,107 and Eisenhower’s initially tepid response to Faubus, left Roy 
Wilkins to complain in a letter to Adam Clayton Powell, 
I have great difficulty speaking calmly about the role of 
President Eisenhower in this whole mess.  He has been 
absolutely and thoroughly disappointing and disillusioning 
from beginning to end. . . . [T]he White House has 
abandoned its own Supreme Court and has abdicated 
leadership in a great moral crisis.108   
America’s goodwill ambassador, Louis Armstrong made his views on 
the matter public, calling Eisenhower gutless and informing a reporter that 
“he had no intention of touring the Soviet Union for the State 
Department.”109  “The way they are treating my people in the South, the 
government can go to hell. . . .  The people over there [would] ask me 
what’s wrong with my country.  What am I supposed to say?”110 
Daisy Bates reports one common man’s rougher assessment of 
Eisenhower’s belated proclamation authorizing the use of federal force to 
restrain Faubus. 
Proclamation be damned!  We’ve had the Constitution since 
1789 and I doubt whether those goons who took over our 
town yesterday can read.  Last night they came into our 
neighborhood and rocked our houses, breaking windows, and 
all that.  We’ve taken a lot because we didn’t want to hurt the 
chances of Negro kids, but I doubt whether the Negroes are 
going to take much more without fighting back.  I think I’ll 
take the rest of the day off and check my shotgun and make 
sure it’s in working condition.111   
Later, Daisy Bates’ personal pleas for federal protection from 
firebombing and cross burning at her home fell on deaf ears.  Federal 
                                                                                                                          
decided to resist the decision ward by ward, precinct by precinct, town by town, and county by 
county.”). 
107 TONY FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 103 (1984). 
108 WILKINS & MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS, supra note 
99, at 251.  For a more extensive critique of presidential ambivalence, see EARL OFARI HUTCHINSON, 
BETRAYED: A HISTORY OF PRESIDENTIAL FAILURE TO PROTECT BLACK LIVES 3–4 (1996) (“Some 
presidents rationalized their hands-off policy by narrowly interpreting the federalist doctrine of state 
and national power.  Some blamed their inaction on a Congress dominated by southern Democrats and 
northern Republican conservatives. . . . Some presidents merely said the statutes were too weak and 
vague to permit sustained and successful prosecutions of racial terrorism.”).  
109 TERRY TEACHOUT, POPS: A LIFE OF LOUIS ARMSTRONG 331 (2009). 
110 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111 DAISY BATES, THE LONG SHADOW OF LITTLE ROCK: A MEMOIR 99 (1962) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
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officials declined to intervene on the argument that they had no 
jurisdiction.112  Local law enforcement was hostile, and harassed the armed 
men of the community who had gathered to guard the Bates home.113  
Mississippi activist, Doctor T.R.M. Howard, received a similar 
response after requesting protection from the FBI.  The neglect here is 
more galling because one of the threats to his life came while federal 
agents were sitting in his office.  The agents were investigating whether 
Howard had been the target of extortion.114  The interview was interrupted 
by a caller who threatened to kill him if he continued to press for 
integration.115  The FBI rebuffed Howard’s request for protection, 
suggesting that he contact local authorities.116  The Governor of 
Mississippi already had refused the NAACP’s plea to investigate a 
shooting (ignored by the sheriff) with the retort that he did not answer 
letters from the NAACP.117  Not surprisingly, Howard kept “a small 
arsenal” in his home.118 
The reaction of the Eisenhower Administration to the daylight murder 
of Lamar Smith on the courthouse lawn in Brookhaven, Mississippi 
illustrates more of the same.  Smith had been active in helping Black voters 
complete absentee ballots.  There were many witnesses to the murder, but 
no one would testify.  “The Eisenhower Administration showed little 
interest.  Arthur Caldwell, the chief of the Civil Rights Division, refused to 
take jurisdiction because the killing involved a state and not a federal 
election.”119 
The voter registration efforts of the Congress of Racial Equality 
(“CORE”) in the south were met hostility not just from the Klan but also 
directly from local officials.  When local police threatened to lynch 
CORE’s National Director, James Farmer, local African Americans 
smuggled Farmer out of town in a hearse.120  The failure by local 
authorities in Jonesboro, Louisiana to protect CORE workers was one 
impetus for formation of the Black self-defense group, the Deacons for 
                                                                                                                          
112 Id. at 162–63 (demonstrating the lack of response and action from federal officials). 
113 Id. at 169.  
114 BEITO & BEITO, supra note 25, at 109. 
115 Id. 
116 Id.  
117 Id. at 108. 
118 Id. at xiii. 
119 Id. at 113. 
120 JAMES FARMER, LAY BARE THE HEART: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 249–52 (1985); see also James J. Farmer, A Night of Terror in Plaquemine, Louisiana, 
1963, in THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 134, 141–43 (Henry 
Steele Commager ed., 1972) (providing James Farmer’s firsthand account of the plan to smuggle him 
out of Plaquemine, Louisiana after he received threats from local police); Horse Troopers Scatter 
Negroes: Charge into Throng of 150 Marching at Plaquemine, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1963, at 41 
(describing a police attack on a group of black marchers in Plaquemine, Louisiana). 
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Defense.121   
In 1962, terrorists shot up the home of Ruleville, Mississippi voter and 
registration activist, Hattie Sisson.122  Her granddaughter and a friend were 
injured.  At the hospital, the mayor laid the blame on Sisson.  “You done 
that yourself, trying to lay it on somebody else.  You done that yourself, 
get out of here, go on out of here.”123   
When, in 1963, a bomb was tossed into a house down the street from 
the childhood home of Condoleezza Rice, her father gathered the family 
with the intent of heading to the police station, but was reminded by his 
wife exactly who and where he was.  “‘Are you crazy,’ she asked.  ‘They 
[the police,] probably set off the thing in the first place.’”124 
In 1964, activists in Halifax County North Carolina expected little 
assistance from the authorities after voter registration efforts prompted a 
wave of cross burnings and arson.125  Bulletin boards at the county police 
station regularly posted advertisements for local Klan rallies.126  John 
Salter, a Native American activist working for the Southern Conference 
Educational Fund, writes, “Fortunately we lived in the middle of a heavily 
armed Black community, with neighbors . . . who were protective.”127   
While the glib collective memory of the Civil Rights era may be one of 
federal saviors and state and local villains, Simon Wendt reminds us,  
Despite the disappearance of the three civil rights  
workers . . . and the violent attacks on black homes and 
churches, the federal government continued to claim that it 
could provide no protection.  While Attorney General Robert 
Kennedy was deeply disturbed by the lawlessness in the 
state, he publicly stated that [these situations were] a “local 
matter for local law enforcement.”  Since federal authority in 
the state was “very, very limited,” the administration could 
                                                                                                                          
121 The Deacons originated in Jonesboro Louisiana during the turmoil of the Civil Rights 
movement.  LANCE HILL, THE DEACONS FOR DEFENSE: ARMED RESISTANCE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 10–11 (2004).  They were a working class armed self-defense movement that protected 
civil rights workers from Klan and police violence.  SIMON WENDT, THE SPIRIT AND THE SHOTGUN: 
ARMED RESISTANCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 67–68, 76 (2007) [hereinafter WENDT, 
SELF-DEFENSE].  They established “twenty-one communities, seventeen in the South and four in the 
North.”  HILL, supra, at 167. 
122 KAY MILLS, THIS LITTLE LIGHT OF MINE: THE LIFE OF FANNIE LOU HAMER 46–47 (1993).  
123 Id. at 47 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
124 CONDOLEEZZA RICE, EXTRAORDINARY, ORDINARY PEOPLE: A MEMOIR OF FAMILY 92 (2010).  
125 WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 190; see also JOHN R. SALTER, JACKSON, 
MISSISSIPPI: AN AMERICAN CHRONICLE OF STRUGGLE AND SCHISM 240 (1979) (explaining that in 
response to so many of the threats regarding election work carrying a revolver was necessary).  
126 WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 190. 
127 Hunter Gray, Material and Libertarian Well-Being—and Firearms, DEVELOPING ISSUES AND 
CONTEMPORARY COMMENT (citing John R. Salter, Civil Rights and Self Defense, AGAINST THE 
CURRENT, July–Aug. 1988, at 24). 
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take no preventative police action against white terror.  
Neither the repeated calls for federal intervention by civil 
rights activists nor the official statement by a group of well-
known law professors that existing law actually gave the 
administration the power to dispatch troops to Mississippi 
could jolt President Lyndon B. Johnson into action.128 
These and other episodes show that trusting the state has been an 
absurd proposition during most of the Black experience in America.129  
Governments at all levels have been equal malefactors.  In fits and starts, 
federal authority was extended to protect Blacks from abuse by state and 
local governments.  Reconstruction efforts were short lived and it took 
another century before federal power was seriously redeployed to protect 
Blacks.  That alone might be enough to argue that Blacks still should 
approach the recommendation to trust the state, with heavy skepticism.   
It is plausible to argue that the radically transformative civil rights 
legislation of the 1960’s signaled a change that justifies black reliance on 
the Federal Government for a variety of needs including basic personal 
security.  But the glaring weakness of that view is that every day policing 
is still firmly in the hands of state and local governments130 whose record 
of delivery of services, and security comes up far shorter and is even more 
deserving of black distrust.131  
It is a peculiar irony that the modern orthodoxy urges Blacks to trust 
                                                                                                                          
128 WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 116–17 (footnotes omitted).  
129 While I have focused here on direct physical threats, the state also menaced Blacks more 
subtly as a propagandist of Black inferiority.  An early example is the Post-Civil War work of the 
Provost Marshal General’s Office.  See JOSEPH T. GLATTHAAR, FORGED IN BATTLE: THE CIVIL WAR 
ALLIANCE OF BLACK SOLDIERS AND WHITE OFFICERS 254 (1990) (discussing the Provost Marshal 
General’s Office’s compilations that concluded that “interracial breeding resulted in an inferior being”).  
Here, state agents purported to offer “scientific” corroboration for the full range of racist stereotypes 
including that “[f]ull blacks had elongated heels . . . resembling those of apes” and that interbred 
mulattoes were inferior beings less suited to the hardships of military service than full-blooded blacks.  
Id.; see also JOHN S. HALLER, JR., OUTCASTS FROM EVOLUTION: SCIENTIFIC ATTITUDES OF RACIAL 
INFERIORITY, 1859–1900, at 19–20, 34 (1971) (providing evidence that “scientific” studies the 
government initiated during the Civil War worked toward institutionalizing racism against blacks and 
thus creating a deeper divide with the government).   
130 Charles Lane’s treatment of the story leading to United States v. Cruickshank illustrates the 
point in vivid and gruesome detail.  CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX 
MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 20–22 (2008). 
131 See EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 4 (“You knew you were a nigger the first time you 
went driving with older Negros and they warned you to avoid the highway patrol.”); see also Nat’l 
Advisory Comm’n on Civil Disorders, Detroit, in RACIAL VIOLENCE IN THE UNITED STATES 205, 222 
(Allen D. Grimshaw ed., 1969) (discussing how “alley courts,” was “police slang for an unlawful 
attempt to make prisoners confess”); RODNEY STARK, POLICE RIOTS, COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT 98 (1972) (providing a description of police “fear [of] black people” and the fact 
that some “openly express violent hostility and prejudice toward them”).  
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government for one of their most fundamental needs.132  This is especially 
so considering the various recent episodes in which the state or its agents 
have earned the continuing distrust of Black people.133  
                                                                                                                          
132 This is not to deny that the choices posed during some of the darkest days of the freedom 
struggle provoked a similar irony.  This is evident in Herbert Shapiro’s characterization of Walter 
White’s 1929 lynching study as “[r]eflecting a sense of urgency coupled with confidence in white 
liberalism.”  SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 197.  White decried the horror of the lynch mob but considered 
the incremental changes in public opinion and development of a stronger liberal coalition against 
lynching to be of immense importance.  Id. at 197–98.  White credited a variety of such organizations 
with contributing to the anti-lynching effort including the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (an 
island of southern liberalism headquarter in Atlanta), the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, and 
the Fellowship of Reconciliation.  Id. at 198. 
133 See, e.g., William J. Barber, II et al., NAACP OF N.C., Stop the Epidemic of Police Shootings 
of African Americans! Joint Statement on Charlotte Police Shootings (June 2008), http:// 
http://carolinajustice.typepad.com/ncnaacp/2008/06/stop-the-epidem.html#more (describing a revision 
of a set of recommendations to address the issue of police-minority citizen contacts in light of the death 
of a twenty-one year old African American by a Charlotte police officer); Victoria Cherrie, NAACP 
Wants SBI to Look at Shootings, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 13, 2008), 
http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2008/06/13/45145/naacp-wants-sbi-to-look-at-shootings.html 
(explaining how NAACP leaders are pushing for legislation that would require the SBI to investigate 
all shootings that involve a police officer instead of having victims’ families request the external 
investigation); Charles Ellison, Tensions Persist in Portland Since Fatal Police Shooting of Unarmed 
Man, POLITIC365 (Sept. 6, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://politic365.com/2010/09/06/tensions-persist-in-
portland-since-fatal-police-shooting-of-unarmed-black-man/ (providing an overview of the actions 
considered against a Portland, Oregon police officer who shot and killed an unarmed black man); 
Nikole Hannah-Jones, Black Experience Propels Anger in Police Shooting of Aaron Campbell, 
OREGONIAN (Feb. 19, 2010, 8:26 PM), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2010/02/Black_ 
experience_propels_anger.html (“[M]any people in Portland are perplexed that large segments of 
Portland’s African American community see the shooting death of Aaron Campbell through a racial 
lens.  A white Portland police officer shot Campbell, an unarmed Black man, in the back during a 
confrontation at an apartment building.  Police and city leaders have come under intense criticism for 
confusion at the scene.  But Ingram and other African Americans who live here say the Campbell 
shooting cannot be seen as a singular incident: It confirms a deep-seated distrust of police and a fear 
that interaction with them has the potential to turn violent.”); Howard Witt, Race May Be Factor in 
Police Shooting of Unarmed Elderly Man, CHI. TRIBUNE (Mar. 13, 2009), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-race-shootings-webmar13,0,7686526.story 
(“Throat cancer had robbed the 73-year-old retired electric utility worker of his voice years ago, but 
family members said Monroe was clearly enjoying the commotion of a dozen of his grandchildren and 
great-grandchildren cavorting around him in the dusty, grassless yard.  Then the Homer police showed 
up, two white officers whose arrival caused the participants at the black family gathering to quickly fall 
silent.  Within moments, Monroe lay dead, shot by one of the officers as his family looked on.  Now 
the Louisiana State Police, the FBI and the U.S. Justice Department are swarming over this 
impoverished lumber town of 3,800, drawn by the allegations of numerous witnesses that police killed 
an unarmed, elderly Black man without justification—and then moved a gun to make it look like the 
man had been holding it.  ‘We are closely monitoring the events in Homer,’ said Donald Washington, 
the U.S. attorney for the Western District of Louisiana.  ‘I understand that a number of allegations are 
being made that, if true, would be serious enough for us to follow up on very quickly.’  Yet the Feb. 20 
Homer incident was not an isolated case.  Across the nation, in four cases in recent months, white 
police officers have been accused of unprovoked shootings of African Americans in what civil rights 
leaders say are illustrations of the potentially deadly consequences of racial profiling by police.  In the 
mostly white Houston suburb of Bellaire, a 23-year-old Black man sitting in his own SUV in the 
driveway of his parents’ home was shot and wounded on New Year’s Eve by police who mistakenly 
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The next section shows that this contradiction is not just an abstraction.  
Long experience with state failure has produced very explicit and direct 
Black support for armed self-defense in both practice and policy.  
III.  TRADITIONAL PRACTICE AND POLICY 
This Part examines the Black community’s traditional approach to gun 
ownership and armed self-defense and shows that the modern orthodoxy 
contradicts traditional practice and policy.  Section A details the tradition 
of Black ownership and deployment of arms for legitimate self-defense.   
Section B shows how that tradition translated into policy through the 
development and maintenance of a strategic dichotomy that insisted on the 
legitimacy of private self-defense while condemning political violence. 
A. The Traditional Practice and Advocacy of Firearms Ownership and 
Armed Self-Defense 
Previous scholarship has argued that the “racist roots” of many gun 
control laws are cause for apprehension about gun control in the modern 
era.134  The  modern orthodoxy responds that things have changed and in 
many ways that is uncontestable.  But there is a separate component to this 
story that increases the burden on the modern orthodoxy.  There is a robust 
tradition of direct support for firearms ownership and armed self-defense in 
the Black Community.  That tradition poses a separate burden of 
explanation and reconciliation on the modern orthodoxy.  
On the heels of the Civil War the nascent Black establishment pressed 
hard for the freedmens’ civil right to keep and bear arms.  In stark contrast 
to the modern era, they were joined by white progressives who saw the 
denial of Blacks’ right to keep and bear arms for self-defense as continuing 
                                                                                                                          
believed he had stolen the vehicle.  The case is under investigation.  In Oakland, a transit police officer 
has been charged with murder for allegedly shooting an unarmed black man in the back while he was 
restrained and lying face down on a train platform on New Year’s Day. . . .The evidence is not merely 
anecdotal.  The most recent national analysis from the Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics 
shows that blacks and Hispanics were nearly three times as likely as whites to be searched by police—
and blacks were almost four times as likely as whites to be subjected to the use of force.”). 
134 See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward an Afro-
Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 318–19 (1991) (providing an examination of how 
Second Amendment rights have been shaped within “subcultures in American society who have been 
less able to rely on state protection”); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, “Never Intended to 
Be Applied to the White Population”: Firearms Regulation and Racial Disparity—The Redeemed 
South’s Legacy to a National Jurisprudence?, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1307, 1309 (1995) (exploring the 
extent to which white Southerners tried to restrict Blacks’ access to guns, even after the enactment of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Clayton E. Cramer, The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 17, 17 (1995) (arguing that the historical record reveals a long line of racism underlying gun 
control laws as “useful for keeping blacks and Hispanics ‘in their place’ and for quieting the racial fears 
of whites”). 
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infringement of the basic rights of citizenship.135  The Black press reflected 
the sentiments of the community.  The African Methodist Episcopal 
Church editorialized in the Christian Recorder: 
The Charleston (S.C.) Leader says: We have several times 
alluded to the fact that the Constitution of the United States, 
guaranties to every citizen the right to keep and bear arms.  
Gen. Tilson, Assistant Commissioner, for Georgia has issued 
a circular in which he clearly defines the right. . . . “Any 
person, white or black, may be disarmed, if convicted of 
making an improper and dangerous use of weapons; but no 
military or civil officer has the right or authority to disarm 
any class of people, thereby placing them at the mercy of 
others.  All men, without the distinction of color, have the 
right to keep arms to defend their homes, families or 
themselves.”   
We are glad to learn that Gen. Scott, Commissioner for this 
State, has given freedmen to understand that they have as 
good a right to keep firearms as other citizens.136 
A Black state convention petition to Congress strikes a similar cord.   
We ask that, inasmuch as the Constitution of the United 
States explicitly declares that the right to keep and bear arms 
shall not be infringed . . . that the late efforts of the 
Legislature of this State to pass and act to deprive us or [sic] 
arms be forbidden, as a plain violation of the Constitution.137 
Practice among the budding black intellectual class suggests that 
interest in the right to keep and bear firearms was more than philosophical.  
By the mid-1880’s, with lynchings on the rise and even incidental 
interracial encounters potentially hazardous, “[m]any [Fisk] students went 
about armed when they left campus to go into [Nashville].138  Coming of 
age a generation later, storied black writer Zora Neal Hurston, in a similar 
assessment of her environment, “packed a chrome plated pistol” as she 
traveled throughout the south collecting Negro folktales.139  
Racist terrorism that wrested political power from North Carolina 
blacks in the 1898 election raised the public call for black self-defense.  At 
a protest rally at the Fifth Avenue Baptist Church in Washington, D.C., 
                                                                                                                          
135 See, e.g., Cramer, Johnson & Mocsary, supra note 23, at 831 (describing the concerns about 
disarmament of freedmen animating reconstruction era legislation and the Fourteenth Amendment).  
136 Editorial, Right to Bear Arms, CHRISTIAN RECORDER, Feb. 24, 1866, at 29–30. 
137 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE BLACK STATE CONVENTIONS, 1840–1865, at 302 (Philip S. Foner & 
George E. Walker eds., 1980). 
138 LEWIS, supra note 31, at 67. 
139 VALERIE BOYD, WRAPPED IN RAINBOWS: THE LIFE OF ZORA NEALE HURSTON 144–45 (2003). 
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Colonel Perry Carson urged blacks to “[p]repare to protect yourselves; the 
virtues of your women and your property.  Get your powder and your shot 
and your pistol.”140  The Washington Post expressed alarm that so sensible 
a man as Carson had voiced such sentiments.141 
Public statements by Black clergy and newsmen reflected the power of 
the self-defense impulse, even where there was little hope of prevailing.  In 
the Cleveland Gazette, Reverend C. O. Benjamin celebrated the heroism of 
a Black man in Mississippi who resisted his white assailants.  “The Negros 
should stand like men . . . if the White man uses the torch and the 
assassin’s knife let the Negro do the same.”142  Speaking before the Afro-
American Press Association in 1901, W.A. Pledger of the Atlanta Age 
advised that whites “are afraid to lynch us where they know the black man 
is standing behind the door with a Winchester.”143 
The importance of armed self-defense was not lost on young Walter 
White, later the famous spokesman for the NAACP.  During the Atlanta 
riots, with a mob encroaching, thirteen-year-old Walter waited with his 
father, gun in hand, at the front windows of their home on Huston Street.144  
Someone in the crowd shouted, “That’s where that nigger mail carrier 
lives.  Let’s burn it down!  It’s too nice for a nigger to live in.”145  White’s 
father calmed him, “Son, don’t shoot until the first man puts his foot on the 
lawn and then—don’t you miss!”146  Shots from a nearby building 
dispersed the crowd before White had to fire, but the episode was seared in 
his memory and cemented his Negro identity.147 
During the bleak days of the lynch era, “[p]ractically all outspoken 
Afro-American leaders . . . advocated self-defense on some level.”148  
Prominent Black editor Thomas Fortune explained, “‘We do not counsel a 
breach of the law, but in the absence of law . . . we maintain that the 
individual has every right . . . to protect himself. . . . We do not counsel 
violence, . . . we counsel manly retaliation.’”149   
                                                                                                                          
140 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 77. 
141 See id. (stating that Carson’s remarks were clearly not “taken lightly” since the Washington 
Post expressed its “alarm and surprise” in an editorial). 
142 Id. at 78.  
143 TIMOTHY B. TYSON, RADIO FREE DIXIE: ROBERT F. WILLIAMS AND THE ROOTS OF BLACK 
POWER 211 (1999) (quoting “Bad Nigger with a Winchester”: Colored Editors Declare for Armed 
Resistance to Lynch Law, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1901, at 4). 
144 See WALTER WHITE, A MAN CALLED WHITE:  THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WALTER WHITE 10–
12 (1948) (describing White’s childhood experience with a mob that was threatening the family home). 
145 Id. at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
146 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
147 Id. at 12. 
148 CHRISTOPHER B. STRAIN, PURE FIRE: SELF-DEFENSE AS ACTIVISM IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA 
20 (2005). 
149 Emma Lou Thornbrough, T. Thomas Fortune: Militant Editor in the Age of Accommodation, 
in BLACK LEADERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 19, 22–23 (John Hope Franklin & August Meier 
eds., 1982). 
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Observing that “lynchings had been prevented by armed self-defense 
in Jacksonville, Florida and Paducah, Kentucky,”150 Ida B. Wells Barnett 
famously advised, “The lesson this teaches and which every Afro-
American should ponder well, is that a Winchester rifle should have a 
place of honor in every Black home.”151  Wells said, “[I]t should be used 
for that protection which the law refuses to give.”152  This was no mere 
flash of rhetoric.  Wells was personally armed at least as early as 1892 
when she “bought a pistol the first thing after Tom Moss was lynched.”153   
W.E.B. Du Bois’s views can be discerned from his work as editor of 
the Crisis.154  But his actions in response to the 1906 Atlanta riot are also 
telling.  The riot occurred while Du Bois was away in Alabama.155  
Although Du Bois knew that many people owned and carried pistols, he 
had never purchased or carried one.156  After the riot, Du Bois revealed, “‘I 
bought a Winchester double-barreled shotgun and two dozen rounds of 
shells filled with buckshot.  If a white mob had stepped on the campus 
where I lived I would without hesitation have sprayed their guts over the 
grass.’”157  
There were no illusions that armed self-defense offered any sort of 
guarantee.  This is evident in Tuskegee Institute President Robert Moton’s 
1919 letter to President Woodrow Wilson lamenting the “‘account of the 
lynching in Georgia, of an old coloured man seventy years of age who shot 
one of two intoxicated white men in his attempt to protect two coloured 
girls, who had been commanded to come out of their home in the night by 
these two men.’”158   
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Some of the earliest efforts of the NAACP were in support of 
individuals prosecuted for acts of armed self-defense. 
The NAACP undertook its first major legal case in 1910 by 
defending Pink Franklin, a Black South Carolina 
sharecropper accused of murder.  When Franklin left his 
employer after receiving an advance on his wages, a warrant 
was sworn out for his arrest under an invalid state law.  
Armed policemen arrived at Franklin’s cabin before dawn to 
serve the warrant without stating their purpose and a gun 
battle ensued, killing one officer.  Franklin was convicted of 
the murder and sentenced to death.  The NAACP appealed to 
South Carolina Governor Martin F. Ansel, and Franklin’s 
sentence was commuted to life in prison.  Eventually, he was 
set free in 1919.159 
In 1919, the NAACP defended Sergeant Edgar C. Caldwell, who was 
prosecuted for killing a street car conductor in Anniston, Alabama.160  
Following a dispute, Caldwell was kicked from the car.  As he was getting 
up, the conductor and the motorman advanced with weapons in their 
hands.  Caldwell drew his revolver and killed the conductor and wounded 
the motorman.  Leaders of the Anniston Branch of the NAACP, supported 
by the national office and an array of lawyers, defended Caldwell, but 
ultimately to no avail.  He was executed on July 30, 1920.161  An editorial 
in the Crisis concluded, “No person who is conversant with the facts in his 
case feels that [Caldwell] was guilty of a crime when he fought to save his 
own life.  No red-blooded person would have done otherwise.  Caldwell 
has been sacrificed on the altar of prejudice.”162 
The NAACP’s biggest case in the 1920’s was the defense of Dr. 
Ossian Sweet, and several family members.163  They were charged with 
murder for killing a member of a mob that attacked their home in a white 
suburb of Detroit.  Shortly after the Sweets moved in the mob gathered.  
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On two successive nights the mob rocked the house and broke out 
windows.  On the second night shots were fired.164  The Sweets fired into 
the crowd, killing a white man.165  All twelve people in the house were 
charged with murder.166  The NAACP raised over seventy thousand dollars 
to support the case167 and hired Clarence Darrow and Arthur Garfield Hays 
to defend the Sweets.168  The Sweets were tried twice and ultimately found 
not guilty.169  
The New York Amsterdam News gave “all out support to upholding the 
right of self-defense,”170 and called the Sweet case the “most important 
court case the Negro has ever figured in in all the history of the United 
States.”171  Editorials urged that the willingness of the Sweet family to 
defend its home represented the spirit “the Negro must more and more 
evidence if he is to survive.”172  
Hubert H. Harrison’s public declaration in 1921 is equally explicit.173  
“I advise you to be ready to defend yourselves.  I notice that the State 
Government has removed some of its restrictions upon owing firearms, and 
one form of live insurance for your wives and children might be the 
possession of some of these handy implements.”174      
During the same period, Tuskegee Institute President, Dr. Robert 
Moton, successor to the conservative legacy of Booker T. Washington, 
took up arms when Tuskegee was menaced by the Klan.175  After the 
Federal government decided to build a Negro veterans hospital on land 
donated by Tuskegee, local whites and the KKK sought control of the 
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enterprise and its jobs.176  When Blacks objected, the Klan paraded through 
Tuskegee and then held a rally on the grounds.177  Walter White’s brother, 
George, passing for white, gained access to the event and learned of plans 
to kill Moton and torch the campus in order to force surrender of control 
over the hospital.178  As the conflict boiled, Walter White traveled to 
Tuskegee and found an extraordinary change in Dr. Moton.179 
He was gentle man who hated conflict and violence.  
Although he had incurred sharp criticism and even bitter 
resentment for doing so, he had urged upon Negro soldiers in 
France that they win the war first and then rely on gratitude 
from their government for the abolition of injustices and 
indignities.  But the brazen attitude of the Ku Klux Klan and 
the . . . threats to destroy Tuskegee Institute marked a turning 
point in Dr. Moton’s philosophy.  I sat with him in his home 
at Tuskegee during the height of the trouble.  He pointed to a 
rifle and a shotgun, well oiled and grimly businesslike, that 
stood in the corner of the room.  Although his words in cold 
print may sound overheroic, they did not sound so to me as 
he said quietly, “I’ve got only one time to die. If I must die 
now to save Tuskegee Institute, I’m ready.  I’ve been running 
long enough.”180 
In the 1930s, Northern organizers supporting the Sharecropper’s Union 
in Alabama181 found that the armed sharecropper was the norm.  At a 
meeting in Dadeville, Alabama, organizer Harry Haywood witnessed “a 
small arsenal. . . . There were guns . . . of all kinds—shotguns, rifles and 
pistols.”182  
In 1939, John Lovell, Jr., Secretary of the Washington D.C. branch of 
the NAACP commented on the efforts of a “militant Howard Professor” 
who had moved into a restricted Washington D.C. neighborhood.   
He was told to get out and get out fast.  When he failed to 
comprehend the warning, his new home was given a 
battering.  Others reported the matter to the police; the 
professor merely took the pains to build a barricado that even 
the Japanese would respect. . . . One [of his friends] got his 
guns together and installed himself in the barricado.  The 
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two, fortified further by sandwiches and milk, quietly sat, 
watched and waited.  [Others] sent word . . . that when help 
was needed, help would come.  Evidently they got [the 
message] over to the enemy, for absolutely nothing happened 
after that.183 
Later in the struggle, Dr. T.R.M. Howard emerged as an unapologetic 
advocate of armed self-defense.  His education paid for by a white sponsor, 
Howard returned to the South in the early 1940s.  “From the beginning, 
armed self-defense was an important component of Howard’s civil rights 
strategy.  In this respect, he followed in a long tradition that later found 
expression under the leadership of Robert Williams . . . and various civil 
rights activists in the Deep South.”184  When Howard was denied a permit 
to carry a concealed weapon under the racist administration of 
Mississippi’s discretionary permit system, he exploited the allowance for 
unconcealed weapons and kept a long gun in a rack in his car.185 also 
claimed to have a secret compartment built into his car to hide his 
handgun.186   
In a long career of activism, Howard is most noted for his efforts 
surrounding the investigation of the Emmett Till murder.  Howard helped 
search for witnesses, develop evidence and opened his home as a safe 
haven for journalists, witnesses and visitors during the trial.187 
Firearms were ubiquitous, including a pistol strapped to 
Howard’s waist.  When Cloyte Murdock of Ebony had 
difficulty getting her luggage through the front door, she 
looked around the corner and saw a cache of weapons on the 
other side.  Another visitor spied a magnum pistol and .45 at 
the head of Howard’s bed, a Thompson submachine gun at 
the foot and “a long gun, a shotgun or rifle, in every corner of 
every room.”  Each day, Howard escorted [Maime] Bradley 
[Till’s mother] and [Representative Charles] Diggs [of 
Michigan] . . . to . . . the trial . . . in an armed car caravan.188 
Some contend that the acquittal of the men charged with Till’s murder 
marked “the beginning of the Civil Rights Movement in Mississippi.”189  
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Howard was propelled onto the national stage.190  In speeches and 
commentary, Howard presented armed self-defense as an essential private 
resource.  On several public occasions Howard recounted the story of his 
friend George L. Jefferson, head of the Vicksburg NAACP.  The Klan had 
burned a cross in front of Jefferson’s funeral home.  According to Howard, 
Jefferson called to alert the Sheriff that some of the logistics of Jim Crow 
required tending: 
[T]hey have burned a cross in front of my funeral home.  I’m 
sure that you and everybody in Vicksburg knows where my 
wife and my family lives.  I understand that they are going 
out there to burn a cross.  And, Mr. Sheriff, I just want to tell 
you that Mississippi laws requires [sic] separate ambulances 
for transportation of colored and white persons and inasmuch 
as the white hearse can’t carry a colored man or a colored 
hearse can’t carry a white man, I’m telling you that when that 
group comes out my home to burn a cross, I have already got 
my colored ambulance standing by.  I want you to send a 
white hearse along because somebody’s going to be hauled 
away.191 
The punch line, rendered “[t]o loud applause” by Black audiences, was 
that no cross was burned at Jefferson’s home.192  The white establishment 
was less enthused.  The Jackson Daily News reprinted the full text of 
Howard’s speech, and in three separate editorials condemned his 
“incendiary” language and his “[p]oison [t]ongue.”193  
In other contexts, members of the leadership benefitted from the self-
defense preparations of the rank and file who had organized to protect their 
communities.  Describing her work with Thurgood Marshall to integrate 
the University of Alabama, Judge Constance Baker Motley recalls: 
When Autherine Lucy registered in February 1956 and was 
finally on campus, a riot broke out . . . . We then went to 
court with a motion to hold the dean of admissions and 
members of the board of trustees in contempt for failing to 
secure Miss Lucy’s peaceful attendance. . . . While in 
Birmingham for this hearing, we stayed in Arthur Shores’s 
spacious new home on the city’s outskirts.  This house had 
been bombed on several occasions, but because we could not 
stay in a hotel or motel in Birmingham, we had to take up 
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Shores’s offer of his bomb-prone abode . . . .   
When Thurgood and I arrived, the garage door was wide 
open.  Inside were six or eight Black men with shotguns and 
machine guns who had been guarding the house since the last 
bombing. . . . When we went to court the next day, the driver 
of our car and one other man in the front passenger seat 
carried guns in their pockets.194  
Judge Motley’s experience was no aberration.  After Autherine Lucy 
was pelted with eggs and gravel as she walked the gauntlet trying to attend 
her first class, she retreated to a salon in the Black part of town where 
beauticians washed her hair and cleaned her clothes.195  As a white mob 
gathered outside, the owner of the shop, Nathaniel Howard, Sr., called for 
help and a group of Black men armed with rifles and shotguns quickly 
arrived.196  This show of force dispersed the crowd.  The Black men then 
gave Lucy an armed escort to Birmingham.197 
In Birmingham, Reverend Fred Shuttlesworth, a leader of the freedom 
movement there, enjoyed armed protection of the “Civil Rights Guards” 
after being threatened and attacked by white racists.198  After the 1963 
bombing of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church in Birmingham killed four 
little girls, residents of the community of black strivers known as 
“Dynamite Hill” set up a community guard system where “[a]rmed blacks 
regularly patrolled their neighborhood.”199  Birmingham native, former 
Secretary of State, and Second Amendment absolutist Condoleezza Rice 
recalls the night in 1963 when a bomb was hurled through the window of a 
house down the block from her home.  Her family fled temporarily to the 
home of friends in a neighboring town.200  When they returned home late 
that night,  
Daddy [Reverend Rice] didn’t say anything more about the 
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bomb.  He just went outside and sat on the porch in the 
springtime heat with his gun on his lap.  He sat there all night 
looking for white night riders.  Eventually daddy and the men 
of the neighborhood formed a watch.  They would take shifts 
at the head of the two entrances to our streets.  There was a 
formal schedule, and Daddy would move among them to 
pray with them and keep their spirits up.  Occasionally they 
would fire a gun into the air to scare off intruders, but they 
never actually shot anyone.201 
A similar defense squad was formed by war veterans in Tuscaloosa, 
Alabama.  The Tuscaloosa defense squad protected the homes of 
movement activists, rescued teenage demonstrators from a mob, and 
repelled a Klan attack.202   
While the Deacons for Defense and Justice203 are the most widely 
known, movement leaders in a variety of other places benefitted from the 
organization and activities of armed defense groups.  In Natchez, 
Mississippi, armed men of the community guarded local NAACP leader 
George Metcalf.204  In Meridian, Mississippi, a defense group guarded the 
home of NAACP leader Claude Bryant.205  In Hattiesburg, Mississippi, 
armed community men led by army veteran James Nix guarded the homes 
of local black leaders Dr. C. E. Smith and J. C. Fairly.206  In Cambridge, 
Maryland, several seasons of black protest fueled a backlash in 1963 when 
white mobs roved through the city’s black neighborhoods.  Black residents 
responded with gunfire and a defense guard formed to protect the home of 
local leader Gloria Richardson.207  Also in 1963, Korean War Veteran and 
NAACP activist Robert Hayling organized a defense squad in St. 
Augustine, Florida.  Hayling’s voter registration efforts and protests of 
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continuing segregation prompted shotgun attacks on his home.  He 
responded by buying a cache of rifles and shotguns and organizing a group 
to guard his home and the surrounding neighborhood.208  In October 1963 
when a carload of Klansmen assaulted local activist Goldie Eubanks, the 
defense squad repelled the attack and killed one white man.209   
But this is not primarily a story of organized defense groups. 
Movement leaders, as well as the rank and file, prepared for the fact that 
often they would be solely responsible for their own safety.  In South 
Carolina, a solitary Reverend J. A. Delaine fired back with effect when 
white terrorists shot up his home.210  The home of local activist Amzie 
Moore of Cleveland, Mississippi, who mentored younger activists who 
would rise to form the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee 
(“SNCC”), was well-stocked with arms and ammunition.  Not only was his 
home well-fortified, “like most politically active Blacks in the Delta,” 
Moore carried a gun when he traveled.211  A young white activist spending 
the night at Moore’s home was startled when Moore placed a pistol on the 
night table and suggested that he and his friends use it “in case of 
emergency.”212 
E.W. Steptoe, chairman of the Amite County NAACP “never went out 
of the door unarmed”213 recollects one SNCC worker.   Another recalled: 
“Steptoe was always so wonderfully well armed. . . . It was just marvelous. 
. . . You’d go to Steptoe’s and as you went to bed he would open up the 
night table [and] there would be a large .45 automatic sitting next to you.  
Just guns all over the house, under pillows, under chairs.”214  
Rosa Parks verified the tradition of defensive firearms ownership she 
first observed as a child:  
By the time I was six, I was old enough to realize that we 
were not actually free.  The Ku Klux Klan was riding 
through the Black community, burning churches, beating up 
people, killing people. . . . [M]y grandfather kept his gun—a 
doubled barreled shotgun—close by at all times. . . . I 
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remember thinking that whatever happened, I wanted to see 
it.  I wanted to see him shoot that gun.215   
Her adult experience confirms that the tradition remained vibrant.  When 
Parks and her husband began organizing activist meetings at their home the 
participants were unfailingly armed.  Parks recalled: “This was the first 
time I’d seen so few men with so many guns.”216  After one meeting where 
Parks had not thought to offer food, she realized: “[W]ith the table so 
covered with guns, I don’t know where I would have put any 
refreshments.”217 
When the Freedom Summer project brought white volunteers to 
Mississippi, “local activists used their guns to defend themselves, their 
communities, and the volunteers they housed.”218  In some areas “a 
majority of African-Americans . . . protected their property with guns.  
Volunteers were required to honk a prearranged signal before approaching 
Black farms.  If they failed to do so, Black guards were likely to fire at 
their car.”219  Consistent with the experience of northern labor organizers 
thirty years earlier, SNCC workers in the modern movement found Black 
sharecroppers in Alabama to be armed and unapologetic advocates of self-
defense.220  
Although some civil rights scholars have characterized the 
substantially male character of Black self-defense during the era as a  
“gendered symbol of defiance,”221 Black women readily used guns to 
defend themselves and others during the freedom struggle.  During the 
Freedom Summer project, one student volunteer was shocked to find that 
her host, “Mrs. Fairly was armed to the teeth”. In a letter home the student 
wrote,  “I met Mrs. Fairly coming down the hall from the front porch 
carrying a rifle in one hand [and] a pistol in the other.”222  In 1965, in 
Bogalusa, Louisiana, the wife of local activist Robert Hicks used her pistol 
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to fend off Klansmen who had followed a CORE worker to her home.223  
In nearby Ferriday, another woman “returned fire when a group of 
Klansmen shot into her home.”224  
When asked how she survived so many years of racist aggression, 
movement stalwart Fannie Lou Hamer responded, “I’ll tell you why.  I 
keep a shotgun in every corner of my bedroom and the first cracker even 
look like he wants to throw some dynamite on my porch won’t write his 
mama again.”225  In this approach, Hamer followed the example of her 
mother, Lou Ella Townsend, who as a field worker at the turn of the 
century had been threatened and raped several times.226  Unbowed, 
Townsend continued to challenge the culture of racism and carried a pistol 
hidden in a bucket while working in the cotton fields.227  
In the turmoil of integrating the Little Rock school system, armed 
Black men guarded the home of activist Daisy Bates228 and “[o]n one 
occasion in 1958, the NAACP leader herself repelled an invader with a 
volley of gunshots.”229  Firearms were a familiar tool.  “In 1934 Daisy and 
L.C. were stopped by the police in Monroe, Louisiana [and] arrested 
 . . . on a charge of ‘investigation.’ . . . [But police] had nothing more on 
[L.C.] than the fact that he was carrying a pistol in his glove 
compartment.”230  In this, L.C. Bates’ channeled both community and 
family tradition.  “At the end of his life [Bates] said his idol had been . . . 
his grandfather in Mississippi, who had shot a white man who [assaulted 
                                                                                                                          
223 Wendt, Protection or Path, supra note 218, at 324. 
224 Id. 
225 Fannie Lou Hamer, To Praise Our Bridges, in 2 MISSISSIPPI WRITERS: REFLECTIONS OF 
CHILDHOOD AND YOUTH 321, 324 (Dorothy Abbott ed., 1986).  Hamer was not always alone in this 
regard.  Len Edwards recounted the days shortly after the Williams Chapel Church—adjacent to 
Hamer’s home—was firebombed.  Following a call threatening that Hamer would be killed that night, 
activists took Hamer to a neighbor’s house and “got shotguns and waited for the cars to drive by.”  
MILLS, supra note 122, at 101. 
226 WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 121. 
227 Id. 
228 Wendt, Protection or Path, supra note 218, at 321–22. 
229 Id. at 322; see also GRIF STOCKLEY, DAISY BATES: CIVIL RIGHTS CRUSADER FROM 
ARKANSAS 186 (2005) (“[W]hen [Bates] and L. C., roused by the sound of a rock crashing into a 
window, came outside, she saw a man poised to throw again.  In all, she said she fired five shots at  
him . . . .”).  Grif Stockley adds texture to the image of Bates’ shooting in self-defense:  
[S]he shaped the story to fit . . . the image she wished to project. . . . [W]hen Bates 
spoke at churches, she became a bit more saintly.  She would say in the future that 
she and L. C. never aimed at anyone, knowing if they shot one of their white 
harassers what kind of trouble she would be buying.   
Id. at 186–87.  
230 STOCKLEY, supra note 229, at 24 (internal parentheses omitted). 
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two of his workers].”231  Daisy Bates underscores the point in a 1959 letter 
to Thurgood Marshall explaining that she and L. C. were under continuing 
threat and “keep ‘Old Betsy’ well oiled and the guards are always on the 
alert.”232  This would not have surprised Marshall, who found the Bates’ 
home “an armed camp” when he stayed there in September 1957 while 
litigating the Little Rock School Board’s delay of court ordered 
integration.233 
In the early stages of his activism, Martin Luther King showed a keen 
appreciation for the self-defense impulse.  On January 30, 1956, about two 
months into the Montgomery bus boycott, King’s house was bombed.234  
Arriving home to find his wife and daughter unharmed and probably a 
hundred angry, armed black men in front of the parsonage, King sent the 
men away.235  But the next day he applied for a pistol permit at the sheriff’s 
office.236  After his application was rejected and following a bombing of 
the home of Montgomery NAACP leader E.D. Nixon, members of King’s 
Dexter Avenue Baptist Church resolved to protect him.237  “[They] brought 
guns and ammunition to the parsonage . . . and began guarding the house in 
shifts.”238 
Arriving at King’s home to assist in the local struggle, Bayard Rustin 
recalled that the parsonage was “a virtual garrison.”239 When Rustin’s 
friend, journalist William Worthy sat down on a pistol lying in a chair, 
King assured the men that the weapons were only defensive precautions.240  
Reverend Glenn Smiley, of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, visited Dr. 
King’s home in 1956 and reported back to his employer:   
[King] had Gandhi in mind when this thing started . . . . [He 
was] aware of the dangers to him inwardly, wants to do it 
right, but is too young and some of his close help is violent.  
King accepts, as an example, a body guard, and asked for a 
permit for them to carry guns.  This was denied by the police, 
but nevertheless, the place is an arsenal.  King sees the 
inconsistency, but not enough.  He believes and yet he 
                                                                                                                          
231 See id. at 27 (“[A]t the end of his life [Bates] said his idol had been . . . his grandfather in 
Mississippi, who had shot a white man who was about to use a stick to hit two boys who were guarding 
his watermelon patch.”). 
232 TYSON, supra note 143,  at 153. 
233 STOCKLEY, supra note 229, at 128, 132. 
234 WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 8. 
235 Id. at 8–9. 
236 Id. at 9. 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 Id.  
240 Interview with Bayard Rustin, in MY SOUL IS RESTED: MOVEMENT DAYS IN THE DEEP SOUTH 
REMEMBERED 52, 53 (Howell Raines ed., 1977). 
 2013] FIREARMS POLICY AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY 1531 
doesn’t believe.  The whole movement is armed in a sense, 
and this is what I must convince him to see as the greatest 
evil.241   
King, of course, became a leading advocate of nonviolent political 
action.242  But as we will see, he still did not consider movement 
nonviolence to be incompatible with private self-defense.243 
Charles Evers, who succeeded his murdered brother Medgar as Field 
Secretary of the Mississippi NAACP,244 writes candidly about members of 
the Mississippi movement deploying firearms in the context of imminent 
threats and state failure.  Immediately following Medgar’s murder, Aaron 
Henry retained an armed guard after being denied police protection.245  
Police then arrested the guard and confiscated his gun.246  “That made the 
Negroes of Clarksdale so mad they gave Aaron guns enough for ten 
lifetimes.”247    
During a particularly turbulent period in 1964, Evers wrote, “I kept a 
gun in every corner of every room of my house. . . . I felt whites would 
probably get me, but not like they had Medgar—not in the back, with no 
return fire.”248  In this, Charles Evers followed the path of his father, who 
in 1935 provoked the wrath of Mississippi racists by violating the custom 
of “No niggers allowed in Decatur [Mississippi] around Christmas.”249  
After his defiance led to an altercation with a white man, Jim Evers, his 
sons, Medgar and Charles, and two neighbors determined, “We better set 
up tonight.”250  With rifles deployed, they “set up a crisscross” and waited 
for an attack that thankfully never came.251 
Charles Evers was not dissuaded by the fact that being armed was no 
guarantee of security.  A willingness to deploy private firearms plainly had 
not prevented his brother from being murdered.  Medgar had followed the 
                                                                                                                          
241 ADAM FAIRCLOUGH, TO REDEEM THE SOUL OF AMERICA: THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN 
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE AND MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 24–25 (1987) (emphasis added); Stewart 
Burns, Overview: The Proving Ground, in DAY BREAK OF FREEDOM: THE MONTGOMERY BUS 
BOYCOTT 22–23 (Stewart Burns ed., 1997). 
242 See infra Part II.B. (discussing King’s argument that political goals were best achieved by non-
violence). 
243 See infra Part II.B. (explaining how Martin Luther King viewed violence in self-defense as 
distinct from nonviolence for political goals). 
244 EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 147. 
245 Id. at 137. 
246 Id. 
247 Id. 
248 Id. at 171. 
249 Id. at 16; see also JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN 
MISSISSIPPI 1 (1995) (recounting a story of Charles and Medgar Evans being turned away by a crowd 
of whites at a polling place and then returning with their guns). 
250 EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 17. 
251 Id. 
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practice of his mentor and employer, Dr. T.R.M. Howard.  Ruby Hurley, 
NAACP Youth Program Director recalls, “[m]any times when Medgar and 
I would be driving together, Medgar would tell about carrying his gun. . . . 
He used to sit on it, under his pillow.”252  Medgar’s wife, Myrlie, later 
recounted, that the family “had guns in every room of our house.  I slept 
with a small revolver  next to me on the nightstand.  He slept with a rifle 
next to him.  We had one in the hall, we had one in the front room.”253  
Medgar’s murder shows that having a gun is no guarantee of safety and 
some will argue only introduces new dangers in the sense that Black self-
defenders who survived attacks often were left to deal with racist local 
authorities.254  But none of this diminished the Evers’ resolve to arm 
themselves for self-defense.255  
These and many other episodes show a practical and intimate 
appreciation within the black community for the principle and practice of 
armed self-defense.  So it should be no surprise that, as a matter of policy 
and philosophy, blacks from the leadership to the grassroots insisted upon 
the legitimacy of private self-defense by distinguishing it from political 
violence, and defended this distinction even at the risk that it would 
impede the freedom movement.  The next section details that effort. 
B.  The Strategic Dichotomy:  The Black Community Upholds Firearms 
Ownership and Armed Self-Defense as Policy 
Coalition politics and alliances with white progressives have played a 
major role in the black freedom struggle.256   This has posed a dilemma. 
Blacks have rightly worried that vital coalitions would unravel if the 
                                                                                                                          
252 Raines, supra note 240, at 271. 
253 HENRY HAMPTON ET AL., VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S, at 152 (1990); see also Interview by Orlando 
Bagwell with Myrlie Evers (Nov. 27, 1985), available at http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb/eve0015
.0753.036myrlieevers.html. 
254 See, e.g., WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 191 (relating story of a Black activist, 
who pursued the perpetrators of a shotgun attack on a civil rights meeting, then being arrested by police 
for carrying a concealed weapon, even though the gun was sitting in the open on the front seat, in 
compliance with Mississippi law).  
255 See EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 64, 154 (describing an incident where the Evers 
brothers brandished guns in public, and Charles Evers later having “guns everywhere”).  Compare the 
modern response of NRA Board Member, Roy Innis (who lost a son to gun violence) to Pete Shields 
founder of Handgun Control, Inc., (who lost a son to gun violence).  Compare Nelson T. Shields Dies; 
Gun Control Advocate, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1993, at D8, with Mr. Roy Innis, NRA BD. OF DIRS., 
http://nra.org/board/#INNIS (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).  Innis followed the Charles Evers approach.  
Shields and many others in the modern era have put their energy into gun control.  Nelson T. Shields 
Dies; Gun Control Advocate, supra.  
256 See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK INSURGENCY 
1930–1970, at 4, 40 (1982) (advocating the political process model of social movement theory as 
explanation for the insurgency of blacks in America, and noting “the political alignment of groups 
within the larger political environment” to be crucial in the generation of that social insurgency). 
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struggle became overtly violent.257  On the other hand, real world threats 
and state failure have made armed self-defense an essential private 
resource.258  In response to this dilemma, the black community developed 
and maintained a strategic dichotomy between private self-defense and 
collective political violence. 
Instinctively, we understand that minorities are unlikely to achieve 
group political goals through violence.  Absent some sort of technological 
or tactical advantage,259 collective violence is a dubious strategy for people 
who are outnumbered.  Private self-defense, however, is another matter.  It 
fits easily within the long tradition of self-help in the private realm that is 
not supplanted by group agendas.260 
On the other hand, the leadership has rightly worried that vital 
coalitions would unravel if the struggle became overtly violent or devolved 
into insurrection.  In response to this dilemma, blacks developed—and 
until relatively recently maintained—a crucial distinction between private 
self-defense and collective political violence. The development and 
defense of that strategic dichotomy and its conflict with the modern 
orthodoxy are the focus of this section.  
The strategic dichotomy is evident early on in the words and deeds of 
Henry Highland Garnet, a free black and Presbyterian minister in Troy, 
New York.261  His 1843 “Address to the Slaves of the United States,” at the 
National Colored Convention in Buffalo, was a call for open revolt.262  
Reports of the speech angered southerners, strained abolitionist alliances, 
and divided the delegates of the Convention.263  Many delegates feared 
retaliation when they returned home and considered Garnet’s advocacy of 
political violence entirely counterproductive.264  On the other hand, without 
                                                                                                                          
257 See WALDO E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 57 (1984) (discussing 
Frederick Douglass’s initial preference of “moral and peaceful” means over “radical” measures in 
attempting to abolish slavery). 
258 STRAIN, supra note 148, at 9, 16 (recognizing the inconsistent application of law by courts with 
regard to different races’ exercise of self-defense and the sentiment of abolitionists that armed response 
is appropriate when forced to protect civil liberties).   
259 See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES 74–80 
(1997) (describing the roles advanced technology, exploitation of political divisions, and speed of 
communication played in permitting a small number of Europeans to conquer an empire of native 
South Americans). 
260 See EDWARD PEEKS, THE LONG STRUGGLE FOR BLACK POWER 15 (1971) (“Although it is 
spotty and uneven in certain periods of the Negro struggle, the tradition [of self-help] is nonetheless a 
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261 PEEKS, supra note 260, at 43. 
262 See id. at 43–44 (detailing Garnet’s call for “every slave throughout the land” to “arise” and 
resist their “lordly enslavers”). 
263 Id. at 44. 
264 See id. at 44–45 (stating that in addition to personal retaliation, the Black delegates feared that 
“the nearly 400,000 free Negroes in the country” would suffer “further restrictions on what remained of 
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his earlier use of private violence in self-defense, Garnet’s life and 
activism might never have blossomed.  Attacked by a mob after attempting 
to integrate the Noyes Academy in New Hampshire, Garnet returned fire 
when a mobber shot into the house where he and other black students were 
barricaded.265  This staunched the attack and allowed the students to flee. A 
classmate reported, “Garnet doubtless saved our lives.”266   
Frederick Douglass articulated the danger of using political violence to 
advance black interests, taking issue with those who argued that blacks 
should take up arms in order to secure the vote.  He knew better than to 
dismiss the opposition as just “a few midnight assassins.”267  Political 
violence, he warned, would confront “trained armies, skilled generals of 
the Confederate army, and in the last resort we should have to meet the 
Federal army.”268    
Still, Douglass faced difficulty translating the entirely pacifist views of 
his early white allies into a message that would resonate for blacks.  
Douglass’s early mentor and fellow abolitionist, William Lloyd Garrison, 
considered all violence evil and thought moral suasion and non-resistance 
to be the only proper tools of reform.269  Douglass, however, acknowledged 
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265 Id. at 45. 
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267 4 LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDRICK DOUGLASS 491–523 (Philip S. Foner, ed., International 
1955). 
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269 See JOHN STAUFFER, GIANTS: THE PARALLEL LIVES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS & ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN 78 (2008) (discussing the Garrison-edited Liberator and its advocacy of nonviolence and 
moral suasion as influential to Douglass). 
While Douglass sought and depended on white alliances, fitting him into this model is 
complicated by the fact that his views changed over time.  Douglass developed under Garrison, whose 
evangelical abolitionism demanded nonviolence and even nonvoting.  See id. at 144 (describing the 
frustration of Black abolitionists with Garrison’s “insistence” on these two practices).  By the 1850s, 
Douglass had moved to a more radical abolitionism.  “Douglass and Radical Abolitionists . . . defined 
slavery as a state of war.  This meant that Congress and the president were obliged to free the slaves 
right now . . . . But since they did nothing, it was the ‘highest obligation’ of the people of the free states 
to make war on slavery in order to preserve the peace and save the Union.”  Id. at 156.  This was 
certainly more extreme than Garrison’s pacifism, but still different from black political violence under 
the strategic dichotomy in that it anticipated a national conflict whose combatants were primarily white. 
To a limited extent, however, Douglass did seem to advocate black political violence.  Following 
the Dred Scott decision, Douglass engaged with John Brown in planning a “Subterranean Pass Way”—
a more radical rendition of the Underground Railroad.  Id. at 158.  The plan was for a network of armed 
warriors to raid plantations and ferry fugitive slaves to Canada and thereby diminish the value of slave 
property in Maryland and Virginia.  Id. at 158–59.  Stephen Oates writes that Douglass was 
sympathetic to Brown’s Subterranean Pass Way as early as 1847.  See STEPHEN B. OATES, TO PURGE 
THIS LAND WITH BLOOD: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN BROWN 61–63 (1984) (describing a meeting between 
the two during which they discussed the Pass Way and “Douglass conceded that Brown’s plan had 
much to commend it” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Douglass drew the line, however, at large-
scale confrontations that would launch blacks into a doomed confrontation against white America.  
When John Brown supplanted the Subterranean Pass Way for an even grander plan to foment full-
blown insurrection through a raid on Harpers Ferry, Douglass refused Brown’s plea to join such raid, 
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the importance of individual self-defense in building his own early sense of 
self and commitment to attaining basic justice for blacks.270  Douglass 
found it “increasingly difficult . . . to express convictions plausible to most 
black folks yet consistent with Garrison.”271   
As blacks took up arms to resist the Fugitive Slave Act and the 
principles enshrined in Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution,272 
Douglass became an open advocate of armed resistance to slave catchers. 
In a speech in 1857, Douglass celebrated recent acts of armed self-defense:  
The fugitive Horace, at Mechanicsburg, Ohio, the other day, 
who taught the slave catchers from Kentucky that it was safer 
to arrest white men than to arrest him, did a most excellent 
service to our cause.  Parker and his noble band of fifteen at 
Christiana, who defended themselves from kidnappers with 
prayers and pistols, are entitled to the honor of making the 
first successful resistance to the Fugitive Slave Bill.  But for 
that resistance, and the rescue of Jerry, and Shadrack, the 
man-hunters would have hunted our hills and valleys, here 
with the same freedom with which they now hunt their own 
dismal swamps.273 
In response to the slave hunter, Douglass recommended “[a] good 
revolver, a steady hand, and a determination to shoot down any man 
attempting to kidnap.”274  Douglass’s praise of the utility of a good 
revolver was earnestly practical.  In 1851, in Christiana, Pennsylvania, 
                                                                                                                          
reasoning that an attack on the federal government “would array the whole country against us.”  
STAUFFER, supra note 269, at 160 (internal quotation marks omitted).  While Brown’s strategy seemed 
like folly, Douglass wrote subsequently, “I am ever ready to write, speak, publish, organize, combine, 
and even to conspire against slavery, when there is a reasonable hope for success.”  Id. at 165 (internal 
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continue to make within the strategic dichotomy.   
270 See MARTIN, JR., supra note 257, at 11, 13 (describing Douglass’s encounter with—and defeat 
of—Edward Covey, “the Negro Breaker” who had been hired to beat the insolence out of him, and his 
realization that “[i]t recalled to life my crushed self-respect, and my self-confidence, and inspired me 
with a renewed determination to be a free man” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Ronald T. 
Takaki, Not Afraid to Die: Frederick Douglass and Violence, in VIOLENCE IN THE BLACK 
IMAGINATION: ESSAYS AND DOCUMENTS 17, 22–23 (1993) (“Douglass’[s] act of violence liberated 
him psychologically.  It completed his rebellion against his slavish hatred of himself and his slavish 
fear . . . . In the process of violent struggle against the oppressor, [he] had . . . suddenly realized more 
deeply than ever before [a] sense of selfhood and consciousness of freedom . . . .”).  
271 STRAIN, supra note 148, at 13–14.  For a detailed treatment of the scholarship and divided 
views about Douglass’s position on violence means to abolition, see id. at 14. 
272 “No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into 
another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or 
Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.”  
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. 
273 Frederick Douglass, Speech on West India Emancipation (Aug. 4, 1857), in TWO SPEECHES BY 
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 3, 22–23 (C.P. Dewey ed., 1857). 
274 STRAIN, supra note 148, at 15. 
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escaped slaves and black and white abolitionists deployed revolvers, rifles, 
and shotguns to fight off slave catchers: 
The fugitive slaves escaped.  They ended up going across 
upstate New York.  Two of them ended up in Frederick 
Douglass’s house in Rochester, New York.  Douglass drove 
them personally in a carriage to the wharf on Lake Erie.  And 
when he bid them goodbye, one of them gave him the 
revolver that he had used at Christiana, a memento that 
Douglass kept the rest of his life.275 
While Douglass saw little promise in large-scale political violence,276 
he did not deny the potential for self-defense or preparation for it to have 
group benefits, acknowledging, “[t]he practice of carrying guns . . . would 
be a good one for the colored people to adopt, as it would give them a 
sense of their own manhood.”277  He further stated, “Every slave-hunter 
who meets a bloody death in his infernal business, is an argument in favor 
of the manhood of our race.”278 
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available at http://oyc.yale.edu/transcript/550/hist-119. 
277 STRAIN, supra note 148, at 15 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
278 2 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, Is It Right and Wise to Kill a Kidnapper?, in THE LIFE AND 
WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS:  PRE-CIVIL WAR DECADE, 1850–1860, at 284, 287 (Philip S. 
Foner ed., 1975);  see also Takaki, supra note 270, at  24 (“Violence as Douglass viewed it was a way 
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The strategic dichotomy is evident in commentators’ critiques of the 
Reconstruction Era.279  Black response to racist terrorism, Herbert Shapiro 
argues, was shaped by three considerations: “the need to maintain links to 
white allies both within the South and in the national government, the right 
of self-defense when actually confronted with violence, and the imperative 
that black unity and the articulation of a common program were necessary 
means of rallying national support.”280 
The risk of upholding the strategic dichotomy was substantial.  There 
was a real and continuing danger that private self-defense would spill over 
into collective political violence.  This spillover is illustrated by an episode 
in Kansas City in 1904.  An altercation between black and white school 
boys resulted in a crippled black boy shooting a white attacker, allegedly in 
self-defense.281  Reports characterize the aftermath as a race riot when the 
private altercation escalated to include more than one hundred 
combatants.282  
A similar spillover is illustrated in a lynching story reported by that 
staunch advocate of the Winchester rifle, Ida B. Wells-Barnett.283  The 
victims’ offense was to operate a grocery store in competition with white 
businesses.284  A white competitor, joined by twelve police officers in 
civilian clothes, raided the Black grocery.285  Under assault, the Blacks 
fired back, wounding three officers.286  They were arrested, then taken 
from the Memphis jail and lynched.287  
                                                                                                                          
279 Compare the similar assessment about the failed alliance between blacks and white Populists 
in the late nineteenth century: “[A]s with most . . . interracial movements in the South, the Populists 
were red-shirted with the cry of ‘black supremacy’ by the Democrats. . . . [B]y the early 1890s white 
‘progressives’ in the South disdained the cause of black advancement.”  GOINGS, supra note 32, at 1.  
280 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 19.  There were notable variations on this theme.  For example, A. 
Phillip Randolph argued, “the Negro peoples should not place their problems for solution down at the 
feet of their white sympathetic allies which has been and is the common fashion of the old school 
Negro leadership, for, in the final analysis, the salvation of the Negro, like the workers, must come 
from within.”  Id. at 257 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
281 See High School Boy Killed, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 12, 1904 (describing the incident in 
which a group of white boys advanced on a group of black boys after a verbal exchange, prompting the 
gunshot); STRAIN, supra note 148, at 23. 
282 See Cold Blooded Murder, WYANDOTTE (KAN.) HERALD, Apr. 12, 1904 (documenting the 
“[g]reat excitement” between “a mob of armed negroes” and “a number of whites” that followed the 
shooting incidenct); STRAIN, supra note 148, at 23. 
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285 See id. (“When [the white competitor] came he led a posse of officers, twelve in number, who 
afterward claimed to be hunting a man for whom they had a warrant.”). 
286 Id. 
287 Id. at 19.  
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This danger of spillover did not diminish the commitment to private 
firearms ownership and armed self-defense.  And one wonders how much 
of this was overt strategic calculation and how much visceral surrender to 
the self-defense impulse.  Witness how W.E.B. Du Bois’s reactions to the 
terror of lynching alternate between outrage and strategic calculation: In 
the Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois argued that violence is counterproductive 
noting that, “[t]he death of Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner proved long 
since to the Negro the present hopelessness of physical defence [sic].”288  
At the same time, his chapter “Of the Coming of John,” a tale of violence 
and private honor, shows an appreciation for the distinction between 
foolish political violence and essential private self-defense.289  It happens 
again in Du Bois’s response to a 1916 lynching in Florida: 
No colored man can read an account of the recent lynching at 
Gainesville, Fla., without being ashamed of his people. . . . 
Without resistance they let a white mob whom they 
outnumbered two to one, torture, harry and murder their 
women, shoot down innocent men entirely unconnected with 
the alleged crime, and finally to cap the climax, they caught 
and surrendered the wretched man whose attempted arrest 
caused the difficulty.   
No people who behave with the absolute cowardice shown 
by these colored people can hope to have the sympathy or 
help of the civilized folk. . . . In the last analysis lynching of 
Negroes is going to stop in the South when the cowardly mob 
is faced by effective guns in the hands of people determined 
to sell their souls dearly.290   
Writing after the 1919 Chicago race riot Du Bois again deployed the 
strategic dichotomy, acknowledging––indeed encouraging––lawful self-
defense but warning against violence as a political strategy: 
Today we raise the terrible weapon of Self-Defense.  When 
the murderer comes, he shall no longer strike us in the back.  
When the armed lynchers gather, we too must gather armed.  
When the mob moves, we propose to meet it with bricks and 
clubs and guns.   
But we must tread here with solemn caution.  We must never 
let justifiable self-defense against individuals become blind 
                                                                                                                          
288 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks, in THREE NEGRO CLASSICS 207, 347 (1965). 
289 See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 127 (describing the story of John Jones, an educated black 
man, who would face a lynch mob for his “suicidal” act of killing a white man when he observed the 
man attempting to rape Jone’s sister).  
290 Id. at 91 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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and lawless offense against all white folk.  We must not seek 
reform by violence.291 
The power of the self-defense impulse was not lost on the Black 
clergy.  Bishop John Hurst called on Blacks to exercise Christian virtue but 
if assailants persist then “do what self respecting people should do—
namely use his gun with effect and impose respect.”292   Some in the Black 
press even urged armed self-defense without explicit concern for the spill 
over into collective violence.  “‘Let every Negro arm himself . . . and 
swear to die fighting in defense of his home, his rights and his person,’” 
editorialized the New York Commoner.293  
Marcus Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association presents 
an interesting variation on the theme.  Garvey openly advocated the most 
extreme form of political violence arguing that, “‘All peoples have gained 
their freedom through organized force. . . . These are the means by which 
we as a race will climb to greatness.’”294  Garvey’s hedge was that this 
violence would not be carried out in America or Europe, but in Africa 
                                                                                                                          
291 W.E.B. Du Bois, Let Us Reason Together, 18 CRISIS 231, 231 (1919).  By the late 1940s, Du 
Bois saw the fortunes of Blacks better served by more left leaning radical affiliations.  While the 
leadership of the NAACP cast its lot with Truman and the Democratic Party, Du Bois joined Paul 
Robeson and more radical Black activist to Henry Wallace of the Progressive Party.  SHAPIRO, supra 
note 26, at 388–89.  These more radical affiliations gave Du Bois new opportunities to engage the 
question of political violence.  In a 1946 speech to the radical Southern Negro Youth Congress, Du 
Bois would not claim “that the uplift of mankind never calls for force and death” even though his core 
skepticism about the utility of political violence shone though in the conclusion that “we ought to be 
the last to believe that force is ever the final word.”  Id. at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 
1957, Du Bois, reflecting on his earlier assessments of violence as a political tool acknowledged:  
There was a time . . . when I thought that the only way in which progress could be 
made in the world was by violence.  I thought that the only way that the darker 
people were going to get recognition was by killing a large number of white people.  
But I think that most of us are beginning to realize that it is not true, that the 
violence that accompanies revolution is not the revolution.  The revolution is the 
reform, is the change in thought, is the change of attitude on the people who are 
affected by it. 
Id. at 449 (internal quotation marks omitted).  In 1959, Du Bois again suggested a greater tolerance for 
violence as a political tool, in his expression of ambivalence about King’s criticism of Robert F. 
Williams: “[I]t is a very grave question as to whether or not the slavery and degradation of Negroes in 
American has not been unnecessarily prolonged by the submission to evil.”  W.E.B. DU BOIS, Crusader 
Without Violence, NAT’L GUARDIAN, Nov. 9, 1959, in W.E.B. DU BOIS: A READER 361, 361 (David 
Levering Lewis ed., 1995).    
292 Lawrence Levine, Marcus Garvey and the Politics of Revitalization, reprinted in BLACK 
LEADERS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 105, 113 (John Hope Franklin & August Meier eds., Univ. Ill. 
Press 1982).  
293 Id. 
294 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 163 (internal quotation marks omitted).  “The Negro must now 
organize all over the world, 400,000,000 strong to administer to our oppressors their Waterloo.”  
Marcus Garvey, Editorial Letter, NW (Chicago, IL), 11 Oct. 1919, reprinted in 2 THE MARCUS 
GARVEY AND UNIVERSAL NEGRO IMPROVEMENT ASSOCIATION PAPERS 41–42 (Robert A. Hill ed. 
1983).  
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where organized Blacks would retake what was properly theirs.295   
But Garvey also deployed the strategic dichotomy, pressing the 
distinction between political violence, which he seemed to admit could not 
succeed in the United States, and private self-defense against imminent 
threats.  Garvey challenged the Klan: “They can pull off their hot stuff in 
the south, but let them come north and touch Philadelphia, New York or 
Chicago and there will be little left of the Ku Klux Klan. . . . Let them try 
and come to Harlem and they will really have some fun.”296  
A. Philip Randolph deployed the strategic dichotomy in his two stage 
“immediate program” to combat lynching.297  The second stage depended 
on Blacks developing economic power.298  But the first was physical action 
in self-defense.  In an editorial in the Messenger, Randolph argued that 
there was no tension between the avowed pacifist views of the Messenger 
and his advocacy of self-defense:  He argued that self-defense was 
“universal law”299: 
Always regard your own life as more important than the life 
of the person about to take yours, and if a choice has to be 
made between the sacrifice of your life and the loss of the 
                                                                                                                          
295 See SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 167–68 (“At the 1924 UNIA convention Garvey favored and 
secured the adoption of a somewhat equivocal resolution regarding the Klan.  On the one hand, the 
resolution stated that the ‘alleged’ attitude of the Klan toward blacks was fairly representative of the 
feelings of whites toward blacks and so the only solution was establishment of a black government in 
Africa.”).  Garvey’s views were still sufficiently immoderate that the movement was continuously the 
target of surveillance by British and American intelligence services and police:  
J. Edgar Hoover recorded that Garvey was particularly active “among the radical 
elements in New York City in agitating the negro movement” and expressed his 
regret that Garvey had “not yet” violated any federal law and so could not be 
deported as an undesirable alien.  Hoover suggested, however, that it might be 
possible to prosecute Garvey on fraud charges.  Ultimately . . . the federal 
government succeeded in convicting Garvey of mail fraud and, upon President 
Coolidge’s commutation of the sentence in 1927, deported him from the United 
States. 
Id. at 167 (footnote omitted); see also PEEKS, supra note 260, at 192–93 (describing Garvey’s meeting 
with Klan leaders).  
296 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 167 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Later Garvey actually met with Edward Young Clark, imperial Wizard of the Klan and advised that it 
“will not help us to fight it or its program” because the solution was creation of a Black government in 
Africa.”  Id.  Garvey embraced “racial purity” and social separation of the races.  Along with claims 
that the Fascists had borrowed their ideology from him, these views diminished Garvey’s appeal.  Id. 
297 JERVIS ANDERSON, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHICAL PORTRAIT 115 (1986).  
298 Id. (“When no profits are to be made from race friction no one will longer be interested in 
stirring up race prejudice. . . . When you make a thing unprofitable you make it impossible.” (alteration 
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
299 CORNELIUS L. BYNUM, A. PHILIP RANDOLPH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 95 
(2000).  But see SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 228 (noting the “southern phenomenon” in which any 
individual act of Black resistance to oppression and intimidation became transformed into a mass 
assault upon the Black community as a whole). 
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lyncher’s life, choose to preserve your own and to destroy 
that of the lynching mob.300  
Roy Wilkins grappled openly with the strategic dichotomy in a 1936 
article in Crisis, recounting the lynching in Gordonsville, Virginia of 
William Wales and his sister Cora.301  The Wales’ had resisted the town’s 
attempt to buy their property for expansion of a cemetery.  Officials sought 
to pressure William with the charge that he had threatened a white woman.  
When the sheriff came to serve the warrant, William shot him.302  The next 
day a crowd of 5,000 surrounded the house.  The Wales resisted with 
shotgun and rifle fire until nightfall when the home was torched.303  
Noting that members of the mob entered the smoldering building and 
hacked up the bodies for souvenirs, Wilkins acknowledged the rage of 
Blacks living under lynch law with bitter sarcasm:  
If the tradition of American lynchers was faithfully followed, 
there reposes now on the mantelpieces of many a Virginia 
home a bit of flesh or a bone preserved in a jar of alcohol to 
remind children and grandchildren of the indomitable 
courage of a brother, father or son of the family who battled 
to the death to prevent two Negros from overcoming 5,000 
white Virginians.304   
Then, recognizing the political risk of the implication, Wilkins asked, 
“Does The Crisis mean to imply by this article that its policy is to defend 
colored people who kill sheriffs?”305  On this question, Wilkins contended 
that Blacks had to support the existing legal structure.306  But he was 
clearly conflicted:  He acknowledged the pull of the self-defense impulse 
and the private pressures that motivated individuals like William Wales 
who “saw his people hanged, roasted and mutilated by mobs while 
legislators called points of order and an aspirant to the Presidency fiddled 
with clauses, periods and commas in the so-called Bill of Rights.”307  On 
the explicit point of the utility and legitimacy of armed self-defense, 
Wilkins said this:  
If one has a fancy for words, this killing was not a lynching.  
It was sport-sport on a grand scale. . . . Hunting possum 
                                                                                                                          
300 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 228. 
301 Id. at 288. 
302 Id. at 289.   
303 Id.    
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Id. 
307 Roy Wilkins, Two Against 5,000, CRISIS, June, 1936, at 169, 170, reprinted in HERBERT 
APTHEKER, 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 240–44 (1994).   
 1542 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1491 
compared to this is tiddlywinks. . . . There was a slight flaw 
in the set-up however.  The man and woman had arms and 
they were not afraid to shoot.  They had killed a sheriff and 
wounded five others.  The leaders of the five thousand 
looked about and took counsel together.  They had numbers.  
They had machine guns.  They had sulphur bombs. . . . But 
the two in the house had rifles, shotguns and perhaps a pistol 
or two.  Not so good.  Not half as good as a lone Negro with 
nothing but his bare hands. . . . No this was a different 
proposition . . . . 
Yes, the Crisis defends William and Cora Wales.308   
The restrictive leg of the strategic dichotomy is evident in the case of 
the Scottsboro boys.309  Early on, the Communist Party used the case as the 
centerpiece of a recruiting focus in the American South.310  This prompted 
conflicts between Communists and the NAACP over strategy and mutual 
denunciations highlighting their competing approaches of coalition 
building and radical upheaval.  In the candidly titled The Right to 
Revolution for the Negro People, communist spokesman James W. Ford 
underscored the revolutionary heritage of insurrection, exalting Nat Turner, 
Gabriel Prosser and Denmark Vesey “and scores of other Negro 
revolutionary leaders.”311  
The NAACP had hired Clarence Darrow as counsel for the Scottsboro 
appeal “in a belated effort to compensate for the association’s rather slight 
attention to the case at the beginning.”312  Darrow conveyed the 
Association’s position that the Communists’ radical strategy, including 
threats to “officials and citizens of Alabama if the verdict of death should 
be carried out,” were counter-productive. 313   
During the modern civil rights era the strategic dichotomy was 
deployed repeatedly and debated publicly.  Though the stakes were 
tremendous, the leadership upheld the fundamental utility and legitimacy 
of armed self-defense.  This is vividly illustrated by the Robert F. Williams 
controversy.  After service in the Marines, Williams returned home to 
Monroe, North Carolina where he was elected President of the Monroe 
branch of the NAACP.314  In 1957, he began organizing a group of armed 
                                                                                                                          
308 APTHEKER, supra note 307, at 241–44.  
309 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 210. 
310 Id. at 211. 
311 Id. at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
312 Id. at 211.   
313 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
314 Julian Mayfield, Challenge to Negro Leadership: The Case of Robert Williams, in REPORTING 
CIVIL RIGHTS: PART ONE AMERICAN JOURNALISM 1941–1963, at 550, 560 (2003) [hereinafter 
Challenge to Negro Leadership]. 
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men to defend Monroe’s Black community.315  In October 1957, Williams 
led an armed group to protect Dr. Albert Perry from a Klan attack.316   
But it was Williams’ apparent endorsement of political violence that 
prompted the NAACP to suspend him from leadership of the Monroe 
branch.317  In widely circulated reaction to the acquittal of a white man for 
the rape of a pregnant Black woman, Williams said this:   
We cannot take these people who do us injustice to the court 
and it becomes necessary to punish them ourselves.  In the 
future we are going to have to try and convict them on the 
spot.  We cannot rely on the law.  We can get no justice 
under the present system.  If we feel that injustice is done, we 
must right then and there, on the spot, be prepared to inflict 
punishment on these people.  Since the Federal government 
will not bring a halt to lynching in the South, and since the 
so-called courts lynch our people legally, if it’s necessary to 
stop lynching with lynching, then we must be willing to resort 
to that method.318  
Williams’ statement confirmed the perennial worry about advocacy of 
political violence.  National headlines blazed, “N.A.A.C.P. Leader Urges 
‘Violence’”.319  The Carolina Times called it the biggest civil rights story 
of 1959.320  Southern editorials attributed Williams’ “bloodthirsty remark” 
directly to the National office.321  Thomas Waring of the Charleston News 
and Courier, ranted, “Hatred is the stock in trade of the NAACP.  High 
                                                                                                                          
315 TYSON, supra note 143, at 87.  
316 Challenge to Negro Leadership, supra note 314, at 560–61.   
It was just another good time Klan night, the high point of which would come when 
they dragged Dr. Perry over the state line if they did not hang him or burn him first.  
But near Dr. Perry’s home their revelry was suddenly shattered by the sustained fire 
of scores of men who had been instructed not to kill anyone if it were not necessary.  
The firing was blistering, disciplined and frightening.  The motorcade of about 
eighty cars, which had begun in a spirit of good fellowship, disintegrated into chaos, 
with panicky, robed men fleeing in every direction.  Some abandoned their 
automobiles and had to continue on foot. 
JAMES FORMAN, THE MAKING OF BLACK REVOLUTIONARIES 167 (1972) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
317 N.A.A.C.P. Leader Urges ‘Violence’: North Carolina Aide Makes Statement—Association 
Quickly Suspends Him, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1959, at 22 [hereinafter N.A.A.C.P. Leader]. 
318 SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 459 (emphasis added); see also TYSON, supra note 143, at 87–89 
(describing how men from the NAACP defended Dr. Perry’s home from an attack by the Ku Klux 
Klan); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, NEGROES WITH GUNS 62 (Wayne St. Univ. Press ed., 1998) (1962) 
(discussing how African Americans in Monroe had to resort to arming themselves in order to prevent 
“mass bloodshed”).    
319 N.A.A.C.P. Leader, supra note 317, at 22. 
320 TYSON, supra note 143, at 149 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
321 Id. at 150.  
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officials of the organization may speak in cultivated accents and dress like 
Wall Street Lawyers, but they are engaged in a revolutionary enterprise.”322 
As soon as word of Williams’s statement reached NAACP 
headquarters in New York, National Director Roy Wilkins called 
Williams.  Wilkins recorded the call.323  Hearing that Williams was 
planning to make a follow-up statement on national television, Wilkins 
warned, “You know, of course . . . that it is not the policy of the NAACP to 
advocate meeting lynching with lynching.  You are going to make it clear 
that you are not speaking for the NAACP?”324  After a tense conversation, 
and realizing that Williams already had been inexorably linked with the 
NAACP, Wilkins dispatched a telegram to Williams, suspending him as 
branch president.325      
Williams appealed his dismissal to the membership at the 1959 annual 
convention.326  The representatives upheld the decision to suspend 
Williams but added an important caveat: “[W]e do not deny but reaffirm 
the right of an individual and collective self-defense against unlawful 
assaults.”327  The report of the Resolutions Committee that brought the 
issue to the floor noted in its Preamble, the NAACP’s long support of the 
right of self-defense, “by defending those who have exercised the right of 
self-defense particularly in the Arkansas Riot Case, The Sweet case in 
Detroit, the Columbia, Tenn., Riot cases and the Ingram case in 
Georgia.”328  
This public engagement of the strategic dichotomy is underscored and 
systematized by Martin Luther King’s separate assessment of the Williams 
controversy.329  In a widely reprinted exchange of essays with Williams, 
King articulated three distinct categories of response to violent attacks and 
political oppression.   The first, pure nonviolence, is difficult, King said.   
It “cannot readily or easily attract large masses, for it requires 
extraordinary discipline and courage.”330  The second response, said King, 
                                                                                                                          
322 Id. 
323 TYSON, supra note 143, at 150. 
324 Id. at 150–51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
325 Id. at 151; WILKINS & MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS, 
supra note 99, at 265.  Wilkins’s account is quoted in Challenge to Negro Leadership, supra note 314, 
at 552.   
326 WILLIAMS, supra note 318, at 28–30.  For full text of the resolutions see Gloster B. Current, 
Fiftieth Annual Convention: A Jubilee for Civil Rights, CRISIS (Aug.–Sept. 1959), at 400, 408. 
327 Current, supra note 326, at 409–10 (emphasis added).  
328 Id. at 408–09 (emphasis added). 
329 LIBERATION, Sept.–Oct. 1959.  Both Essays are printed in SOUTHERN PATRIOT 18, No. II (Jan. 
1960) at 3.  An edited version of the essay appears in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL RIGHTS READER.  
Martin Luther King, Jr., “The Social Organization of Non-Violence”, in THE EYES ON THE PRIZE CIVIL 
RIGHTS READER 112, 112–14 (Clayborn Carson et. al. eds., Penguin 1991); see also WILLIAMS, supra 
note 318, at xxvi–vii (quoting Martin Luther King, Jr.).  
330 King, Jr., supra note 329, at 112.  
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was implicit in the freedom struggle and should not discourage outsiders 
from supporting the movement:   
Violence exercised merely in self-defense . . . [in] all 
societies, from the most primitive to the most cultured and 
civilized, accept as moral and legal.  The principle of self-
defense, even involving weapons and bloodshed, has never 
been condemned, even by Gandhi. . . . When the Negro uses 
force in self-defense . . . he does not forfeit support—he may 
even win it, by the courage and self-respect it reflects.331   
This explicit endorsement of armed self-defense, contrasted with 
King’s third assessment, puts the strategic dichotomy in high relief.  The 
third approach, Williams’s approach, said King, advocated “violence as a 
tool of advancement, organization as in warfare . . . [and posed] 
incalculable perils.”332  Political goals, King argued, were best achieved by 
nonviolent, “socially organized masses on the march.”333   
Anne Braden reprinted the King and Williams essays in the Southern 
Patriot and her summary succinctly captured King’s engagement of the 
strategic dichotomy.  No one disputes the right to defend home and family 
she explained, “What the nonviolent movement says is that the weapons of 
social change should be nonviolent.”334  
King’s assessment was only one aspect of a robust community 
engagement of the strategic dichotomy.   Louis Lautier of the Baltimore 
Afro-American argued that Williams had not advocated political violence, 
but merely that “colored people should defend themselves if and when 
violence is directed at them.”335  In the Arkansas State Press, Daisy and 
L.C. Bates were equivocal on Roy Wilkins’ contention that Williams had 
crossed the line into advocacy of political violence.  But they were firm on 
the importance of private self-defense, warning “nonviolence never saved 
George Lee in Belzoni, Miss., or Emmett Till, nor Mack Parker at 
Poplarville, Miss.”336   
The National office also received protests from the branches.337  The 
Brooklyn Branch of the NAACP wired Wilkins in protest of the “illegal 
and arbitrary removal from office of Robert E. Williams for expressing 
                                                                                                                          
331 TYSON, supra note 143, at 215 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
332 King, Jr., supra note 329, at 113.  
333 Id. 
334 TYSON, supra note 143, at 216. 
335 Id. at 154. 
336 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Bates responding to blandishments from Wilkins 
ultimately supported the suspension of Williams.  See id. at 164.  
337 The Flint Michigan Branch demanded his “immediate reinstatement.”  TYSON, supra note 143, 
at 156–57 (citing Box 2 CCRI Papers).  
 1546 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1491 
sentiments to which we subscribe.”338  This and other unqualified support 
for Williams arguably ranged over the line into advocacy of political 
violence.339   
But the thoughtful establishment support, was exhibited by John 
McCray, in a Baltimore Afro-American, article titled, “There’s Nothing 
New About It.”  McCray engaged the strategic dichotomy in candid, 
practical terms.  On issues of social change he said, “A minority group 
cannot hope to win in campaigns of violence”.340  On the other hand, 
McCray acknowledged, without criticism, that Black self-defense had deep 
roots.  “Today, thousands of our people have secured ‘protection’ in their 
homes, mostly with the intent to repel night riders who, years ago, were 
terrors to their forbearers.”341   
With debate raging, Wilkins defended his position with a succinct 
deployment of the strategic dichotomy.  In a pamphlet entitled The Single 
Issue in the Robert William’s Case, Wilkins argued, “There is no issue of 
self-defense . . . The charges are based on his call for aggressive, 
premeditated violence.  Lynching is never defensive.”342  In this, Wilkins 
articulated a philosophy dating back to Fredrick Douglass.  While 
condemning political violence as a hazard to the movement, he 
unequivocally recognized armed self-defense as a crucial private resource.  
At a June 1959 fundraising dinner in Chicago, Wilkins emphasized, “Of 
course, we must defend ourselves when attacked.  This is our right under 
all known laws.”343   
                                                                                                                          
338 Id. at 156. 
339 Adams wrote to Wilkins, “I support Williams one million percent . . . . Why can’t we do like 
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fire to the Klan’s cross, hanging Cole in effigy, the Lumbees helped push Carolyn out of the ditch.  
“Draped in Klan regalia, they celebrated into the night.  The cover of Life magazine featured a playful 
photograph of a beaming Simeon Oxendine wrapped in a confiscated Ku Klux Klan banner.”  Id.  Four 
people were injured, apparently by falling bullets.  Id. 
340 TYSON, supra note 143, at 158. 
341 Id.  
342 Id. at 163.  
343 Id.  
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Wilkins reiterated this position throughout his life.  In his 1982 his 
memoir, Wilkins confirmed, “Like [Robert] Williams, I believe in self-
defense.  While I admire Reverend King’s theories of overwhelming 
enemies with love, I don’t think I could have put those theories into 
practice myself.  But there is a difference between self-defense and murder, 
and I had no intention of getting the NAACP into the lynching 
business.”344   
The Williams case is remarkable for the detail in which it elaborates 
the strategic dichotomy.  But it is not unique.  On at least two other 
occasions, Roy Wilkins defended the strategic dichotomy against 
statements he worried blurred the line between self-defense and political 
violence.  In 1959, an angry Charles Evers made provocative statements 
after a car bomb attack on Natchez, Mississippi NAACP leader, George 
Metcalf.  Like Robert Williams before him, Evers generally rejected 
political violence as fruitless, declaring,  “The only way we have is through 
nonviolence, there’s no other way.”345  But following the attack on 
Metcalf, Evers channeled the mood of the community, “We’re not going to 
take it any longer.  We’re not going to start any riots, but we’ve got guns 
and we’re going to fight back.”346  A day later, after Governor Paul 
Johnson ordered guardsmen to Natchez, Evers was urging the community 
that group violence would be counterproductive.347 
From the National office, Roy Wilkins responded in a September 3, 
letter, “We have never authorized you, as our representative, to state either 
privately or publically, ‘we are armed, we have taken all we will take, we 
will fight . . . or any sentiments approximating that language.  [We cannot] 
afford these damaging statements in a nationally syndicated newspaper 
column.”348  Wilkins demanded that Evers clarify his statements by 
September 10.  After a follow-up statement by Evers in the New York Post, 
that Wilkins considered unsatisfactory, he drafted but never sent a letter 
demanding Evers resign by September 15.349  The reasons for Wilkins’ 
retreat are unclear.350  But the episode shows again vigorous engagement 
and defense of the strategic dichotomy.  
Wilkins already had experienced a similar conflict with St. Augustine, 
Florida activist, Robert Hayling, a Black dentist who had led local voter 
                                                                                                                          
344 ROY WILKINS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF ROY WILKINS 265 (1982). 
345 ROBERT PENN WARREN, WHO SPEAKS FOR THE NEGRO? 105 (1965). 
346 WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
347 Id. at 126–27. 
348 TYSON, supra note 143, at 150–51. 
349 WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 128.   
350 Some suggest it may have been Wilkins’s own recognition of his waning power. Id. at 128. 
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registration and desegregation efforts.351  After a shotgun attack on his 
home, Hayling organized an armed defense squad.352  He warned the Klan 
publicly that his guards would “shoot first and ask questions later.”353  Roy 
Wilkins responded as he had to Robert Williams, and Hayling broke ties 
with the NAACP.354  But in a familiar turn of the strategic dichotomy, 
when Martin Luther King came to St. Augustine in 1964 he consented to 
Hayling’s deployment of armed guards for protection.355 
CORE Chairman, James Farmer, pressed the strategic dichotomy 
aggressively when responding to questions about the militancy of the 
Deacons for Defense, who were protecting CORE workers in the South.  
Farmer made a clear distinction between armed self-defense “outside” the 
movement and CORE’s nonviolent demonstrations.  “You must 
understand, when a man’s home is attacked that’s not the movement, that’s 
his home.”356   
Simon Wendt comments, “[CORE’s] legitimacy as an acceptable Civil 
Rights organization as well as its financial wellbeing depended almost 
exclusively on white Northern liberals, who easily confused the 
acknowledge right of self-defense with the specter of ‘Black violence.’”357  
Pressed on the point that CORE demonstrations involving the Deacons for 
Defense happened in the streets not the home, Farmer stubbornly insisted 
that armed self-defense and political violence were fundamentally 
different.358 
Committed pacifists within CORE considered members who advocated 
violent self-defense traitors to the cause.359  But nonviolence in the face of 
imminent threats was easier in theory than in practice.360  In response to 
                                                                                                                          
351 Robert W. Hartley, A Long Hot Summer: The St. Augustine Racial Disorders of 1964, in ST. 
AUGUSTINE, FLORIDA, 1963–1964: MASS PROTEST AND RACIAL VIOLENCE 3, 17 (David J. Garrow ed., 
1989). 
352 Id. at 20–21.   
353 Id. at 21.   
354 See id. at 21–22 (describing Wilkins’s phone call).  
355 See DAVID R. COLBURN, RACIAL CHANGE AND COMMUNITY CRISIS: ST. AUGUSTINE, 
FLORIDA 1877–1980, at 84–85 (1985) (discussing Dr. King’s reluctant acceptance of Hayling’s guards 
and the FBI as protection in St. Augustine and the tensions between the two groups); see also DAVID J. 
GARROW, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN 
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 317–34 (1986) (discussing security concerns at St. Augustine).  
356 Simon Wendt, Urge People Not to Carry Guns: Armed Self-Defense in the Louisiana Civil 
Rights Movement and the Radicalization of the Congress of Racial Equality, 45 LA. HIST. 261, 280 
(2004).  
357 Id. at 279.  
358 Id. at 280.  
359 Id. at 277.  
360 “Pacifist CORE worker Meldon Acheson found himself the last representative of an 
insignificant minority.  ‘Nearly everyone in the community is armed to the teeth’ he wrote in a letter to 
his parents . . . all but one are [sic] committed to nonviolence only as a tactic.”  Id.  His attempts to 
convert the local Black population to philosophical nonviolence soon fizzled.  Id.  In West Feliciana 
Parish, CORE worker Mike Lesser was less conflicted: “We are preaching non-violence, but we can 
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reports that local Blacks were arming against private threats, the national 
leadership of CORE pressed its field staff, “Urge the people not to carry 
guns.”361  These instructions prompted tensions and defiance.362  In a staff 
meeting at the end of 1963 two activists angrily responded “to hell with 
CORE, we’re with the people.”363  Some CORE field staff began carrying 
guns themselves.364 
CORE’s National Office wrestled with the perennial concern of Black 
civil rights groups that have depended on alliances with white 
progressives. 
National Director James Farmer had to be more cautions in 
dealing with the issue of armed resistance. . . . The 
organization’s legitimacy as an acceptable Civil Rights 
organization as well as its financial wellbeing depended 
almost exclusively on white Northern liberals, who easily 
confused the acknowledged, right of self-defense with the 
specter of “Black violence.”. . . Letters by white CORE 
sympathizers to James Farmer served as an additional 
reminder about the fragility of Northern support.  “Although 
only a small percentage of whites will help actively,” a white 
man from New Jersey wrote in 1963, “the majority feel 
guilty and will not oppose the Negro’s advance as long as it 
is nonviolent,” and only if CORE maintained its nonviolent 
image would “sympathetic bystanders” continue to support 
the organization.365 
The subsequent history and radicalization of CORE perhaps confirms 
the assessment that advocacy of political violence would destroy interracial 
alliances.366  While CORE continued to espouse nonviolence and to 
                                                                                                                          
only preach non violence.  We cannot tell someone not to defend his property and the lives of his 
family and let me tell you, these 15–20 shotguns guarding our meetings are very reassuring.”  Id.  
361 Id. at 278.   
362 Id.   
363 Id.   
364 FRED POWLEDGE, FREE AT LAST? THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE PEOPLE WHO 
MADE IT 573 (1991). 
365 Wendt, supra note 356, at 279.   
366 The assumption, that political violence was an entirely losing strategy also is complicated by 
mounting challenges to the view that the successes of the Civil Rights movement were entirely rooted 
in nonviolence.  Studies of the Civil Rights movement have matured, beyond the early treatments that 
focused on organizations and leaders like Martin Luther King.  Id. at 263.  “In the mid 1980’s the focus 
of the literature began to shift toward the study of local movements and the contribution of ordinary 
Black citizens . . . . [S]ome of  the most recent studies suggest that . . . armed self-defense was more 
than a mere footnote to the history of the Black freedom struggle.”  Id.; see also Christopher B. Strain, 
“We Walked Like Men”: The Deacons for Defense and Justice,” 38 LA. HIST. 43, 43–62 (1999) 
(providing a historical account of the rise of the Deacons for Defense and CORE’s eventual aligning 
with many of the groups views); Aniyele O. Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet: Comparative Analysis 
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distance itself from the publicity the Deacons for Defense were attracting, 
the realities of imminent threats eroded the commitment to non-violence in 
the field.367  The work of the Deacons underscored the fundamental 
necessity of self-defense and drew CORE field workers and members to 
more openly advocate resistance against violent attacks.368   
The Deacons made a firm rhetorical commitment to the strategic 
dichotomy.  In 1965, Deacon spokesman Charles Sims emphasized, “I 
believe nonviolence is the only way.  Negotiations are going to be the main 
point in this fight. . . . As a Deacon, you cannot fire on a man unless 
you’ve been attacked.”369  For the Northern, white, middle-class pacifists 
who had been the backbone of CORE, the idea of armed violence, even 
tempered by the strategic dichotomy, was anathema.370  CORE leadership 
attempted to keep the Deacons “in the background.”371   
But for the growing Black membership of CORE, the practical 
necessity of armed self-defense in the field was obvious.  “As early as 
1965 . . . delegates openly contested the . . . commitment to pacifism . . . 
during CORE’s annual convention.”372  By 1966, Floyd McKissick had 
succeeded James Farmer as National Director of CORE.373  Though 
McKissick maintained a commitment to tactical nonviolence,374 his 
ascension marked a dramatic shift of policy and his rhetoric was more 
aggressive.  He insisted, for example, that, “The right of self-defense is a 
constitutional right and you can’t expect Black people to surrender this 
right while whites maintain it.”375  For CORE’s pacifist, white members, 
this broke the bargain.  By the end of 1966, CORE had lost most of its 
white support and transformed into an almost entirely Black 
organization.376  
The visceral draw of the self-defense impulse and the difficulty of 
maintaining the strategic dichotomy against spillover into political violence 
                                                                                                                          
of Armed Resistance in the Civil Rights Movement, 29 J. BLACK STUD. 558, 558–78 (1999) [hereinafter 
Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet] (concluding that many factors including class orientations, 
leadership paradigms, organizing styles, and changing cultural climates were responsible for the 
transformation of the views of CORE leadership). 
367 “Farmer continued to reject the ostensible danger that the Deacons posed to CORE’s non-
violent stance.  In reality though, by 1965, most CORE activists had abandoned philosophical 
nonviolence.”  Wendt, supra note 356, at 280.    
368 Id. at 281–82. 
369 Id. at 276.  
370 JAMES FARMER, FREEDOM—WHEN? 65 (1965). 
371 Wendt, supra note 356, at 279 n.82. 
372 Id. at 281.  
373 Id. at 284.  
374 Id.   
375 CIVIL RIGHTS 1960–66, at 377 (Lester A. Sobel, ed., 1967). 
376 Wendt, supra note 356, at 284–85; see also TYSON, supra note 143, at 290–91 nn.15–18 
(discussing CORE’s abandonment of nonviolence and the acceptance of self-defense as natural and 
necessary). 
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are illustrated again in the events surrounding the shooting of James 
Meredith in 1966.  A veteran of the freedom struggle,377 with a 
commitment to nonviolence, Meredith was ambushed by a white gunman 
on the first day of his “Mississippi March Against Fear.”378  Interviewed 
from his hospital bed, an angry Meredith made national headlines 
declaring, “I’m sorry I didn’t have something to take care of that man.”379  
In future travels through Mississippi, Meredith told reporters he would be 
armed.380  In some sense Meredith’s statement conveyed a simple intent to 
defend himself.  But in context, the danger that it would incite political 
violence is plain.  That worry is underscored by the debate and decisions 
that followed. 
Despite the attack on Meredith, CORE vowed to continue the “March 
Against Fear.”  There was an obvious concern about the safety of the 
participants and a corresponding worry that security measures would be 
considered provocative.   
During the organizational meetings, national Civil Rights 
Leaders engaged in vigorous debate about armed self-
defense.  This question, along with the debates about the role 
of whites and the hesitancy of the federal government to 
support the movement eventually split the frail coalition.  
When Floyd McKissick, CORE’s new director, Martin 
Luther King, Jr., of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference and Stokely Carmichael of SNCC signed a 
manifesto highly critical of the Johnson administration and 
agreed to have the Deacons for Defense and Justice protect 
the march, the NAACP’s Roy Wilkins and the Urban 
League’s Whitney Young, Jr., angrily withdrew their 
support.381   
The alignment of King, McKissick, and Carmichael against Roy 
Wilkins and Whitney Young illustrates the spectrum of circumstances 
along which the strategic dichotomy might be deployed and the risk that 
accompanies aggressive renditions of it.  Wilkins and the NAACP had 
comfortably exercised the careful conservative rendition of the strategic 
                                                                                                                          
377 In 1962 Meredith attempted to integrate the University of Mississippi.  Wendt, supra note 356, 
at 281.  
378 Id. 
379 James H. Meredith, Big Changes Are Coming, SAT. EVENING POST, Aug. 13, 1966, at 23–27, 
available at http://reportingcivilrights.loa.org/authors/selections.jsp?authorId=135; Roy Reed, 
Meredith Regrets He Was Not Armed, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1966, at 1; see also WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, 
supra note 121, at 135 (citing He Shot Me Like . . . a Goddam Rabbit, NEWSWEEK, June 20, 1966, at 
30). 
380 Supra note 380. 
381 Wendt, supra note 356, at 281.  
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dichotomy to support compelling cases of private self-defense.  But the 
“March Against Fear” controversy shows that the strategic dichotomy also 
could be deployed more aggressively to sanction self-defense preparations 
that pressed closer to the boundary of political violence.  Those aggressive 
renditions risked spillover to which more cautious leaders like Wilkins 
were highly averse. 
In the wake of the attack on Meredith, continuing protests, especially 
those employing the Deacons as security, had enhanced political 
significance and the potential for igniting political violence.  On the other 
hand, with a comrade wounded, members of the coalition had an 
understandable concern about their personal safety.  The diverging 
calculations of King and Wilkins illustrate different appetites for the risk 
inherent in aggressive deployments of the strategic dichotomy. 
In a much more practical way, the words and deeds of Holmes County, 
Mississippi farmer and SNCC activist, Hartman Turnbow distill the 
importance of private self-defense and the basic impulse fueling the 
strategic dichotomy.  When racist terrorists attacked his home, Turnbow 
“pushed his family out the back door and grabbed the rifle off the wall and 
started shooting.”382  Turnbow saw this as perfectly consistent with the 
non-violent philosophy of the movement declaring,  “I wasn’t being non-
nonviolent, I was protecting my wife and family.”383   
Turnbow was not alone in this sentiment.  After a shootout with 
Klansmen, Mississippi activist Robert Cooper explained, “I don’t figure 
that I was violent.  All I was doin’ was protectin’ myself.”384  Charles 
Evers depicts his brother Medgar’s concurrent commitment to political 
nonviolence and private self-defense essentially the same way.  During the 
turmoil surrounding James Meredith’s attempt to integrate Ole Miss, 
“Medgar and Myrlie were barricaded in at home . . . . Medgar was 
nonviolent, but he had six guns in the kitchen and living room.”385  SNCC 
activist James Forman, confirms that these episodes reflect broad 
community norms.  Commenting on Hartman Turnbow, Forman observed 
that “[s]elf-defense—at least of one’s home—was not a concept new to 
Southern blacks in 1963 and there was hardly a black home in the South 
                                                                                                                          
382 CARSON, supra note 220, at 89; CHARLES E. COBB, JR., ON THE ROAD TO FREEDOM: A 
GUIDED TOUR OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS TRAIL 302 (2008).  
383 COBB, JR., supra note 382, at 302.  Turnbow was not dissuaded by the fact that armed self-
defense was an imperfect response.  The attack came at 3:00 a.m. with a firebomb and then shots fired 
into Turnbow’s home.  Turnbow charged out, “I saw two white men and one of them no sooner he saw 
me he shot at me. . . . I had my .22 already in position and I just commenced shooting at him right fast.”  
The aftermath is not surprising.  The only arrest made was of Turnbow himself, on the suspicion of 
setting fire to his own home.  MILLS, supra note 122, at 96. 
384 Interview with Robert Cooper, in YOUTH OF THE RURAL ORGANIZING CULTURAL CENTER, 
MINDS STAYED ON FREEDOM: THE CIVIL RIGHTS STRUGGLE IN THE RURAL SOUTH, AN ORAL HISTORY 
94 (1991).  
385 EVERS & SZANTON, supra note 86, at 117 (emphasis added). 
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without its shotgun or rifle.”386 
For most of our history, the Black community has supported armed 
self-defense by maintaining the strategic dichotomy in the face of 
tremendous risks.  The danger that self-defense would spill over into 
political violence and destroy crucial white alliances was substantial.  The 
entire movement—the freedom of an entire people—was on the line.  On 
that measure, the traditional costs of armed self-defense387 were just as 
great, or greater than, the costs today.  Despite that risk, as a matter of 
practice, philosophy and policy, the community upheld the self-defense 
interest of individual Blacks who were the victims of criminal aggression 
and state failure.  Though the stakes have been tremendous, the community 
traditionally did not ask individuals to surrender the self-defense resource 
to advance group goals.  The modern orthodoxy, on the other hand, does 
exactly that by pressing a recipe for community safety that requires good 
people to surrender the standard tools of self-defense.388  
IV.  THE MODERN ORTHODOXY: EXPLANATION AND CRITICAL 
EVALUATION 
From the very beginning, it has been evident that crucial alliances with 
white progressives would suffer if the freedom struggle devolved into 
political violence.  Part II showed how despite that risk, Blacks deployed 
the strategic dichotomy to maintain armed self-defense as a crucial private 
resource.  However, as the civil rights conflict boiled over, urban rioting 
exacerbated mainstream worries about Black violence, and Black radicals 
invoked self-defense in a broader sphere that threatened the traditional 
boundary against political violence.  This made the strategic dichotomy 
harder to maintain conceptually and more costly politically.  
Concurrently, alliances between conservative/integrationist civil rights 
groups and white progressives became more important in the wake of 
white backlash against Black radicalism and urban rioting.389  The newly 
minted national gun control movement rested firmly within that 
progressive coalition.  The conservative/integrationist wing of the 
movement, with its focus on institutional methodologies of legislation and 
litigation came to dominate the Black leadership.  It is from this 
                                                                                                                          
386 JAMES FORMAN, THE MAKING OF BLACK REVOLUTIONARIES 376 (1985). 
387 Success or failure of the entire movement was arguably on the line. 
388 See Nicholas J. Johnson, Imagining Gun Control in America: Understanding the Remainder 
Problem, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 837, 840 (2008) (discussing the removal of guns from the 
population as a means to reduce gun crime) [hereinafter Johnson, Imagining Gun Control]. 
389 MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS, supra note 256, at 192–93 (“By the off-year elections of 1966 
the degree of racial polarization in this country was such that openly to court the black vote was to 
invite defections among one’s white constituents.  Prematurely prophesied three years earlier, the 
much-heralded ‘white backlash’ had indeed set in.”).  
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perspective that the traditional support of Black self-defense is dismissed 
with argument that “things have changed.”  This Part will engage these 
developments. 
Section A details the evolution of the modern orthodoxy.  Section B 
argues that traditional Black support for armed self-defense is 
fundamentally a response to state failure and impotence that continues 
unabated.   
A.  The Rise of the Modern Orthodoxy 
The modern orthodoxy is rooted in a particular strand of civil rights 
advocacy and political strategy that survived competing approaches within 
the Black freedom movement.390  The NAACP model is the exemplar of 
that approach.   
Although the NAACP was the dominant civil rights organization in the 
early stages of the Civil Rights movement, by the 1960s four major groups 
had emerged.  “The result was the highly competitive situation . . . [where] 
the so called Big-Four organizations—NAACP, the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (“SCLC”), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (“SNCC”), and CORE—jockeyed with one another for 
influence over the movement, as well as for the increased shares of 
publicity and money generated by protest activity.”391  The philosophical 
divisions between these groups and the decline of three of them help us 
understand the modern orthodoxy.392 
The ascension of the evolving NAACP model and its influence on the 
modern orthodoxy is significantly attributable to the shifts toward more 
radical approaches by competing organizations.  Flirtations with radicalism 
tested the utility of political violence.393  The failure of the radical 
                                                                                                                          
390 See id. at 36 (discussing the political process model). 
391 Id. at 154 n.7.  In the footnote, McAdam addresses the National Urban League, which some 
have added to constitute the “Big Five.”  Id. at 154 n.7, 185 (referencing Goldman who used the term 
“Big Five”).  McAdam argues that the Urban League was influential in “social welfare and business 
circles,” but far less so “within the movement itself.”  The organizations visibility within the “liberal 
establishment” (foundations, academia, social welfare groups) may help to account for the prominent 
role ascribed to it by many of the movement’s contemporary chroniclers who were largely drawn from 
the same establishment.”  Id. at 154 n.7. 
392 RECORD, supra note 163, at 36 (“From its origins the NAACP was limited by the fact that its 
leaders did not envision it as a mass organization; the ‘Talented Tenth’ orientation, epitomized—almost 
caricatured—in the stately and aloof Du Bois dominated the top staff.”). 
393 Radical advocacy within the Black freedom struggle is nothing new.  Nor is the tension 
between radicals and more traditional, conservative organizations.  This is illustrated by the divide in 
the 1920s between the NAACP and more radical Black labor organizations.  In addition to A. Philip 
Randolph’s Messenger organization, the African Black Brotherhood (Harlem) and the American Negro 
Labor Congress (“ANLC”) in Chicago and later the League of Struggle for Negro Rights, all took a 
more radical stance in the Black freedom struggle.  SHAPIRO, supra note 26, at 209.  After 1930, “the 
main channel for Communist activity among blacks became a new organization, the League of Struggle 
for Negro Rights.  The league was part of implementing a Communist party decision to pay more 
 
 2013] FIREARMS POLICY AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY 1555 
experiments validated a more conservative/integrationist approach. That 
approach, with its focus on institutional action inside mainstream 
boundaries, fuels the modern orthodoxy. 
Akinyele Umoja argues that the civil rights groups of the 1960’s 
evolved along different trajectories partly because their leadership came 
from different strata within the Black middle class.394  He divides the 
leadership into the categories established by Thomas Boston for 
identifying different strata in the Black middle class—independent, 
dependent, and conservative.395  
At the “center” of the Black political life, the dependent 
strata, while maintaining social ties and identification with 
the aspirations of the Black masses are also obligated to 
“pacify the anxieties of white society” from which it draws 
political and financial support. This tension creates 
vacillation in the dependent strata relative to militant 
collective action.396      
SNCC and CORE took the militant path.  The NAACP, the Urban 
League, and to a lesser degree SCLC,397 pursued coalition politics.  There 
was evidence of the divide early on.  SNCC and CORE were often seen as 
troublemakers by the Kennedy Administration.398  Contrasting 
                                                                                                                          
attention to work in the South. Within a year the Scottsboro case became a critical focus of that work.”  
Id. at 210.  The ANLC particularly aimed to build “a militant mass Negro organization” with a working 
class leadership.  Id. at 209.  The strategic disagreement is made plain in the ANLC “Call to Action” 
explaining why middle class leadership of organizations intent on mainstream coalition building was 
not to be trusted.  Id.  
These leaders (property owners, landlords, real estate agents, preachers, prostitute 
college professors, editors of middle-class magazines and newspapers, heads of 
various “advancement” and “improvement” associations) have a stake in the system 
under which the masses of Negroes are oppressed and exploited.  They are therefore 
not in favor of its abolition, but merely seek a fuller share in the exploitation of their 
own people and a higher social status for their own class.  Moreover they are 
incapable of leading the struggle because they have neither a clear understanding of 
the nature of the struggle (which is essentially a class struggle, and not as they 
pretend, a purely racial struggle) nor the courage to prosecute it militantly enough to 
insure success. 
Id. at 210. 
394 Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet, supra note 366, at 560. 
395 Id. at 567 (citing THOMAS D. BOSTON, RACE CLASS AND CONSERVATISM 43–46 (1988)). 
396 Id. at 567–68 (citing BOSTON, supra note 395, at 43–46 (internal citations omitted)). 
397 SCLC diverged with King’s denunciation of the Vietnam War and declined as a force after his 
assassination.  Id. at 563. 
398 Id. at 568.   
SNCC and Core leadership did not enjoy amicable relations with Washington.  In 
fact, SNCC and Core were often seen as troublemakers by the executive branch 
during this period.  According to King’s biographer . . . John F. Kennedy was 
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philosophies also were evident in the responses to Lyndon Johnson’s 
request for suspension of demonstrations during the 1964 presidential 
elections. 399  The NAACP, SCLC and the Urban League “all agreed to 
honor President Johnson’s requested moratorium to support his reelection 
efforts.”400  SNCC and CORE refused.401   
“By 1966 both [SNCC and CORE] had endorsed armed self-defense as 
a legitimate and viable tactic in the struggle to achieve civil and human 
rights.”402  That strategy, by most accounts, was a failure and the radical 
organizations declined and withered.403 In contrast, the 
conservative/integrationist groups continued to reject political violence in 
favor of coalition politics.404    
The response to Black radicalism and political violence of the 1960’s 
confirmed the assessment of generations of Black leaders that political 
violence would lead to white backlash.405  The strategic dichotomy was 
muddied as Black radicals invoked “self-defense” as a rationale for overt 
political violence.406   
                                                                                                                          
pleased that SCLC rather than SNCC was leading the 1963 desegregation campaign 
in Birmingham . . . quot[ing] Kennedy as saying ‘SNCC has got an investment in 
violence. . . . They’re sons of bitches. 
Id. 
399 Id.   
400 Id.   
401 Id.  
402 Id. at 558. 
403 See generally MICHAEL LEVINE, AFRICAN AMERICANS AND CIVIL RIGHTS: FROM 1619 TO THE 
PRESENT 198–208 (1996).  SNCC became overtly racially exclusive during the 1966 Atlanta project.  
SNCC Leaders Stokely Carmichael and H. Rap Brown became more widely known in the Black power 
movement.  Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet, supra note 366, at 558.  Attempting to encourage more 
expedient action on the part of the federal government after the Meredith March, King warned “I’m 
trying desperately to keep the movement nonviolent, but I can’t keep it nonviolent by myself.”  Id. at 
563.  CORE, a formally interracial organization founded on Gandian principles of nonviolence, 
transformed into an almost entirely a Black organization.  “CORE’s members and leadership were 
predominately White middle class individuals prior to the 1960’s.  By the summer of 1964, Core 
membership was predominately Black.”  Id. at 575.  Today, CORE is notable as perhaps the only Black 
civil rights organization to align itself with gun rights organizations.  CORE President Roy Innis has 
been a member of the board of directors of the National Rifle Association and CORE filed an amicus 
brief supporting Shelly Parker and Dick Heller in the landmark decision District of Columbia v. Heller.  
Brief of Amicus Curiae Congress of Racial Equality in Support of Respondent, District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290). 
404 See Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet, supra note 366, at 561 (“SCLC leaders felt it necessary 
to dissociate themselves from any retaliatory violence or form of self-defense by local activists and 
movement supporters, for Black people in general to win the public opinion battle with White 
segregationists.  They believed that the use of force by Black people and the movement would only 
serve to alienate White liberal and the general White population.”). 
405 See, e.g., MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS, supra note 256, at 156–60.  
406 For example, the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense rationalized some of their most violent 
self-destructive efforts by explicitly grounding them on the rules and ordinances governing self-
defense.  See id. at 207 (describing a Black Panthers press release which stated that the Party stands for 
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This was a tipping point in the development of the modern orthodoxy.  
There was a “growing disagreement within insurgent ranks over the proper 
goals of the movement and the most effective means of attaining them.” 407 
Lined up on one side were traditional integrationists who 
continued to eschew violence as an unacceptable or 
ineffective means of pursuing movement goals.  Among the 
Big Four, SCLC and NAACP shared this position.  A further 
distinction can be made between these two groups on the 
basis of the principal method used to pursue integrationist 
aims.  With its reliance on noninstitutionalized protest 
techniques, SCLC can be seen as constituting the “radical” 
faction within the integrationist wing, while the NAACP, on 
the basis of its continued emphasis on institutionalized forms 
of protest, comprised a “conservative” integrationist faction.  
Aligned in increasing opposition to the integrationists was 
the so-called “black power” wing of the movement, with its 
rejection of integration as the fundamental goal of black 
insurgency and its approval of violence (either in self-defense 
or as an offensive tactic), as an acceptable addition to the 
movement’s tactical arsenal.  The remaining two members of 
the Big Four—CORE and SNCC—were in varying degrees 
associated with this wing of the movement.408 
The spillover risk that had always plagued the strategic dichotomy was 
particularly acute in this context.  Scholars of the Civil Rights and Black 
Power movements, emphasize that although “self-defense had always been 
a part of the movement . . . [a] shift from self-defense to proactive violence 
contributed to the [latter] movement’s demise.”409  
While there had been scattered black opposition to the strategy of non-
violence,410 it was not widely covered until Malcolm X leveled harsh 
                                                                                                                          
“revolutionary solidarity with all people fighting against the forces of imperialism, capitalism, racism 
and fascism”). 
407 Id. at 183. 
408 Id. at 184 (emphasis added). 
409 Yohuru Williams, Book Review, J.S. HIST. Vol. LXXII, No. 2, at 518, 519 (2006) (reviewing 
CHRISTOPHER B. STRAIN, PURE FIRE: SELF-DEFENSE AS ACTIVISM IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2005)); 
see also MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS, supra note 256, at 208.  The onset of Black power produced 
sharp birth pangs for its principal advocates.  Both CORE and SNCC were reduced to serious financial 
straits as white sympathizers deserted in droves.  This is not the unanimous view.  Christopher Strain 
argues that “the personal and largely apolitical issue of self-defense morphed into a highly public and 
political issue for black Americans in the 1960’s . . . that any assertion of self, or self-protection, by 
black Americans represented a blow against racism and bigotry . . . even though it was often an 
individual act of defiance, free from formal coordination, collective action or overtly political aims.”  
STRAIN, supra note 148, at 6–7.  
410 Early on, the Black nationalist press questioned the utility of the nonviolent strategy and some 
criticisms equated nonviolence with cowardice.  Wendt, Protection or Path, supra note 218, at 325.  
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public criticisms of Martin Luther King.411  Even Malcolm’s incendiary 
advocacy paid lip service to the strategic dichotomy.  He pressed the self-
defense point, arguing that Blacks are “peaceful people” except in response 
to aggressors.  He explicitly invoked the Second Amendment and claimed 
a fundamental and constitutional right to self-defense against criminal 
attack.  But in a final flourish Malcolm plunged fully into advocacy of 
political violence.  “The biggest criminal against whom Blacks need to 
defend themselves”, he claimed was the state, “Uncle Sam.”412 
Militant advocacy of political violence raised the difficulty and costs 
of defending the strategic dichotomy and diminished its effectiveness.413  
The influence of the radicals and the problem they posed for 
conservative/integrationist support of the strategic dichotomy is illustrated 
by the shift of Black activists in Cleveland from nonviolent protests of de 
facto school segregation, to creation of the Medgar Evers Rifle Club 
Community Self-Defense Organization.414  
In contrast to Southern protective squads, the Medgar Evers Rifle Club 
was not a response to overt racist threats and served no evident “protective 
purpose.”415  Such a group could not be justified on the foundation of 
traditional self-defense that the leadership had recognized and 
accommodated through the strategic dichotomy.  Now, the preparation for 
violence spilled over into a less defined setting and could be construed as 
threatening political violence.   
Simon Wendt’s assessment of the Black Power movement underscores 
the point.  Advocacy of political violence “fostered violent race riots, 
betrayed the integrationist and nonviolent vision of earlier activism” and 
                                                                                                                          
Also it is evident that nonviolence (like any opposition to racism) was not cost free.  In the summer of 
1956, one official of the White Citizen’s Council in Alabama explained the growth of his organization: 
“The bus boycott made us . . . . Before the niggers stopped riding the buses, we had only 800 members.  
Now we have 13,000 to 14,000 in Montgomery alone.”  THOMAS R. BROOKS, WALLS COME 
TUMBLING DOWN: A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1940–1970, at 116 (1974). 
411 Wendt, Protection or Path, supra note 218, at 325.  It is difficult to know all of the reasons 
that moved Black radicals to the seemingly suicidal strategy of political violence.  Frustration, hubris, 
and desperation may have all played a role.  In many ways, radical advocacy of political violence was a 
strategy of talk loudly and carry a small stick.  However, a 1963 Brink and Harris Survey produced an 
interesting response to the question: “Some people have said that since there are ten whites for every 
Negro in America, if it came to white against Negro, the Negroes would lose.  Do you agree with this 
or disagree?”  Only two in ten Blacks agreed.  WILLIAM BRINK & LOUIS HARRIS, THE NEGRO 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 74 (1963).    
412 Antihostile, MALCOLM X ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT (Harlem, 1964), YOUTUBE (Apr. 9, 
2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cz3isgUZe5Y.  
413 Wendt, Protection or Path, supra note 218, at 328.  After his split with the Nation of Islam, 
Malcolm X founded the secular Organization of Afro-American Unity, which advocated the creation of 
Black controlled educational, cultural, economic, and political institutions and active armed resistance 
to white violence.  Id. at 325. 
414 Id. at 326. 
415 Id.   
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was a strategic failure.416  Initially designated “The Black Panther Party for 
Self-Defense” the Panthers pushed political violence under the umbrella of 
self-defense.417  For them, self-defense included “strategic choices and 
carefully posed challenges to the so-called legitimate forms of state 
violence that had become all too regularly used within Black 
communities.”418  The Panthers flouted the traditional distinction between 
self-defense and political violence and the consequences confirmed the 
fears of generations of Black leaders.   
The Black Panther Party was decimated by federal, state, and local 
response to its open campaign of political violence.  Direct confrontations 
with the state lead to incarceration and deaths of party members.419  
Confirming the long-standing assessment, Huey Newton later 
acknowledged in his memoirs that political violence was counterproductive 
and brought the Panthers an unwinnable war with the state that destroyed 
their white support.420  
Splinter groups like the Black Liberation Party were even more overt 
advocates and practitioners of political violence under the banner of self-
defense.  The BLA’s avowed strategy included preemptive strikes against 
police.421  The official response was predictable.422  The trajectory of these 
                                                                                                                          
416 Id. at 320.  
417 Id. at 328–29. 
418 Id. at 326. 
419 Id. at 327. 
420 Id. at 328. 
421 MARYLAND STATE POLICE: CRIMINAL INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, THE BLACK LIBERATION 
ARMY: UNDERSTANDING—MONITORING—CONTROLLING 4 (1991).  A core conviction of the BLA 
was to take control of the community by killing police (both Black and white).  Id. at 4, 12.  The BLA 
claimed credit for the murder of at least two policemen at a Harlem housing project and the attempted 
murder of two others who were guarding the home of a lawyer who was prosecuting a case against the 
BPP.  KENNETH O’REILLY, “RACIAL MATTERS”: THE FBI’S SECRET FILE ON BLACK AMERICA, 1960–
1972, at 321 (1989).  Assata Shakur (JoAnne Chesimard) provides an illuminating account.  Senit 
Rahel Debesai, Assata Olugbala Shakur, UNIV. MINN. (May 23, 2001), 
http://voices.cla.umn.edu/artistpages/shakur_assata.php.  Shakur was convicted of murdering a State 
trooper, then sprung from jail by members of the BLA.  Id.  She then fled to Cuba where she wrote an 
autobiography that offers an insider’s account of the BPP and BLA.  Id.  See generally ASSATA 
SHAKUR, ASSATA: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1987).  Shakur’s assessment highlights the divide between 
the strategy of radical resistance and coalition building.  See ASSATA, supra, at 227 (“One day, in the 
not too distant future, any Black organization that is not based on bootlicking and tomming will be 
forced underground.”).  John Castellucci offers a less sympathetic view of the BLA and similar 
organizations, stating frankly that the “BLA went underground to kill cops.”  JOHN CASTELLUCCI, THE 
BIG DANCE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF KATHY BOUDIN AND THE TERRORIST FAMILY THAT COMMITTED 
THE BRINK’S ROBBERY MURDERS 134 (1986).   
422 There is an interesting parallel between the Black radical movements of this period and the 
radical left.  Laura Browder details the advocacy of armed political violence by various radical leftist 
groups with a focus on radical women of the 1960s and 1970s.  See LAURA BROWDER, HER BEST 
SHOT: WOMEN AND GUNS IN AMERICA 136–37 (2006) (recounting the focus on tracing women’s use of 
guns in the 1960s and 1970s as a means of placing themselves within an American tradition).  Her 
treatment of “Armed Women of the Far Right” reflects a similar self-destructive advocacy of political 
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groups confirmed the futility of Black political violence. 
In what Doug McAdam marks as a contraction of political 
opportunities, the period 1966–1970 is crucial in the development of the 
modern orthodoxy.423  Radical organizations were in decline.424  In the 
North, urban riots marked a sort of failure of the civil rights leadership to 
connect to the energy that fueled the violence.  This failure to connect 
made the surviving organizations even more dependent on external (white 
progressive) sources of funding and support.425  Urban rioting diminished 
Black political capital, prompted white backlash, and pressed the Blacks 
more firmly into the camp of progressive allies.426  
In this environment, it was practically and conceptually difficult and 
tactically wasteful to expend the political capital necessary to sustain the 
strategic dichotomy.  When Black radicals flouted the strategic dichotomy, 
the crucial question was whether more conservative organizations would 
step in to defend it.  This was an entirely new dynamic.  The incentives and 
opportunities to deploy the strategic dichotomy on behalf of a competing 
group within the movement were minimal with dubious promise of payoff.  
The radicals had sullied the strategic dichotomy with claims of equivalence 
between political violence and self-defense.  Increasing efforts by 
conservatives/integrationists to sustain the dichotomy threatened to inflame 
progressives and seemed less relevant to the floundering northern 
movement.   
There was an early marker of this in 1966.  On August 21, 
representatives from along spectrum of Black leadership appeared on the 
nationally syndicated political talk show, Meet the Press, to address Civil 
Rights.427  It was a pivotal and high profile airing of the strategic 
dichotomy.  
Opposing the radical implications of “Black Power” were Martin 
Luther King of SCLC, Roy Wilkins of the NAACP and Whitney Young of 
the Urban League.428  Defending it were James Meredith, Stokely 
Carmichael of SNCC and Floyd McKissick of CORE.429  Carmichael had 
deployed the phrase “Black Power” in June of 1966 in a Greenwood, 
                                                                                                                          
violence.  See id. at 186–87 (discussing armed female activists of the far right and the effect of using 
their sexual attention to attract male recruits) . 
423 MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS, supra note 256, at 201–02. 
424 Id. at 191.   
425 Id. at 208–10 
426 See id. at 194 (explaining how the “rac[e] issue tended to polarize the various components of 
[the Democrats’] traditional urban coalition” and how the “white ethnics abandoned the party in 
droves”); see also LEVINE, supra note 403, at 204 (stating that Blacks lost political allies as a result of 
“white backlash”). 
427 Meet the Press (transcript of NBC television broadcast Aug. 21, 1966), at 1, 2, available at 
http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/meet-press#. 
428 Id. at 2–3. 
429 Id. at 3–4.   
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Mississippi speech, initiating the resumption of the Mississippi March 
Against Fear.430 
The questioning acknowledged the traditional insistence upon a 
distinction between self-defense and political violence.  Host Lawrence 
Spivak’s question to Floyd McKissick, the new Director of CORE, reflects 
this mainstream acknowledgement of the strategic dichotomy: “There is a 
difference between self-defense and non-violence. . . . Everybody believes 
in self-defense. . . . Am I to understand then that you and Dr. Martin Luther 
King really are not in disagreement on the principle and the philosophy of 
nonviolence?”431 
McKissick responded that “self-defense and nonviolence are not 
incompatible,” but equivocated on whether he agreed with King about the 
precise boundary between self-defense and political violence.432   
Unable to draw a direct answer from McKissick, the panel put the 
question to King.433  King’s cautious response reflected the circumstances.  
Contrast King’s earlier characterization of self-defense in the Robert 
Williams controversy as “moral,” “legal,” and perhaps earning blacks 
support for the “courage and self-respect it reflects”.434  Now, in the 
shadow of radical invocations of Black Power, King offered a barely 
recognizable rendition of the strategic dichotomy that showed an obvious 
concern about statements or actions that would prompt political violence: 
I believe firmly in nonviolence. . . . I think a turn to violence 
on the part of the Negro at this time would be both 
impractical and immoral.  Now, if Mr. McKissick believes in 
that, I certainly agree with him.  Now, on the question of 
defensive violence, I have made it clear that I don’t think we 
need programmatic action around defensive violence.  People 
are going to defend themselves anyway.  I think the minute 
you have programmatic action around defensive violence and 
pronouncements about it, the line of demarcation between 
defensive violence and aggressive violence becomes very 
thin.  The minute the nomenclature of violence gets into the 
atmosphere, people begin to respond violently and in their 
unsophisticated minds they cannot quite make the distinction 
between defensive and aggressive violence.435 
Spivak pressed the self-defense/political violence boundary again in an 
                                                                                                                          
430 WENDT, SELF-DEFENSE, supra note 121, at 131. 
431 Meet the Press, supra note 427, at 20–21. 
432 Id. at 22. 
433 Id.  
434 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 5 The Social Organization of Nonviolence, in THE PAPERS OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 299, 302 (2005). 
435 Meet the Press, supra note 427, at 22. 
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exchange with James Meredith.  The result was a raw and open 
endorsement of political violence that defied the distinctions Blacks 
traditionally had worked to sustain through the strategic dichotomy. 
Referencing Meredith’s criticisms of King’s nonviolent approach, Spivak 
asked,  
Mr. Meredith, don’t you think we ought to get straight on the 
difference between nonviolence and self-defense? . . .  I think 
when Dr. King and others speak about nonviolence they say 
that groups of negroes shouldn’t take [arms] . . . . I don’t 
think that there are many of us who don’t believe in the right 
of self-defense of [any] Negro against anyone who attacks 
him. . . . When we talk about nonviolence, we are saying that 
the Negro ought not in groups or alone take up a gun . . . in 
order to take what he believes belongs to him.436 
Meredith’s response was devastating to the long and careful efforts to 
maintain the strategic dichotomy, rendering it an awkward tool with 
dubious political utility: 
MR. MERIDITH:  [T]he Negro has never entertained the 
idea of taking up arms against the whites . . . . But now I 
think the Negro must become part of this mainstream and if 
the whites—now you take Mississippi, for instance—now I 
know the people that shot in my home years ago.  They know 
the people that killed all of the Negroes that have been  
killed. . . . [T]he Negro has no choice but to remove these 
men and they have to be removed. 
MR. SPIVAK:  Are you suggesting then that if several 
Negroes are killed or any white men are killed and the law 
does not punish them, as happens very often in the case of 
white men too, that people ought to organize a[s] vigilante[s] 
and go out and take the law into their own hands and commit 
violence?  You are not saying that, are you, Mr. Meredith? 
MR. MERIDITH:  That is exactly what I am saying.  Exactly 
MR. CARMICHAEL:  If those won’t do it, who is going to 
do it?  
MR. SPIVAK:  Mr. Meredith, do you mean to tell me that 
you believe the Negroes in this country ought to organize, 
take up guns . . . .  
MR. MEREDITH:  This is precisely, and I will tell you why, 
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because the white supremacy is a system— 
MR. SPIVAK:  Well, Mr. Meredith, this doesn’t even make 
sense against 180 million people.  If you do it they are going 
to do it.  
MR. ROWAN:  Mr. Carmichael, do I detect that you agree 
with Mr. Meredith that the Negro may have to take up arms?  
MR. CARMICHAEL:  I agree 150 percent that black people 
have to move to the position where they organize themselves 
and they are in fact a protection for each other. . . . [I]f in fact 
180 million people just think they are going to turn on us and 
we are going to sit there, like the Nazis did to the Jews, they 
are wrong.  We are going to go down together, all of us.  
MR. EVANS:  Mr. Wilkins, I want to ask you, . . . about 
[Carmichael’s] last statement, do you think it serves the 
Negro or the white man, his purpose in any way, to threaten 
that the ten percent of the Negro population can, if it has to, 
drag down this whole country? 
MR. WILKINS: I think Mr. Carmichael is—if he weren’t 
where he is, he ought to be on Madison Avenue.  He is a 
public relations man par excellence.  He abounds in the 
provocative phrase.  Of course, no one believes that the 
Negro minority in this country is going to take up arms and 
try to rectify every wrong that has been done the Negro race 
if somebody doesn’t rectify it through the regular channels.437 
It is easy to understand how in this environment the leadership would 
become more circumspect in deploying the strategic dichotomy and about 
its general approach to the question of black violence, even in self-defense.  
With subtle distinctions harder to sustain, prudence demanded strong 
condemnation of the dangerous advocacy of political violence as self-
defense being advanced by the black power movement.   
For Wilkins, some have argued that the approach was tactical; that 
donations to the NAACP quadrupled in the period 1966–1968 when the 
organization was vigorously opposing the radical concept of “black 
power.”438  Whatever the motivation, Wilkins plainly opposed the 
aggressive, radical rendition of the strategic dichotomy.   
Still, in other venues, Wilkins continued rhetorical support of a careful, 
conservative version.  In his keynote address at the 1966 NAACP 
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convention, Wilkins criticized the radical turn of SNCC, directly deployed 
a traditional, conservative rendition of the strategic dichotomy, and 
repudiated the radical aggressive rendition (first addressing SNCC’s new 
public endorsement of self-defense and then repudiating the new black 
power movement): 
One organization [SNCC] which has been meeting in 
Baltimore has passed a resolution declaring for defense of 
themselves by Negro citizens if they are attacked.  This is not 
new as far as the NAACP is concerned.  Historically our 
Association has defended in court those persons who have 
defended themselves and their homes with firearms. . . . But 
the more serious division in the civil rights movement is the 
one posed by a word formulation that implies clearly a 
difference in goals.  No matter how endlessly they try to 
explain it, the term “black power” means anti-white  
power. . . . It has to mean separatism. . . . It is a reverse 
Mississippi, a reverse Hitler, a reverse Ku Klux Klan. . . . We 
of the NAACP will have none of this.439 
This was an important moment of converging trends.  While the 
militant strategy of “political violence as self-defense” was proving a 
failure, coalition politics and the conservative strategy of institutional 
change were paying off:  
In marked contrast to the withdrawal of external support 
experienced by SCLC, SNCC, and CORE, the NAACP 
enjoyed a steep and steady rise during this period in its level 
of outside funding. . . . [T]he NAACP came to be seen by 
external support groups as virtually the only “acceptable” 
funding option available. . . . In response, first to the 
substantive radicalization of SNCC and CORE, and later to 
King’s antiwar stance, many groups that had earlier 
contributed to one of these three organizations shifted their 
support to the NAACP. . . . By the end of the [1960s], this 
dramatic redistribution of external support had helped to 
reduce the once formidable Big Four to a single strong 
movement organization. 440 
Important institutional changes were also unfolding.  President Lyndon 
                                                                                                                          
439 Roy Wilkins, Whither “Black Power”?, CRISIS, Aug.–Sept. 1966, at 353, 353–54; see also 
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Johnson advanced the War on Poverty with spoils to the Black 
underclass.441  He pressed for and signed landmark civil rights 
legislation442 and appointed former NAACP Chief Counsel Thurgood 
Marshall as the first Black to the post of Solicitor General and then to the 
United Supreme Court.443  Concurrently, Johnson pressed for and signed 
the Gun Control Act of 1968,444 lamenting that it was a “watered-down” 
version of what he had proposed.445   
The themes intersect in Johnson’s nomination of Marshall to the 
Supreme Court.  In preparation for Marshall’s confirmation hearings, 
Johnson “put him on a national commission to study crime and violence in 
American cities.  The idea was to keep Marshall’s name in the news as a 
sober, rational voice able to respond to black militants.”446  Throughout the 
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black violence, see ROBERT SHERRILL, THE SATURDAY NIGHT SPECIAL 280, 282–83 (1973), Wilkins 
was asked by Robert Novak, “Would you be in favor of a massive effort to disarm the Negroes in the 
ghettoes, just to try to prevent these open-shooting wars such as occurred in Newark last night?”  Meet 
the Press, supra note 427, at 9.  Wilkins’s principle response was a standard rendition of the strategic 
dichotomy: “I wouldn’t disarm the Negroes and leave them helpless prey to the people who wanted to 
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armed self-defense and is an early signal of potential support in the Black leadership for stringent gun 
control. 
446 JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 334 (1998). 
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1960s and into the 1970s as Blacks registered to vote in greater numbers, 
more Black representatives were elected to legislatures.447  Blacks gained 
increasingly influential positions in the executive branch and Black 
administrations came to power in various cities.448   
This prevailing Black establishment faced a new reality.  A product of 
successful coalition politics and beneficiary of legislation forged by 
progressive alliances, it disconnected from the tradition of Black self-
defense that itself was now sullied by the radicals’ blurring of the boundary 
between private self-defense and political violence.  With access to new 
levels of power, the Black establishment now could plausibly view the 
historic reasons for distrust of the state as having disappeared with their 
own ascendency to power.449   
This was precisely the time that the national gun control movement 
emerged and was quickly ensconced in the progressive coalition.450  With 
cities burning and black radicals preaching violent revolution,451 politicians 
and editorialists called for stricter gun legislation as a way to disarm the 
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176–77 (2001) (discussing the 1965 race riot in California and how it was described as “guerrilla 
warfare, an uprising, or a revolt”).  
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ghettos.452  Black mayors, local state and national representatives and 
appointees—having gained power, now facing the burden of exercising 
it—embraced the progressive program of supply side gun control as an 
answer to the crime and unrest afflicting their new domains. 
From there, the modern orthodoxy took hold and flourished as supply-
side gun control became an article of faith for progressives.  By 1976, for 
example, Maynard Jackson, the first black mayor of Atlanta,453 serving as 
the Chairman of the National Coalition to Ban Handguns, urged that, “[t]he 
United States should move immediately to ban the import, manufacture, 
sale and possession of all handguns . . . .”454   Today, the worry that this 
demands a level of trust in government that is incompatible with the Black 
experience, practice, and policy is answered with the assertion that things 
have changed.455  The next section will critique the view that changed 
circumstances validate the modern orthodoxy. 
B.  Answering the Twenty-First Century Objection 
One might agree that there is a strong tradition of armed self-defense 
in the Black community and still reason that the modern orthodoxy is 
justified on the view that “things have changed.”  There is no dispute that 
Black-on-Black crime by desperate young men in poor urban communities 
is a scourge that prompts many to embrace the promise of supply-side gun 
control.  This view is pressed in detail by Michael de Leeuw, author of the 
NAACP’s Amicus Brief supporting the District’s gun ban456 in District of 
Columbia v. Heller.457  His essay in the Harvard Blackletter Law Journal 
defends and carries forward the modern orthodoxy, arguing that in urban 
districts with Black administrations, stringent supply-side gun laws should 
be upheld as an exercise of community autonomy and that support for such 
exceptions to the right to keep and bear arms should be an essential part of 
the modern civil rights agenda.458  This is a more race-driven rendition of 
Justice Breyer’s Heller dissent, which would permit local governments to 
                                                                                                                          
452 SHERRILL, supra note 445, at 283–90.  
453 David M. Halbfinger, Maynard H. Jackson Jr., First Black Mayor of Atlanta and a Political 
Force, Dies at 65, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A29.  
454 Maynard Holbrook Jackson, Jr., Handgun Control: Constitutional and Critically Needed, 8 
N.C. CENT. L.J. 189, 189 (1977).  “In [1989], the National Coalition to Ban Handguns changed its 
name to the Coalition to Stop Gun Violence to reflect its view that assault rifles, as well as handguns, 
should be outlawed.”  KRISTIN A. GOSS, DISARMED: THE MISSING MOVEMENT FOR GUN CONTROL IN 
AMERICA 112 (2006).  The National Urban League continues as a member of the Coalition.  Member 
Organizations, COAL. TO STOP GUN VIOLENCE, http://www.csgv.org/about-us/member-organizations 
(last visited Feb. 23, 2013). 
455 See infra note 469 (discussing de Leeuw et al.).  
456 Brief of Amicus Curiae the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc. in Support of 
Petitioners at 25–29, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290).  
457 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
458 de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 136–37. 
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impose more stringent limits on generally available firearms or outright de 
jure bans in certain communities.459   
There is, however, a mistake of focus in the objection that ‘things have 
changed.’460  Even if it is true that Blacks no longer have to worry about 
racist violence461 and malevolent governments (or more contestably their 
agents),462 the objection ignores that the Black self-defense tradition is 
                                                                                                                          
459 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 722 (2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).  The impulse 
to exalt the role of benevolent governments in this context is an understandable counterpoint to the 
historic treatment of Black-on-Black crime as a non-issue by racist state and local governments.  See, 
e.g., POWDERMAKER, supra note 25, at 169–74 (1939) (arguing that malevolent and neglectful 
governments forced Blacks to settle their own intra-group difficulties using violence that might have 
been avoided by the imposition of the rule of law by a benign administrator). 
460 The “things have changed” argument also might dictate a change in views about the death 
penalty and prisoners’ rights.  If Black administrations and Black police are now locking up Black 
criminals that prey on Black victims, why should Blacks continue to worry about rights of the accused 
in the same way we worried through most of our history (where the state was notorious for 
misidentifying, viciously interrogating, mistreating and Black suspects and offenders)?  The answer is 
that the problems continue and have not been erased simply by the election of Black mayors; the same 
is true for armed self-defense. 
Finally, the leap from Black electoral success to the assumption that poor Black communities 
should trust the Black security apparatus is a perilous one.  The dynamic between police culture and 
minority communities is a complicated one that is beyond the scope of this Article.  But that 
complexity is manifested in the ample evidence that Black mayors does not automatically equal 
harmonious police-community relations.  The recent indictment of New Orleans Police officers for 
assault and murder of Blacks following Hurricane Katrina is a prime illustration of this.  See Trymaine 
Lee, Inquiries Give Credence to Reports of Racial Violence After Katrina, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, 
at A9 (“Several police officers and a white civilian accused of racially motivated violence have recently 
been indicted [and convicted] in various cases, and more incidents are coming to light as the Justice 
Department has started several investigations into civil rights violations after the storm.”).  There, at 
least one of the officers was Black.  See Jarvis DeBerry, Black New Orleans Police Officers Help 
Maintain Blue Wall of Silence, TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 27, 2012), 
http://www.nola.com/opinions/index.ssf/2012/05/black_new_orleans_ 
police_offic.html (“Robert Faulcon, a black officer convicted in the Danziger Bridge case, got the 
longest sentence given to an officer for Katrina-related crimes.”).  While this alone is not an argument 
for civilian armament, it undercuts trust in the collective security apparatus, which is an important 
component of the gun control movement’s most aggressive anti-self-defense views. 
461 This, however, is contestable, as evidenced by the Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks 
modern episodes and groups that advocate racist violence.  See What We Do, S. POVERTY L. CTR., 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-involved/what-we-do (last visited Mar. 4, 2013) (“We track the activities 
of hate groups and domestic terrorists across America, and we launch innovative lawsuits that seek to 
destroy networks of radical extremists.”).   
462 This, too, is contestable.  See, e.g., Victoria Cherrie, NAACP Wants SBI to Look at Shootings, 
CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 13, 2008), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2008/06/13/45145/naacp-
wants-sbi-to-look-at-shootings.html (describing the NAACP of North Carolina’s effort to enact state 
legislation in response to police-involved shootings); Charles Ellison, Tensions Persist in Portland 
Since Fatal Police Shooting of Unarmed Man, POLITIC365 (Sept. 6, 2010), 
http://politic365.com/2010/09/06/tensions-persist-in-portland-since-fatal-police-shooting-of-unarmed-
Black-man/ (noting local anger over perceptions of chronic police brutality in Portland, Oregon).  
[M]any people in Portland are perplexed that large segments of Portland’s African 
American community see the shooting death of Aaron Campbell through a racial 
lens.  A white Portland police officer shot Campbell, an unarmed black man, in the 
back during a confrontation at an apartment building. Police and city leaders have 
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fundamentally a response to the failure and limitations of government.463   
It is true that the Black self-defense tradition emerged in a context where 
much of the reason for this failure was overt hostility and official neglect. 
But it is a mistake to presume that the reason for failure of government is 
pivotal.  From the perspective of people at risk, the reason is secondary.  
The central thing is that they face a physical threat within a window of 
state failure.464  The reasons for the state’s failure to protect these people 
                                                                                                                          
come under intense criticism for confusion at the scene.  But Ingram and other 
African Americans who live here say the Campbell shooting cannot be seen as a 
singular incident: It confirms a deep-seated distrust of police and a fear that 
interaction with them has the potential to turn violent. 
Nikole Hannah-Jones, Black Experience Propels Anger in Police Shooting of Aaron 
Campbell, OREGONIAN (Feb. 19, 2010), http://www.oregonlive.com/portland 
/index.ssf/2010/02/black_experience_propels_anger.html. 
Then the Homer police showed up, two white officers whose arrival caused the 
participants at the Black family gathering to quickly fall silent.  Within moments, 
Monroe lay dead, shot by one of the officers as his family looked on.  
. . . . 
Yet the Feb. 20 Homer incident was not an isolated case.  Across the nation, in four 
cases in recent months, white police officers have been accused of unprovoked 
shootings of African Americans in what civil rights leaders say are illustrations of 
the potentially deadly consequences of racial profiling by police.  In the mostly 
white Houston suburb of Bellaire, a 23-year-old black man sitting in his own SUV 
in the driveway of his parents’ home was shot and wounded on New Year’s Eve by 
police who mistakenly believed he had stolen the vehicle. The case is under 
investigation.  In Oakland, a transit police officer has been charged with murder for 
allegedly shooting an unarmed black man in the back while he was restrained and 
lying face down on a train platform on New Year’s Day. 
. . . . 
The evidence is not merely anecdotal.  The most recent national analysis from the 
Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics shows that blacks and Hispanics 
were nearly three times as likely as whites to be searched by police—and blacks 
were almost four times as likely as whites to be subjected to the use of force. 
Howard Witt, Race May Be Factor in Police Shooting of Unarmed Elderly Man, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 13, 
2009), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-race-shootings-
webmar13,0,7686526.story; Press Release, NAACP of N.C, Stop the Epidemic of Police Shootings of 
African Americans! Joint Statement on Charlotte Police Shootings (Jun. 2008), available at 
http://http://carolinajustice.typepad.com/ncnaacp/2008/06/stop-the-epidem.html#more (highlighting the 
series of Charlotte-area civilian shootings by police during the first five months of 2008). 
463 For an assessment of my past scholarly work on the topic, see Nicholas J. Johnson, Self- 
Defense?, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL. 187, 194 (2006) (“At the instant the threat arises, government generally 
is just an abstraction with nothing to say about the physical matters at hand, powerless either to impair 
self-defense or for that matter to protect the victim.”).  See also Nicholas J. Johnson, Principles and 
Passions: The Intersection of Abortion and Gun Rights, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 97, 118 (1997) (“The 
state’s inability to stop imminent criminal attacks justifies, and indeed compels, a right to armed self-
defense to fill the gap.”). 
464 I have previously addressed the assertion that opposition to gun control is the cause of this 
government failure.  See Johnson, Imagining Gun Control, supra note 388, at 851 (noting that even 
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may have changed. But the core private interest in self-preservation within 
that window and the tools to facilitate it have not.  
In an earlier era, Thomas Fortune urged, “in the absence of law . . . we 
maintain that every individual has every right . . . to . . . protect himself.465  
Ida B. Wells advocated armed self-defense as a response to government 
failure, noting the folly of trusting the government that was plainly not 
strong enough to protect the exercise of the ballot.466  She advocated the 
Winchester repeating rifle on the view that even if the Federal government 
was not overtly hostile, it certainly was not equipped to protect Blacks 
from imminent threats.467  In 1963, CORE workers complained to the still-
pacifist national office, “[w]e cannot tell someone not to defend his 
property and the lives of his family . . . .”468 
In 1916, W.E.B. Du Bois picked up a gun to protect his home and 
family.  Nearly a century later, Shelly Parker was similarly besieged by 
thugs in her Washington D.C. neighborhood.  In both cases, within a 
specific window, the state was no answer to the impending threat.  We do 
not begrudge Du Bois his gun.  But Shelly Parker, under the full weight of 
the modern orthodoxy, required intervention by the United States Supreme 
Court to validate her right to armed self-defense.  And even now, some 
lament the Court’s decision as a tragedy for Blacks.469    
This is a curious turn of events.  It is as though the complexion of the 
threat has changed our focus and concern entirely away from the 
immediate victim.  This may be natural for remote observers and public 
officials pulled by disparate policy considerations and themes of 
community victimization.  Indeed, it is a predictable stance for those 
plugged into mainstream, public institutions.  But from the perspective of 
the immediate victim, the color of the attacker makes not one whit of 
difference and armed self-defense remains as important as ever. 
Where government fails, the necessity of self-help continues. Black 
electoral success does nothing to diminish the problem of imminence that 
always has been the core of legitimate self-defense or the problem of finite 
resources that renders public response to private threats even more 
tenuous.  The next two subsections argue that the failure and limitations of 
the state, in the context of imminence and finite resources require a 
                                                                                                                          
when an outright prohibition of handguns in Washington D.C. overcame opposition and was instituted 
prior to the Heller decision, the city failed at reining in gun crime). 
465 Thornbrough, supra note 149, at 23.  
466 JACQUELINE JONES ROYSTER, IDA B. WELLS BARNETT, SOUTHERN HORRORS AND OTHER 
WRITINGS 70 (1997). 
467 Id. 
468 TYSON, supra note 143, at 291.  
469 See, e.g., de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 148 (“[T]he possibility of a loosening of firearms 
restrictions around the country in the wake of Heller should be of serious concern to civil rights 
activists and lawyers.”). 
 2013] FIREARMS POLICY AND THE BLACK COMMUNITY 1571 
reassessment of the modern orthodoxy. 
1.  Government Failure Within the Window of Imminence  
Self-defense is a universal exception to the state’s monopoly on 
legitimate violence.470  Recognition of state impotence is built into the 
doctrine through the imminence requirement. Self-defense is justified 
where individuals encounter immediate threats to which government 
cannot respond and private violence is necessary to avoid death or serious 
bodily harm. 471 George Fletcher elaborates: 
[T]he imminence requirement expresses the limits of 
governmental competence:  when the danger to a protected 
interest is imminent and unavoidable, the legislature can no 
longer make reliable judgments about which of the 
conflicting interests should prevail.  Similarly, when an 
attack against private individuals is imminent, the police are 
no longer in a position to intervene and exercise the state’s 
function of securing public safety. The individual right to 
self-defense kicks in precisely because immediate action is 
necessary.472 
State failure within the window of imminence is universal.473  Given 
                                                                                                                          
470 See David B. Kopel et al., The Human Right of Self-Defense, 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 43, 178 
(2007) (“No government has the legitimate authority to forbid a person from exercising her human 
right to defend herself against a violent attack or to forbid her from taking the steps and acquiring the 
tools necessary to exercise that right.”).  Validation of violence in self-defense is ancient.  It is a 
component of most civilized systems of government, to the point that in the U.S. system, even the 
claim of the lowly slave was occasionally recognized.  See Johnson, Self-Defense?, supra note 463, at 
209 (describing that “in some instances, even the dehumanized slave was acknowledged to have some 
of the basic prerogatives inherent in all God’s creatures”). 
471 Imminence also impacts our views about the utility of handguns and storage requirements.  
The handgun is both portable and easily accessible, both of which are important variables in responding 
to imminent threats.  Imminence also complicates the conversation about safe storage (storing loaded 
guns, utilizing trigger locks, etc.). 
472 George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 
553, 570 (1996) (emphasis added).  For more analysis of self-defense by the same author, see GEORGE 
P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW (2000). 
473 Some may contest this on the view that the state certainly can affect the precursors of violent 
aggression and prohibit certain types of weapons, thus at least eliminating the violence committed with 
those weapons.  The problem is that the supply-side controls that stem from this reasoning require 
reductions of the gun inventory to levels approaching zero.  That is simply impossible in a country with 
300 million guns, a robust gun culture, and a contested constitutional right to arms.   
The implications of the imminence problem are illustrated in another way.  Assume for the sake 
of argument that our government actually could make guns disappear.  This would eliminate gun crime.  
It would also exacerbate the imbalance of power in favor of the young, strong, and ruthless.  The gun, 
through its ease of use, equalizes the capacity to commit violence so that the old and weak are even 
with the young and strong.  In a world of contact weapons however, there surely will be no gun 
violence, but query whether that is a better world.  See, e.g., Brief for Southeastern Legal Foundation, 
Inc. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 
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our history, one might expect Blacks to be particularly sensitive to this 
failure, especially since the window of imminence is often larger in Black 
neighborhoods where various challenges stretch public resources.  So how 
do we explain the shift of the modern orthodoxy away from the traditional 
support of self-defense?  Perhaps the reason is that failure of the state is 
less galling today.  Under slavery, Black Codes, and Jim Crow, when the 
state intervened, it was often a menace rather than a benefit.474  Under 
those circumstances, reliance on the state for personal security was more 
obviously an absurd proposition. 
Today, state failure is less pernicious and more in the nature of 
inherent limitations.  So it is possible for those ensconced in local, state, 
and national bureaucracies to comfortably urge reliance on the state and 
ignore the continuing failure of government within the window of 
imminence. But if that is the explanation, then the modern orthodoxy is not 
really a clear-eyed policy decision to trade off the costs of imminent 
threats.   Rather, private concerns about imminent threats are just glibly 
ignored because the most egregious renditions of state failure have passed.   
Failure of the modern orthodoxy to engage state failure in the context 
of imminence is highlighted, by contrast, to the thinking about it in the 
context of other issues on the progressive agenda. Progressives have 
pressed the idea of state failure aggressively to expand the range of 
legitimate self-defense in other contexts and in support of reproductive 
rights.475 
State failure is at the core of advocacy for expansion of self-defense for 
battered women.  One school of thought would actually eliminate the 
imminence requirement in favor of a no “genuine alternatives” standard, 
wherein state failure justifies self-defense, even absent an immediate threat 
of death or bodily harm.476  Here, state failure is urged as the justification 
                                                                                                                          
(2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 405570 at *I (highlighting the Founders’ belief that without arms, the 
strong would invariably dominate their weaker counterparts). 
474 For a factual background on Black self-defense jurisprudence, see supra notes 18–99 and 
accompanying text. 
475 See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in the 
Law of Evidence, 47 LOY. L. REV. 81, 94 (2001) (highlighting the reality that gender-specific suffering 
by women is often ignored within the context of our culture as a whole); Paul Butler, By Any Means 
Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REV. 721,763 (2003) 
(arguing that civil rights advocates view discrimination as a “malign evil” and that “[j]ust war doctrine 
allows a proportionate response”); Robert B. Chapman, Missing Persons: Social Science and 
Accounting for Race Gender, Class and Marriage in Bankruptcy, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 347, 409 (2002) 
(noting that the bankruptcy system redefined the relationship between the government, individuals, and 
their property); Mary Sigler, Contradiction, Coherence and Guided Discretion in the Supreme Court’s 
Capital Sentencing Jurisprudence, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1151, 1154 (2003) (maintaining that 
confusion stemming from courts’ just-punishment jurisprudence has complicated efforts to determine 
the constitutionality of capital punishment).  
476 See, e.g., Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination and the Social Contract, 57 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 579, 609 (1996) (“[B]ecause of the absence of genuine alternatives . . . if she does not 
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for a woman, who endures years of physical and emotional abuse, to kill 
her abusive husband in his sleep.477  The juxtaposition is striking and 
curious.  While the modern orthodoxy discounts state failure within the 
window of imminence, feminist advocacy invokes it as the primary reason 
for expanding self-defense for battered women.   
Notably, this feminist advocacy does not depend on any assertion that 
the state is overtly hostile to the interests of women478 (decline of the 
malevolent state remember, is central to the “things have changed” defense 
of the modern orthodoxy).  It is simply the fact of state failure that justifies 
a broader range of legitimate self-defense by battered women.  The 
comparison to the modern orthodoxy is ironic.  Progressive advocacy urges 
dramatic expansion of self-defense by battered women, deeming the 
reasons for government failure irrelevant.  The modern orthodoxy in 
contrast, would constrict armed self-defense simply on the view that 
government failure is no longer malicious.   
Other progressive commentators have pressed the issue of state failure 
to justify the right to abortion.  Robin West argues,  
To whatever degree we fail to create the minimal conditions 
for a just society, we also have a right, individually and 
fundamentally to be shielded from the most dire or simply 
the most damaging consequences of that failure. . . . We must 
have the right to opt out of an unjust patriarchal world that 
visits unequal but unparalleled harms upon women . . . with 
unwanted pregnancies.479    
In a society where physical attack is a real danger (especially in 
communities where the risk is generally higher) and government is a 
demonstrably incomplete response, West’s formulation is a solid 
foundation for a robust right of self-defense using standard civilian 
technology.480  It is odd that the modern orthodoxy—and perhaps 
progressive thinking generally—seems more comfortable with West’s 
                                                                                                                          
resort to defensive aggression, she will inevitably suffer death or grievous bodily harm by the 
assailant.”).  For critiques of the utilization of principles of self-defense to expand rights on the 
progressive agenda, see Johnson, Self-Defense?, supra note 463, at 187; Johnson, Principles and 
Passions, supra note 463, at 97; and Nicholas J. Johnson, Supply Restrictions at the Margins of Heller 
and the Abortion Analogue: Stenberg Principles, Assault Weapons and the Attitudinalist Critique, 60 
HASTINGS L.J. 1285 (2009). 
477 See Zipursky, supra note 385, at 583 (arguing that in such an instance, the wife really only has 
two options: kill or be killed). 
478 This recall is the core of the objection under the modern orthodoxy that things have changed. 
479 Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on Professor 
Brownstein’s Analysis of Casey, 45 HASTINGS L. J. 961, 964–65 (1994).  
480 Johnson, Principles and Passions, supra note 463, at 117. 
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formulation in the abortion context.481  When pressed, her critique of state 
failure provides comparatively stronger support for armed self-defense.482 
2.  Finite Resources  
Michael de Leeuw, Counsel for the NAACP as amici in Heller, argues 
that in urban communities where Black voters have elected Black 
administrations, gun prohibition should be respected as an exercise of 
community autonomy.483  But Black electoral success does nothing to 
diminish the limitations on state action that make self-defense a crucial 
private resource.   
Even the best-intentioned administrations must wrestle with practical, 
fiscal, and political limitations. 484  It is fair to expect that racism will not 
be the reason that Black administrations fail to fully protect Black citizens.  
But racism is only one of many reasons for people to resist entrusting their 
lives to the state.  The modern orthodoxy does not really answer the 
concerns of people like Shelly Parker and Otis McDonald, Black plaintiffs 
who complained that government had disarmed them but was not able to 
protect them.485  Engaging the issue explicitly in the context of those two 
examples is distracting because of the myriad other implications of the 
Heller and McDonald decisions.     
But there are many other illustrations of the problem. Consider, for 
example, the difficulties that plague the government and citizens of 
Detroit.   It is a story of decline, civic tragedy, and the full range of urban 
                                                                                                                          
481 See id. at 98–99 (asserting that our recognition of abortion rights and gun rights “allow what 
might be crucial private choices in extreme personal crises”); Johnson, Supply Restrictions, supra note 
476, at 1286 (stating that “there is a broad analytical intersection between abortion and gun-rights 
claims”). 
482 Johnson, Principles and Passions, supra note 463, at 117. 
483 de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 133–34. 
484 While failure of government in the context of imminent threats is a constant that cannot be 
avoided, other government failures are episodic.  The reasons will vary.  Historically, Blacks had good 
reason to expect overtly racist governments would not protect them.  Today, such episodic failures are 
more likely to result from limited resources.  
In Tulsa, Oklahoma, a search for a missing six-year-old girl tied up police.  So, a 911 call about a 
drunk threatening gun violence waited for nine minutes before an officer could be located, and a report 
of a woman being beaten waited twenty minutes before an officer was able to respond.  Police 
departments lament small increases in response time.  But thirty-second shifts one way or another still 
do not answer the basic problem that people must fend for themselves during the crucial moments 
when the danger is at its peak.  Do not forget that this data about response time does not incorporate the 
time it takes to get to a phone, and the people who are injured or killed without ever making contact 
with police.  Id.; see also Crime-Ridden Camden, N.J., Cuts Police Force Nearly in Half, CNN (Jan. 
18, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-01-18/us/new.jersey.layoffs_1_police-force-police-officers-
public-safety?_s=PM:US [hereinafter Crime-Ridden Camden]. 
485 Jon S. Vernick et al., Changing the Constitutional Landscape for Firearms: The US Supreme 
Court’s Recent Second Amendment Decisions, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2021 (2011). 
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challenges.486 In the middle of it is Johnette Bartham, a young Black 
woman who saw opportunity in Detroit.487  She learned quickly that the 
neighborhood where she invested $74,000 into a three thousand square 
foot brick colonial placed substantial demands on residents.488  
A neighbor said he would “look[] out for her” when she came home 
from work.489 She “befriended a local policeman, who would drive by at 
night to check on her.”490  But he was soon reassigned to another precinct.  
After that, if she felt unsafe returning home late at night, “she would drive 
to a major road, flag down a squad car and ask for an escort home.”491  
Break-ins became routine she explains, “I was constantly being targeted in 
a way I couldn’t predict, in a way that couldn’t be controlled by the 
police.”492 One night she returned home around 1:30 in the morning to find 
her front door broken open and what she thought was a robbery in 
progress.493  “She rushed back to her car to call 911 and waited there for 
police.  They arrived at 4:41 a.m., according to their report.”494   
In the past, the three-hour police response might have stemmed from 
overt racist neglect.  In modern Detroit that is not the explanation.  Today, 
the problem is resources.  The police department is seven hundred officers 
short.495  Chief Warren Evans has taken a triage approach, focusing on the 
worst crimes and hoping he is prescient enough to make this distinction 
with persistent accuracy.496  
So how do we justify denying the standard tools of civilian self-
defense to people who live under such conditions? Johnette Bartham 
survived to complain about a three-hour police response.  But what if she 
had faced an immediate threat?  How do we deny her the option of a 
handgun in her purse?  Would you would want that option for someone 
you cared about?497  If that is possible, then it is not obvious why 
                                                                                                                          
486 Alex P. Kellogg, Black Flight Hits Detroit, WALL ST. J. (June 5, 2010), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704292004575230532248715858.html. 
487 Id. 
488 Id. 
489 Id.   
490 Id. 
491 Id. 
492 Id. 
493 Id. 
494 Id. 
495 Id. 
496 Id.; see also Crime-Ridden Camden, supra note 484 (reporting slower police response time in 
Camden, New Jersey due to fewer police resources).  Less than two years later, “police acknowledge 
that they have all but ceded [Camden] streets to crime . . . [and] are already so overloaded they no 
longer respond to property crimes or car accidents that do not involve injuries”.  Kate Zernike, To Fight 
Crime, a Poor City Will Trade in Its Police, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/201
2/09/29/nyregion/overrun-by-crime-camden-trades-in-its-police-force.html?hp.  
497 Her story might have proceeded two ways.  She might have pulled a gun, then had it taken 
from her and used against her.  She might have pulled it out and scared off an attacker, in which case 
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weakening the right to arms to allow de jure gun bans in Black 
neighborhoods or other aggressive renditions of the modern orthodoxy 
should be “part of any civil rights agenda.”498   
V.  REASSESSING THE MODERN ORTHODOXY 
Granting my assessment to this point, some will still object that the 
modern orthodoxy is an essential and practical response to problem 
captured by William Oliver’s striking summary. 
The disproportionate rates of violent crime found among 
African Americans have been described in numerous studies 
and reports.  For example, the FBI reports that in 1998, 
African Americans, who constitute 13 percent of the general 
population, were overrepresented among persons arrested for 
murder (53 percent), robbery (55 percent), aggravated assault 
(30 percent) and assault (34 percent).  A significant 
characteristic of violent crime in the United States is that 
most violent incidents tend to involve an interracial victim-
offender relationship pattern.  That is, individuals who 
commit acts of violence generally commit these acts against 
members of their own racial group.  For example, in 1998, 94 
percent of black murder victims were slain by black 
offenders.  Similarly in 1998, 87 percent of white murder 
victims were slain by white. 
. . . . 
The most revealing data regarding the disproportionate 
impact that violent crime is having on African Americans, 
particularly black makes is the data on homicide 
victimization.  According to the FBI, in 1998, black males 
represented 38 percent of known homicide victims, followed 
in descending order by white males (35 percent), white 
                                                                                                                          
she would be added to the 2–2.5 million people in Gary Kleck and Marc Gertz’s Defensive Gun Use 
(“DGU”) count.  Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of 
Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 164 (1995).  She might have fired in 
self-defense and avoided prosecution, but been traumatized by the aftermath or even the subject of 
revenge attacks by the victim’s associates.  She might have fired and killed an innocent person, either 
with a stray bullet or because she mistook an innocent person for an attacker.  The data suggest that the 
non-shooting DGU is far more likely.  Id. at 173.  But beyond the statistical debate is a fundamental 
question about the rights of the individual facing a deadly threat. 
It is fair to object that guns are not a global long-term answer for the problems that afflict 
neighborhoods like this.  That is not my claim.  The focus here is the immediate problem of imminent 
threats.  Would you want the option of a gun for yourself or a loved one if you had to move into 
Jonnette’s house tonight?  
498 de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 137.   
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females (14 percent) and black females (9 percent).  High 
rates of homicide among African Americans also have been 
reported in compilations of health statistics.  According to 
data compiled by the National Center for Health Statistics 
(1998), black males had a homicide death rate of 52.6 per 
100,000 in 1996, whereas white males had a homicide death 
rate of 4.7 per 100,000. 
As a group, violence researchers generally regard individuals 
in the age range between fifteen and twenty-four as the most 
murder prone.  However, there are significant differences 
between black and white males of this age in terms of their 
homicide risk.  For example, white males fifteen to twenty-
four years of age had a homicide death rate of 6.4 per 
100,000 in 1996, whereas black males of this age range had 
a homicide death rate of 123 per 100,000, nearly twenty 
times greater than similarly aged white males.  Moreover, for 
every age range, black males have higher rates of homicide 
death than their white male counterparts of the same ages. 
A significant trend in homicide patterns involves the 
increasing youthfulness of homicide offenders and victims.  
Young black males experienced dramatic increases in both 
homicide victimization and offending rates in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s.  For example, the number of homicide 
victims in the fifteen to twenty-four age group increased 
nearly 50 percent between 1975 and 1992.  Moreover, in 
1987, homicide accounted for 42 percent of all deaths among 
young black males.  Persons between the ages of fifteen and 
nineteen experienced the greatest increases in the rate of 
death due to homicide in this period.  Since 1991, homicide 
rates have been declining among all race-sex subgroups in 
the United States.  However it is important to note that in 
spite of the declining homicide rates among black males, 
homicide remains the leading cause of death among black 
males between fifteen and twenty four years of age.499 
In the face of such accounts, the reflex to blame gun proliferation and 
wish guns away is understandable.  The modern orthodoxy translates that 
reflex into policy with the promise that the right mix of statutory language 
can solve the problem by pushing the gun inventory toward zero. 
                                                                                                                          
499 WILLIAM OLIVER, THE STRUCTURAL-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A THEORY OF BLACK MALE 
VIOLENCE IN VIOLENT CRIME: ASSESSING RACE AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES (Darnell F. Hawkins, ed., 
2003) (citations omitted).  The recent trend is reflected in his distillation of the problem.  
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Endorsement of this approach by the Black political establishment implies 
that it is or should be embraced by anyone who cares about the community.  
This implication undergirds NAACP counsel, Michael De Leeuw’s 
confident declaration that race targeted gun bans should be part of any 
Civil Rights agenda.500  But closer critique reveals more diversity within 
the community than one might surmise and the social science raises serious 
substantive questions about the wisdom of the modern orthodoxy.   
A.  The Modern Orthodoxy and Community Attitudes 
Even the roughest cut at the question reveals that the modern 
orthodoxy has less following in the community than one might expect.  
National polling by the Pew Research Center asked,  “What do you think is 
more important—to protect the right of Americans to own guns, OR to 
control gun ownership?”501  Fifty-four percent of whites and 30% of blacks 
said it was more important to protect gun rights compared to 66% of blacks 
who said it was more important to control gun ownership.502  Respondents 
were also asked a question that reflects one of the explicit strands of the 
modern orthodoxy, “Should States and Localities be able to pass laws 
banning handguns?”503  Sixty-four percent of blacks said yes and 30% said 
no.504    
Mid-sixty percent majorities are still consistent with the intuition that 
many Blacks would favor gun control of some sort.505  But this is 
substantially lower than Black allegiance to the Democratic Party, which is 
generally in excess of 90%.506  This presents an interesting contrast with 
the Black leadership where Democrats predominate.507  The gap suggests 
that a significant swath of the community is at odds with the standard 
position of the Black political establishment.  
Pressing further into the details and the social science, the picture 
becomes even more complex.  High rates of Black victimization from gun 
crimes actually cut two ways.  In a population more at risk from violence, 
one might expect to find both a desire to keep guns from criminals and a 
parallel desire to possess guns for self-defense.  
                                                                                                                          
500 de Leeuw et al., supra note 11, at 137. 
501 Gun Rights and Gun Control, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 2010), http://www.pewresearch.org/files/o
ld-assets/pdf/gun-control-2011.pdf. 
502 Nicholas J. Johnson, Gun Control’s Racist Origins, LIBR. OF L. & LIBERTY (Dec. 7, 
2012), http://www.libertylawsite.org/2012/12/07/gun-controls-racist-origins/. 
503 Id. 
504 Id. 
505 Id. 
506 Id. 
507 Support for gun rights is articulated by the occasional Black Republican (Ken Blackwell and 
Condolezza Rice, for example).  But at the grass roots, the percentage of Blacks that support 
Republicans is far lower than the percentage that supports gun rights.  Id. 
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We see this starkly in the period that gives rise to the modern 
orthodoxy.  A concern about violent crime and unrest during the 1960’s 
was one driver of the Gun Control Act of 1968 and the rise of the modern 
gun control movement.508  It also sparked an unprecedented period of 
firearms acquisition:   
One of the major findings of The National Commission on 
the Causes and Prevention of Violence established by 
President Lyndon Johnson after the urban violence of the 
1960s was that firearms became increasingly available late in 
that decade. . . . In brief, the sale of handguns quadrupled and 
the sale of long guns doubled during the 1960’s.  The 
Commission found that in many cities a sharp increase in gun 
sales and registrations followed a riot.  In Detroit, for 
example, the number of handgun permits issued by the police 
increased by a factor of five between 1965 and 1968.509     
The same phenomenon is evident in assessments focusing specifically 
on Black community attitudes.  Paula McClain conducted a finely grained 
study examining the “fear and loathing” hypothesis that “firearms 
purchases are motivated by fear of crime, violence, and civil disorder.”510  
She cautioned against findings based on national data, which “makes 
comparisons between whites and blacks difficult because the size of the 
black sample is usually extremely small.  Hence, generalizations from the 
sample could be distortions of real population parameters.”511  
McClain examined perceptions of risk, patterns of gun ownership, and 
attitudes toward gun regulation between blacks and whites at the 
neighborhood rather than the national level.512  She surveyed blacks and 
whites in distinct Detroit neighborhoods categorized by race and risk 
factors—e.g., white high risk, black high risk.513  Her findings contradicted 
studies that used national data.  For example, early research based on 
national data found that blacks were less likely to report having a gun in 
the home.514  McClain found the rate of gun ownership between whites and 
Blacks “relatively the same across neighborhoods studied, with the 
                                                                                                                          
508 See Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 921 (2006), § 101, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 
1213. 
509 Reynolds Farley, Homicide Trends in the United States at 20, in DARNELL F. HAWKINS, 
HOMICIDE AMONG BLACK AMERICANS (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 1986); see also Gary Kleck, Capital 
Punishment, Gun Ownership, and Homicide, 84 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 882, 907–08 (1979) (discussing the 
relationship between increased gun ownership and increased homicide rates in the 1960s). 
510 Paula D. McClain, Firearms Ownership, Gun Control Attitudes, and Neighborhood 
Environment, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 299, 300 (1983). 
511 Id. 
512 Id. at 302. 
513 Id. 
514 Id at 304. 
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exception of whites living in black low risk neighborhoods”515 who 
reported owning more guns than any other group.516 
With regard to differential Black and white attitudes about gun 
regulation, McClain found that the number of questions and specificity of 
the questions made important differences: 
The attitudes of the residents of the four kinds of 
neighborhoods varied in regard to their support for or 
opposition to various forms of gun regulation proposals. . . . 
The policy position with the most support among the five 
groups was that requiring individuals to obtain a police 
permit before purchasing a firearm.  At least three-fourths of 
the respondents of all five groups were supportive of this 
policy.  The policy option with the least support among the 
groups was the confiscation of all weapons except for those 
of the police.  The support for confiscation ranged from a 
high of 26% among blacks in a high risk area to a low of 
10.16% among blacks in a low risk area. . . .  
Support for having the government sell firearms through 
government-owned stores, much like liquor is sold in states 
like Pennsylvania, also varied substantially.  Blacks in high 
risk neighborhoods are again the least supportive–19.4%. . . . 
With few exceptions, individuals in the five groups appeared 
to be almost evenly divided in their support for and 
opposition to the regulation of only handguns.  In most 
neighborhoods at least 40% of the people questioned 
supported handgun regulation and at least the same 
percentage opposed it. . . . 
The indication that the supportive responses vary depending 
on the policy option is a significant finding.  It is significant 
because previous studies, which have primarily utilized the 
permit question, have consistently found that a majority of 
people support gun control. . . . The variability in the 
responses to the other questions, however, clearly calls into 
question the reliability of a one-item indicator as a measure 
of gun control attitudes. . . . 
From an index of gun regulation attitudes, the results differ 
widely from previous studies. Blacks in high risk 
neighborhoods have a more favorable attitude toward some 
                                                                                                                          
515 Id.  
516 Id. at 305.   
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form of regulation than do whites in high-risk 
neighborhoods—52.7% and 34.9%, respectively.  
Conversely, a greater proportion of whites in high risk 
neighborhoods oppose regulation (46.5%) than do blacks in 
similar risk neighborhoods (37.8%). 
There also appears to be a difference in the attitudes of 
blacks and whites in low risk neighborhoods.  Blacks, once 
again, appear to favor regulation in a greater proportion than 
do whites (40.4% and 34.7%, respectively); however, the 
difference is not as great as between blacks and whites in 
high risk areas.  Interestingly, whites residing in 
neighborhoods defined as black low risk favor regulation in 
approximately the same proportion as do blacks.  Thus the 
results of the computed gun regulation index show that urban 
residents are less overwhelmingly supportive of gun 
regulation than is suggested by studies that use the one-item 
indicator.517    
Other studies focusing specifically on Black attitudes show that a 
significant cohort of Blacks favors prohibition or other strong limits on the 
criminal subculture but disfavor blanket prohibition that would impede 
self-defense by trustworthy people.  A study by Brennan and Lizotte, 
found that Blacks disfavored gun bans at higher levels than whites, even 
though they favored measures like permits and registration at levels higher 
than whites.518  This comports again with the intuition that many people 
who fear of violence will want guns to protect themselves and also favor 
laws promising to keep guns from criminals.   
This is just a snapshot of the social science.  I do not claim that it is 
dispositive.  But it does confirm the intuition that Black criminality might 
drive Black demand for lawfully owned guns just as readily as it fuels 
support for the supply control policies of the modern orthodoxy.  This 
suggests a diversity of attitudes about firearms policy that is 
underrepresented by Black political establishment and obscured by 
overwhelming Black allegiance to the Democratic Party.  
B.  Competing Critiques of Black Criminality  
It is a mistake to conclude that the modern rate of violent crime is an 
                                                                                                                          
517 Id. at 307–08 (emphasis added). 
518 Pauline G. Brennan, Alan J. Lizotte & David McDowall, Guns, Southerness, and Gun Control, 
9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 289, 304 (1993).  The Pew Study, on the other hand, found that 38% 
of whites and 64% of Blacks thought states and localities should be able to pass laws banning 
handguns.  Public Divided over State, Local Laws Banning Handguns, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 23, 2010), 
http://www.people-press.org/2010/03/23/public-divided-over-state-local-laws-banning-handguns/.  
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unprecedented variable that easily explains the modern orthodoxy.  The 
fact is that the Black tradition of arms has long demanded a balancing of 
the self-defense interest of good people in the community against high 
costs of criminal violence and traditionally, the community has privileged 
lawful self-defense. 
A report sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health 
reviewed a series of early studies showing that very high rates of homicide 
victimization and violent crime among Blacks is not unprecedented:  
The risk of homicide victimization in the black community 
has traditionally been high in large urban environments.  
Brearley, reporting on the level of victimization in selected 
cities in 1925, substantiates this point.  Victimization rates 
were higher during that era than they are at present.  It was 
not uncommon to find victimization rates in excess of 100 
per 100,000.519 
These victimization data do not explicitly indicate the race of the 
perpetrators, but the dismissive local government response is suggestive. 
By 1925, southern cities were already renowned for the level 
of violence present within the black community.  Memphis, 
in 1930, was described as the homicide capital of the nation.  
The city fathers were said to explain this situation by 
indicating “most of the murders were of negroes by negroes, 
so the police and government could not be held 
responsible.”520 
The 1925 victimization rates in several cities exceeded the modern 
rates summarized by William Oliver at the beginning of this section.521  
The Black homicide victimization rate per 100,000 of population in 
Chicago, Detroit, and Cleveland were approximately 103, 113, and 101, 
respectively.522  In Memphis, the rate was 129.523  In Cincinnati, it was 
approximately 190.524  And in Miami, the reported rate was approximately 
208 per 100,000.525 
In 1958, preeminent criminologist Marvin Wolfgang published the 
classic, Patterns in Criminal Homicide, which focused substantially on 
                                                                                                                          
519 HAROLD M. ROSE & PAULA MCCLAIN, CTR. FOR MINORITY GRP. MENTAL HEALTH 
PROGRAMS, NAT’L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, GRANT #5 RO1 MH 29269-02, BLACK HOMICIDE AND 
THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT 174 (1981). 
520 Id. at 175.  
521 OLIVER, supra note 499, at 281–83. 
522 ROSE & MCCLAIN, supra note 519, at 175. 
523 Id. 
524 Id. 
525 Id. 
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Philadelphia during the period 1948–1952 and surveyed the findings of a 
variety of earlier studies from across the country.526  Wolfgang reported 
that during the four-year period of the study, Blacks were 18% of the 
population but 73% of homicide victims and 75% of homicide offenders.527  
Then, as now, Black males dominated the ranks of victims (77% of Black 
victims) and perpetrators (80% of Black perpetrators).528  Wolfgang 
surmised, without testing, that economic desperation contributed to the 
high rates of violence, calculating that  90% to 95% of all offenders in the 
study (Black and white) were “in the lower end of the occupational 
scale.”529   
The availability of guns was not a plausible explanation for 
Wolfgang’s findings.   The instrument most often used by Black murderers 
was the knife.530  Stabbing accounted for 47% of the homicides of Black 
victims.531  It is unclear how much this reflected the general trend, and 
Wolfgang notes studies from several other cities where shooting was the 
leading cause of Black homicides.532 
Wolfgang noted that “no homicide figures were classified according to 
color prior to 1921,” but summarized a variety of studies conducted after 
data became available.533  A 1940 assessment of seven sections of the 
southern United States with high homicide rates concluded that the murder 
and manslaughter rate for Blacks was “twelve times that of whites.”534  A 
study of Birmingham from 1937 to 1944 showed that Blacks represented 
85% of homicide convictions and 40% of the population.535  In St. Louis 
from 1949 to 1951, Blacks committed 73% of homicides and represented 
18% of the population.536  Wolfgang cautioned that these data may be 
skewed by the fact that conviction rates for Blacks were consistently 
higher than for whites in the southern states surveyed.537   
Outside the South, studies of victimization rates (race of the 
perpetrator not specified) suggest a similar trend.  During 1920 and 1925, 
homicide victimization rates per 100,000 for Pennsylvania were 
“considerably higher for Blacks than for whites both in urban and rural 
                                                                                                                          
526 MARVIN E. WOLFGANG, PATTERNS IN CRIMINAL HOMICIDE 5 (Univ. Pa. 1958). 
527 Id. at 31. 
528 Id. at 35. 
529 Id. at 37. 
530 The penknife, switchblade, kitchen knife, and ice pick accounted for 45% of all weapons used 
by Black perpetrators in criminal homicides from 1948 to 1952.  Id. at 84. 
531 Id. 
532 Id. at 90–95. 
533 Id. at 40. 
534 Id. at 41. 
535 Id. at 43. 
536 Id. at 45. 
537 Id. at 44. 
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communities.”538  In urban areas, whites had a homicide rate of 5.3 
compared to 47.1 for Blacks.539  In comparison, the white rate was 3.4 and 
the Black rate was 45.2 in rural areas.540  Between 1921 and 1930 in thirty-
seven upstate New York counties, the homicide victimization rate per 
100,000 for whites was 2.8 and 30.4 for Blacks.541  As shown in the 
subsections below, squaring these historically exceptional rates of violence 
and victimization with the modern orthodoxy and with my criticism here is 
instructive.    
1.  The Black Tradition of Arms and the Violent Criminal Microculture 
The first part of this article details a strong Black tradition of arms 
responding to racist aggression and state failure.  To the degree that high 
homicide victimization rates reflect interracial conflict (the early 
victimization studies do not reliably indicate the race of the perpetrator)542 
fear of such encounters is consistent with the Black tradition of arms that I 
have elaborated.543      
Alongside that tradition, the dominant theme in the modern era is the 
story of Black criminality and intra-racial homicide.  The fact that high 
intra-racial homicide rates are nothing new suggests that Black tradition of 
arms has long required balancing between the legitimate self-defense 
interests of good people against the costs of criminal activity.  Even at the 
exceptional rates detailed by Wolfgang, Beardsley, and others, Black 
homicide is still fairly attributable to slim criminal microculture.  
More than 100 years ago, Du Bois dubbed this microculture the 
“submerged tenth.”544  In The Souls of Black Folk, he lamented the rise of 
“a distinct criminal class” in the urban slums.545  In the sociological study, 
The Philadelphia Negro, Du Bois tracked the activity of a Black criminal 
                                                                                                                          
538 Id. at 45. 
539 Id. 
540 Id. 
541 Id.    
542 Id.  The early studies of the victimization rate do not reliably indicate the race of the 
perpetrator.  The victimization rate in the New York study was calculated from death certificates.  We 
are left to speculate on the race of the perpetrator. 
543 The possibility that Black deaths from homicide have always been predominately from intra-
racial conflict suggests that fear of racist violence occupies a place in our collective psyche out of 
proportion to the actual attacks.  See STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, FREAKONOMICS: A 
ROGUE ECONOMIST EXPLORES THE HIDDEN SIDE OF EVERYTHING 62 (2009) (claiming that racist terror 
groups generated fear and apprehension far out of proportion to their activities because “[o]ne or two 
lynchings went a long way toward inducing docility among even a large group of people, for people 
respond strongly to strong incentives”).   
544 W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO 311 (1899); see LEWIS, supra note 31, at 206 
(describing the people at the “bottom of the Seventh Ward heap” as a “class of criminals, prostitutes, 
and loafers”).  
545 W.E.B. Du Bois, The Souls of Black Folks, in THREE NEGRO CLASSICS 329 (Avon 1965) 
(1903). 
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class that in many ways mirrored the modern Black criminal 
microculture.546  He reported that life in Philadelphia’s Seventh Ward in 
the late 1890’s was “hard noisy and deadly for too many of the lack people 
there.  On Saturday nights [the neighborhoods and bars] disgorged [the] 
maimed and murdered clients and dwellers before morning.”547 Displaced 
from economic opportunities by other races and ethnicities monopolizing 
certain industries, “it was not surprising that many Seventh Ward Blacks 
sought release in drugs and crime or savagely turned on each other out of 
rage or a sense of hopelessness.”548  In commentary that rings consistent 
with modern anxieties, Du Bois recalled his days in the “slums” of 
Philadelphia, “where in the night when pistols popped, you didn’t get up 
lest you couldn’t.”549   
Black leaders from the Mississippi Delta on the Committee for Better 
Citizenship agitated to “ensure greater punishment for black criminals who 
committed offenses against blacks.”550  Delta civil rights leader and 
staunch armed self-defense advocate T.R.M. Howard complained that 
failure of the state to punish Black-on-Black crime was another indictment 
of separate but equal, arguing that the “greatest danger to Negro life in 
Mississippi is not what white people do to Negroes but what the courts of 
Mississippi let Negroes of Mississippi do to each other.”551  In 1939, 
Sociologist Hortense Powdermaker advanced a different assessment, 
arguing that state malevolence and neglect exacerbated intra-group 
                                                                                                                          
546 DU BOIS, THE PHILADELPHIA NEGRO, supra note 544, at 240–41, 248–50 (explaining that the 
sudden increase in crime perpetuated by African Americans was due to their relatively late arrival in 
cities and providing statistics about the rates of crime and types of crime likely to be committed by 
African Americans).  
547 LEWIS, supra note 31, at 186.   
548 Id. at 187.   
549 W.E.B. DU BOIS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF W.E.B. DU BOIS: A SOLILOQUY ON VIEWING MY 
LIFE FROM THE LAST DECADE OF ITS FIRST CENTURY 195 (Int’l Publishers 1968); see Monroe N. 
Woek, Crime in Cities, in NOTES ON NEGRO CRIME PARTICULARLY IN GEORGIA: A SOCIAL STUDY 
MADE UNDER THE DIRECTION OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY BY THE NINTH ATLANTA CONFERENCE 
(W.E.B. Du Bois ed., Atlanta Univ. Press 1904), available at http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=inu.3
2000001728924;page=root;view=image;size=100;seq=1;num=1 (considering past rates of Black crime 
and arrest rates in cities, which reached a high in Philadelphia of 150 arrests per every 1,000 Black 
residents in 1864, and noting that “peculiar conditions of the Negro, past and present, tend to keep the 
crime rate high”). 
550 DAVID T. BEITO & LINDA ROYSTER BEITO, BLACK MAVERICK: T.R.M. HOWARD’S FIGHT FOR 
CIVIL RIGHTS AND ECONOMIC POWER 67–68 (2009).   
551 Id. at 73 (citing Mississippi Regional Council of Negro Leadership, Prospectus, at 13–14).  
Some modern commentators, in contrast, are highly critical of U.S. criminal justice system 
incarceration policy.  See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW, MASS INCARCERATION 
IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 96–98 (2010) (noting that in at least 7 states, African-Americans 
account for 80% to 90% of all incarcerated drug offenders, and that in at least 15 states, Black men are 
imprisoned on drug charges at rates from 20- to 57-times the incarceration rates of their white peers and 
arguing that these disparities exist even though “[p]eople of all races use and sell illegal drugs at 
remarkably similar rates”).  
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violence by Blacks who were wary about entanglements with the white 
power structure.552 
Social scientists continue to debate the core impulse that drives people 
to murder.553  But attribution of the Black homicide rate to a slim 
microculture is consistent with research showing that most murders are 
extreme aberrants with long histories of criminal activity and 
psychopathology and violence. Delbert Elliot explained that “the vast 
majority of persons involved in life-threatening violence have a long 
criminal record with many prior contacts with the justice system.”554   The 
aberrance of murderers is so solidly demonstrated in the literature that 
Kennedy and Braga dub it one of the “criminological axioms.”555  Robert 
Cottrol applied this critique explicitly to the black community and offered 
a detailed assessment of the influences that may have shaped the Black 
microculture of violence.556   
The fact that the Black tradition of arms grew up alongside exceptional 
rates of black homicide, is consistent with a decision that acts of the 
criminal microculture do not justify impairing the legitimate self-defense 
interest of the sober mature members of the community.  Indeed the 
dangers created by the criminal microculture actually strengthen the claims 
of good people to standard tools of self-defense.   On top of that, the failed 
experiments in Washington D.C. and elsewhere show that making guns 
illegal for the Parker/McDonald class557 do not and cannot stop the violent 
microculture from getting guns.  
2.  Exceptional Black Criminality and Blanket Gun Bans 
The modern orthodoxy does not expressly reject the thesis that 
exceptional black victimization and criminality is attributable to a slim 
microculture.  But blanket gun bans, like those urged as core policy under 
the modern orthodoxy, do carry the implication that the Black community 
at large cannot be trusted with guns (and knives as well, if we integrate 
Marvin Wolfgang’s study of Philadelphia).  This is an unavoidable 
implication of the view that targeted gun bans in certain Black 
communities should be part of any civil rights agenda.  To be fair, 
                                                                                                                          
552 POWDERMAKER, supra note 25, at 329–34.  
553 See, e.g., infra note 561 (exploring the three views on the subject of violence: pure 
nonviolence, violence exercised in self-defense, and violence as a tool of advancement, and stating that 
“many Negroes are being tempted today” toward the impulse to use violence as a method to achieve 
advancement).  
554 Delbert S. Elliott, Life Threatening Violence Is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on 
Prevention, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1081, 1093 (1998). 
555 David Kennedy & Anthony Braga, Homicide in Minneapolis: Research for Problem Solving, 2 
HOMICIDE STUD. 263–90 (1998).   
556 Robert J. Cottrol, Submission Is Not the Answer: Lethal Violence, Microcultures of Criminal 
Violence and the Right to Self-Defense, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 1029, 1040–42 (1998). 
557 See supra note 493. 
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advocates of the modern orthodoxy would probably prefer that no one have 
guns.  But short of that, they are clearly willing to settle for targeted gun 
bans just in places with large Black populations and aggressive criminal 
microcultures.   This is perverse. 
Under the banner of civil rights, this policy would brand the entire 
community with a badge of inferiority through a race-coded deprivation of 
an established prerogative of American citizenship.  It resonates 
disturbingly with early racist claims “that colored men were unfit for 
citizenship”558 and rationalizations of Black Code gun restrictions targeting 
Freedmen.559  The results from Washington D.C. already show that this 
prescription only bars legal guns and does little to block illegal guns from 
the violent micro-culture.  So, for a negligible impact on the real target, the 
policy stigmatizes entire urban enclaves as untrustworthy.560  This irony 
invites questions that suggest the true appeal of the modern orthodoxy. 
The promise of an easy answer—gun bans—to the exceptional rate of 
violence among Blacks and especially among young black men is 
politically appealing because it offers a seemingly straightforward solution 
to a far deeper problem that in reality has no easy answer.  Consider the 
more serious attempts to explain the exceptional rate of Black male 
violence summarized by William Oliver: 
There exists very little consensus among criminologists and 
other crime scholars regarding “the causes” of black male 
violence.  Numerous explanations have been offered, 
including acquired biological causes (e.g., head injuries); 
social disorganization and inadequate socialization; poverty 
and economic inequality; racial oppression and displaced 
aggression; adherence to the norms of a subculture of 
violence; joblessness and family disruption; the cheapening 
of black life as a result of the imposition of lenient sentences 
against blacks who assault or murder blacks; and 
involvement in self-destructive lifestyles centered around 
heavy drinking, drug abuse and drug trafficking, and street 
gangs.  Theoretical explanations of black male violence have 
                                                                                                                          
558 CHARLES LANE, THE DAY FREEDOM DIED: THE COLFAX MASSACRE, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE BETRAYAL OF RECONSTRUCTION 5 (2008). 
559 See Cramer, supra note 134, at 20 (describing the Black Codes enacted after the Civil War that 
prohibited blacks from carrying or possessing firearms or bowie knives without licenses to do so); 
Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 134, at 1324 (describing the “Black Codes,” including laws limiting the 
rights of freed blacks to testify against whites, as well as travel, assembly, and businesses restrictions 
and others). 
560  Michael de Leeuw and others who advance the modern orthodoxy focus almost exclusively on 
the urban underclass and fail to account for the possibility of a still vibrant rural and even suburban 
culture of arms among Blacks.  The discussion in Part III, supra, suggested, but did not fully develop, 
how the modern orthodoxy arose as a reaction to urban violence.    
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generally emphasized the significance of structural factors or 
cultural factors.561  
Although they represent a minority viewpoint, some criminologists 
maintain that racial differences in violent crime offending may stem from 
genetic/non-acquired biological factors.562 
This assessment leaves the leadership and public officials with two 
choices.  One is to acknowledge that there is no ready diagnosis, and 
therefore no viable public solution to the problem (thus strengthening 
private claims to self-help).  The alternative is to claim there is a ready 
solution to the problem, but it has failed because of the NRA or other 
bogeymen who block stringent gun control.  
A separate political appeal of the modern orthodoxy is that it avoids 
stigmatization and class distinctions inherent the criminal microculture 
critique.563  This boundary drawing will be especially problematic for the 
black political class who may rightly worry that in communities with high 
offender rates,564 any attempt to stigmatize the criminal class (people who 
are not just isolated criminal actors, but also sons, fathers, and nephews), 
will be inflammatory.565  Comparatively, calling for stringent gun control is 
                                                                                                                          
561 William Oliver, The Structural-Cultural Perspective: A Theory of Black Male Violence, in 
VIOLENT CRIME: ASSESSING RACE AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES 280 (Darnell F. Hawkins ed., 2003) 
(citations omitted).  
562 Id.  
563 This is a politically uncomfortable, but potentially useful analytical step.  Criminologist 
Darnell Hawkins argues:  
There is substantial evidence that much could be learned about black homicide and 
other aspects of black life in the United States if more careful attention were paid to 
differences among blacks as well as between black and whites.  The incidence of 
homicide among blacks, as among nonblacks, is significantly correlated with social 
class. . . . [T]he study of homicide among blacks may benefit from a within-group as 
well as a between-group analytic framework. 
Darnell F. Hawkins, Introduction to HOMICIDE AMONG BLACK AMERICANS 3, 8 (Darnell F. Hawkins 
ed., 1986).  
564 That has led to just as much criticism of the criminal justice system as the behavior that caused 
the incarceration.  Witness for example, the recent widely acclaimed book from Michelle Alexander, 
The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (2012), arguing that traditional 
limitations on felon’s rights is the new Jim Crow.  
565 Careful politicians might navigate this by distinguishing between the full population of 
offenders (which might be quite high) and the microculture of violent predators, which is quite small.  
See, e.g., Don B. Kates & Gary Mauser, Would Banning Firearms Reduce Murder and Suicide? A 
Review of International and Some Domestic Evidence, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 649, 677 (2007) 
(asserting that “murderers generally fall into a group some criminologists have called ‘violent 
predators,’ sharply differentiating them not only from the overall population but from other criminals as 
well”).  On the other hand, a recent report indicated that nearly one in six residents of Newark, New 
Jersey had been arrested at some point.  Howard Husock, From Prison to a Paycheck, WALL ST. J. 
(Aug. 3, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443866404577565170182319412. 
html.  Newark Mayor Corey Booker’s focus on assisting ex-offenders and reintegrating them into the 
work force is understandable as good economics and good politics.  See id. (describing the Newark ex-
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the path of least resistance.    
C.  Firearms Policy and the Interests of Innocents 
Regardless of how we choose to integrate the historic homicide trends 
into our thinking today, those trends eliminate an important strand of the 
claim that “things have changed.”  This section focuses on the remaining 
assumptions rooted in firearms costs and benefits.   
Otis McDonald and Shelly Parker claimed that policies rooted in the 
modern orthodoxy impaired their fundamental right to self-defense. 
Protecting the interests of this class of innocents is a crucial gauge of 
sound firearms policy in the black community.  So what sort of regulation 
leaves the Parker/McDonald class566 better or worse off? 
It is plausible that they are better off under a zero gun environment.  
That was the presumption the of Washington D.C. gun ban.  The difficulty 
is that this was an unworkable policy before Heller and unconstitutional 
after it.  The “no guns” equals “no gun crime” logic would be compelling 
if it could be implemented; if for example, we were starting from zero and 
deciding whether to have guns or not.  The problem is that Americans 
already own almost 300 million guns567 and have a deep cultural 
attachment to them. 
We know from international data that people defy gun bans at a rate 
that produces 2.6 illegal guns for every legal one.568  This is simply the 
average.  In many countries the defiance ratio is far higher.569  And none of 
those places have as robust a gun culture as the United States.  The upshot 
is that neither, Heller, McDonald, weak gun laws, nor NRA lobbying are 
the principle obstacles to successful gun prohibition.  The obstacle is that 
Americans already own nearly half the private firearms on the planet and 
have an exceptional cultural attachment to them.570  Whatever the dynamic 
elsewhere, de jure prohibition really just means tilting the distribution of 
firearms toward the worst people in the community.   
The affiliated, compromise position of spot firearms bans only for 
black communities is a demonstrably failed experiment.  The proffered 
excuse for this failure and for the extraordinary levels of gun violence in 
Washington, D.C., despite its gun ban, was that criminals were getting 
                                                                                                                          
offender employment assistance program and the “importance of assisting ex-offenders, if only as part 
of the crime reduction [Mayor Booker] sees as the foundation of Newark’s economic renewal”). 
566 This is the class of law-abiding adults and excludes the microculture of aggressive young 
criminals. 
567 Johnson, Imagining Gun Control, supra note 388, at 843. 
568 Id. at 853. 
569 See id. at 854 (providing statistics on the defiance rate in England, China, and Germany). 
570 Id. at 855–56, 853 n.77. 
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guns from other jurisdictions.571  The solution, proponents said, was 
extension of D.C. style gun restrictions to neighboring jurisdictions.  But 
even before Heller, that was a pipe dream in America.572  Spot prohibition 
failed in D.C. because anyone who was willing to break the law could get a 
gun from the leakage out of the hundreds of millions already in the civilian 
inventory.573  In practical terms, this core policy of the modern orthodoxy 
amounted to de jure prohibition but de facto gun ownership by the criminal 
microculture.  Places like Washington, D.C. and Chicago that followed this 
policy had nation leading gun crime.  They were also places where the 
Parker/McDonald class was essentially under siege.574 
The policy sought by Parker and McDonald is continued stringent 
rules formally prohibiting criminal micro class from owning guns and 
allowing legal access to guns for non-criminals.  This approach is 
consistent with the Black tradition of arms.  Objections to this approach 
center on hazards and social costs of firearms.  But those objections 
overstate firearms costs and fail to account for the offsetting benefits of 
lawful gun possession.  The next two sub-sections critique those costs and 
benefits.  
1.  Costs 
a.  Is Armed Self-Defense Ineffective and Uncommon? 
One way of dismissing the self-defense interest of the 
Parker/McDonald class is to say that their desire for defensive firearms is 
misguided; that armed self-defense is ineffective, uncommon, or 
counterproductive.  Some advance the debunked factoid that you are 44 
times more likely to hurt yourself or someone you love than to use the gun 
                                                                                                                          
571 This complaint has fueled federal legislative proposals like H.R. 452, the Gun Trafficking 
Prevention Act.  Gun Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013, H.R. 452, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013).  
Representative Carolyn McCarthy argues: “Guns are often trafficked from states with weaker gun laws 
to states with stronger gun laws. . . . The ATF has identified several major gun trafficking routes, 
including the I-95 ‘Iron Pipeline’ corridor between Miami and Boston.”  Gun Safety, 
CONGRESSWOMAN CAROLYN MCCARTHY, http://carolynmccarthy.house.gov/gun-safety3/ (last visited 
Mar. 7, 2013). 
572 See Johnson, Imagining Gun Control, supra note 388, at 852 (looking to New York City in 
particular, and acknowledging “that tough municipal laws alone are not enough” and that “[t]he source 
of some of the contraband guns . . . come from scofflaw dealers from other states”). 
573 Roughly 500,000 guns are stolen each year.  NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND 
VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 74 (Charles F. Wellford et al., eds., 2005).  
574 This problem is exacerbated by the fact that prohibition policies always have been extreme 
policy outliers, strikingly at odds with the national norms.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Second 
Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 262–63 (2008) (citing Supreme 
Court jurisprudence, including Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), where the Court struck down “a 
highly unusual Colorado state constitutional amendment precluding state or local action banning 
measures forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation”). 
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for self-defense.575  This conjures images of June Cleaver mistakenly 
shooting Ward when he arrives home early from a business trip.  The 
image is false.  The factoid comes from a study that only counted gun 
deaths, most of which were suicides, and completely ignored the vast 
majority of defensive gun uses.  The data show that Americans defend 
themselves with guns at a startling rate.  
There have been 14 major surveys of defensive gun use (“DGU”).  The 
estimates range from highs above 2 million to lows in excess of 100,000.576 
                                                                                                                          
575 Arthur L. Kellermann & Donald T. Reay, Protection or Peril? An Analysis of Firearm-Related 
Deaths in the Home, in THE GUN CONTROL DEBATE: YOU DECIDE 239, 243 (Lee Nisbet ed., 1990).  
The 43-times more likely claim is a result of Kellermann and Reay counting 743 gunshot deaths in 
King County, Washington, which includes Seattle, from 1978 to 1983.  Id. at 240.  For every case 
where a gun in the home was used in a justifiable killing, there were 4.6 criminal homicides, 37 
suicides, and 1.3 unintentional deaths.  Id. at 242; see also Stevens H. Clarke, Firearms and Violence: 
Interpreting the Connection, POPULAR GOV’T, Winter 2000, at 3, 9 (citing to the Kellermann and Reay 
study and asserting that “[t]he inference from such studies is that guns in the home are far more likely 
to be used in illegal or undesirable killings than in legitimate ones”). 
Gary Kleck shows that the core mistake in Kellermann’s claim is the failure to include the 
millions of yearly defensive gun uses where no one is shot and the gun is not even fired.  See GARY 
KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 128–29 (1991) [hereinafter POINT BLANK] 
(asserting that the Kellermann and Reay study “unwittingly replicated” a study which was criticized 
because merely accounting for “the number of burglars killed does not in any way serve as a measure 
of the defensive benefit of keeping a gun”); Gary Kleck & Marc Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime: 
The Prevalence and Nature of Self-Defense with a Gun, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 150, 181 
(1995) [hereinafter Armed Resistance to Crime] (critiquing Kellermann and Reay’s approach of 
comparing the “number of lives taken with guns with the number of criminals killed by victims”).  
Gary Kleck finds that “fewer than 2% of fatal gun accidents (FGAs) involve a person accidentally 
shooting someone mistaken for an intruder.  With about 1400 FGAs in 1987, this implies that there are 
fewer than 28 incidents of this sort annually.”  KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra, at 122.  
Also, the homicide numbers in the Kellerman study do not translate into a general risk factor for 
the population at large.  Generally, murderers are extreme aberrants who will already exhibit a variety 
of other risk factors that make them outliers in the population.  See supra text accompanying notes 
436–38. 
Gun control advocate Andrew McClurg, who finds suicides still a compelling reason for strict 
gun control, makes a remarkable observation: 
Most people are surprised to learn that annual firearm suicides routinely outpace 
firearm homicides.  In 1996, . . . 18,166 Americans committed suicide with a 
firearm, substantially more than the 14,327 victims of homicide by firearm the same 
year.  Firearm suicides have exceeded firearm homicides in forty of the sixty years 
between 1933 and 1992.  For all our fear of being victims of a violent criminal 
attack, “[i]f a randomly chosen person adds up the probabilities that each of the five 
and one-half billion other people in the world will kill her, the sum . . . is still less 
than the probability she’ll kill herself.” 
Andrew J. McClurg, The Public Health Case for the Safe Storage of Firearms: Adolescent Suicides 
Add One More “Smoking Gun,” 51 HASTINGS L.J. 953, 960 (2000) (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting John Allen Paulos, A Better Chance You’ll Shoot Yourself than Be Shot by Another, 
PUB. PERSPECTIVE, June–July 1995, at 17, 17). 
576 There have been at least fourteen surveys regarding the frequency of DGU in the modern 
United States.  See Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, supra note 575, at 157 (asserting that 
“[a]t least thirteen previous surveys have given a radically different picture of the frequency of DGUs” 
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compared to the National Crime Victimization Survey).  The surveys range from a low of 760,000 
annually to a high of almost 3 million.  In contrast, much lower annual estimates come from the NCVS, 
a poll using in-person home interviews conducted by the Census Bureau in conjunction with the 
Department of Justice.  Data Collection: National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATS., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=245 (last updated Apr. 17, 2012).   
These surveys define “defensive gun use” to include instances where an attack is thwarted without 
discharge of the gun.  See Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, supra note 575, at 169 (“Many 
of the ‘gun crimes’ in the NCVS . . . do not involve the gun actually being used by the criminal.  Thus, 
the NCVS estimate . . . overstates the number of crimes in which the offender actually used the gun.”).  
These non-shooting DGUs constitute the vast majority of the total.  See, e.g., GUN CONTROL AND GUN 
RIGHTS: A READER AND GUIDE 6–33 (Andrew J. McClurg et al. eds., 2002) (detailing the debate 
regarding the effectiveness of guns for self-defense and providing statistics on the number of DGUs). 
Critics say the NCVS figure is too low because the survey never directly asks about DGUs.  
GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL 152 (1997) [hereinafter KLECK, 
TARGETING GUNS]; Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Defensive Gun Uses: New Evidence from a 
National Survey, 14 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 111, 115 n.8 (1998).  The NCVS first asks if the 
respondent has been a “victim” of a crime.  See Cook & Ludwig, supra, at 128 (“It is worth noting that 
the NCVS asks DGU questions only of those respondents who report a victimization.”).  Critics charge 
that this excludes successful DGUs where people do not consider themselves “victims.”  Additionally, 
critics charge, the NCVS only asks about some crimes and not the full range of crimes where a DGU 
might occur.  See, e.g., KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra, at 152–53 (Respondents “are not directly 
asked about DGUs, but rather are only generally asked about anything they might have done for self-
protection. . . . [T]hey are merely offered an opportunity to volunteer mention of a DGU, but are never 
put in a position of having to lie in order to deny a DGU.”).  
Gary Kleck and Mark Gertz conducted an especially thorough survey in 1993, with stringent 
safeguards to cull respondents who might mischaracterize a DGU story.  Kleck and Gertz found a 
midpoint estimate of 2.5 million DGUs annually.  See Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, 
supra note 575, at 164.  The Kleck and Gertz survey found that 80% of DGUs involved handguns, and 
that 76% did not involve firing the weapon, but merely brandishing it to scare away an attacker.  Id. at 
175. 
Marvin Wolfgang, one of the most eminent criminologists of the twentieth century and an ardent 
supporter of gun prohibition, reviewed Kleck’s findings and observed:  
I am as strong a gun-control advocate as can be found among the criminologists in 
this country. . . . I would eliminate all guns from the civilian population and maybe 
even from the police.  I hate guns. . . . 
Nonetheless, the methodological soundness of the current Kleck and Gertz study is 
clear. . . . 
The Kleck and Gertz study impresses me for the caution the authors exercise and the 
elaborate nuances they examine methodologically.  I do not like their conclusions 
that having a gun can be useful, but I cannot fault their methodology.  They have 
tried earnestly to meet all objections in advance and have done exceedingly well. 
Marvin E. Wolfgang, A Tribute to a View I Have Opposed, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 188, 188, 
191–92 (1995). 
Philip Cook of Duke University and Jens Ludwig of Georgetown University were skeptical of 
Kleck’s results and conducted their own survey, the National Survey of Private Ownership of Firearms, 
sponsored by a grant from the National Institute of Justice to the Police Foundation.  That survey 
produced an estimate of 1.46 million DGUs per year.  PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN 
AMERICA: RESULTS OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SURVEY OF FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 108 
(1996).  Cook and Ludwig argue that their own study produced implausibly high numbers, and they 
state that the NCVS estimate is more reliable.  Id. at 102.  For a response to Cook and Ludwig, see 
Gary Kleck, Has the Gun Deterrence Hypothesis Been Discredited?, 10 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 65, 
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The compromise estimate is around 700,000 DGU’s per year.577  And there 
is no indication that this phenomenon excludes blacks.  A significant 
aspect of these DGU’s is that in the vast majority of them, no shots are 
fired.578    
Another objection is that armed self-defense just does not work; that 
you will have your gun taken and used against you.  This claim is generally 
at odds with the DGU data and more textured research shows explicitly 
that people actually are better off resisting than giving in.579  Data from the 
National Crime Victimization Survey (“NCVS”) show that a victim’s 
weapon is taken by the attacker in about 1% of cases where the victim uses 
a weapon.580  The NCVS and other sources also show that “[t]here is no 
sound empirical evidence that resistance does provoke fatal attacks.”581  In 
a study of all of the NCVS data on robberies from 1979 to 1985, the 
firearm offered the most effective form of resistance.582  Resistance with a 
gun was the method most likely to thwart the crime and most likely to 
prevent injury to the victim.583  The NCVS data show that “[t]he use of a 
gun by the victim significantly reduces her likelihood of being injured” in 
                                                                                                                          
65 (1998) (arguing that “widespread gun ownership among noncriminals may exert various beneficial 
effects, including the reduction of some kinds of crime through deterrent effects”).  The National 
Opinion Research Center (“NORC”) argues that Kleck’s figures are probably too high, and the NCVS 
too low.  The NORC estimates annual DGUs in the range of 256,500 to 1,210,000.  Tom Smith, A Call 
for a Truce in the DGU War, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1462, 1468 (1997).  Gary Kleck notes 
“[t]here are now at least 14 surveys, with an aggregate sample size of over 20,000 cases, and all of the 
surveys indicate at least 700,000 DGU’s [per year].”  Gary Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun 
Use, in DON B. KATES & GARY KLECK, THE GREAT AMERICAN GUN DEBATE 151, 159 (1997) 
[hereinafter Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun Use]. 
577 Kleck, The Frequency of Defensive Gun Use, supra note 576, at 159; see also JOHNSON ET AL., 
FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 450.  
578 See Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, supra note 575, at 173 (“Only 24% of the gun 
defenders in the present study reported firing the gun, and only 8% report wounding an adversary.”).  
As previously indicated, the Kleck/Gertz survey found that 80% of DGUs involved handguns, and that 
76% did not involve firing the weapon.  Id. at 175. 
579 See Jongyeon Tark & Gary Kleck, Resisting Crime: The Effects of Victim Action on the 
Outcomes of Crimes, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 861, 902 (2004) (“[U]nless there are circumstances that clearly 
indicate resistance will lead to significant harm, the evidence reported in this paper indicates that some 
form of resistance should be the path generally taken.”). 
580 Id. 
581 Id. at 903. 
582 Gary Kleck, Crime Control Through the Private Use of Armed Force, 35 SOC. PROBS. 1, 7, 8 
tbl.4 (1988).  
583 Id. at 7; see also Kleck & Gertz, Armed Resistance to Crime, supra note 575, at 174−75 
(reporting survey results showing that crime victims who deployed a gun in self-defense “rarely lose 
property and rarely provoke the offender into hurting them”); Gary Kleck & Miriam DeLone, Victim 
Resistance and Offender Weapon Effects in Robbery, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 55, 73−77 
(1993); William Wells, The Nature and Circumstances of Defensive Gun Use: A Content Analysis of 
Interpersonal Conflict Situations Involving Criminal Offenders, 19 JUST. Q. 127, 152 (2002) (citing 
studies showing that individuals who use a gun for self-defense and survive the incident usually do so 
uninjured). 
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situations when the robber is armed with a non-gun weapon.584 Whether 
the robber has a gun, or has no weapon, victim gun possession does not 
seem to affect injury rates.585  
Another rendition of the firearms costs objection is you will hurt 
yourself or have an accident.  This plays out in advertising of the most 
tragic types of events—children who get access to guns and shoot 
themselves or a playmate.586  Perceptions of this risk are often wildly 
inflated. On a recent panel before an audience of top-flight lawyers and 
judges, one of the speakers conducted an informal survey, asking for 
ballpark estimates about the number of children below the age of 14 killed 
in firearms accidents annually.  By a show of hands, a few people said one 
million.  A handful said 500,000.  Nearly half the room said 100,000.  
Most of the room said at least 50,000.  Virtually everyone said at least 
10,000.  Several months later at a lunch with six New York lawyers, I 
asked the same question with roughly the same distribution of answers.587  
The actual number of such tragedies for 2010 was about 40.588 
The fatal gun accident rate for all ages is at an all-time low today,589 
while the per capita gun supply is at an all-time high.590  The annual risk 
level for a fatal gun accident is around 0.22 per 100,000 population—about 
the same risk level as taking two airplane trips a year, or getting a 
whooping cough vaccination.591  
                                                                                                                          
584 Lawrence Southwick, Jr., Self-Defense with Guns: The Consequences, 28 J. CRIM. JUST. 351, 
362 (2000). 
585 Id. at 361−62. 
586 See, e.g., Gun Accidents Kill 500 Kids a Year, MOMLOGIC (Aug. 1, 2008), 
http://www.momlogic.com/2008/08/protect_your_kids_from_guns.php (recounting the story of a 
toddler who fatally shot himself after finding a gun in his parents’ car and listing five other similar 
tragedies to support the assertion that such accidents are not unusual). 
587 One person estimated one million deaths.  Two said around 100,000.  One said 50,000.  
Everyone agreed that it was at least 10,000.  The National Safety Council reported that for children in 
age range 0–19 years, the total number of firearms-related deaths for 2007 was 3,067 if homicide, 
suicide, and unintentional injuries are included.  NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 143 (2011) 
[hereinafter INJURY FACTS].  These 3,067 firearms-related deaths are broken down into 138 
unintentional deaths, 683 suicides, and 2,161 homicides, 25 due to legal intervention, and 60 for which 
the intentionality of the deaths was not determined.  Id.  Viewed by age group, 85 of the total firearms-
related deaths were of children under 5-years-old, 313 were children 5–14 years old, and 2,669 were 
teens and young adults 15- to 19-years-old.  Id. 
588 Id. 
589 See id. at 46−49 (reflecting that unintentional gun deaths in 2009 were lower than any other 
year after 1903 in both nominal and per capita terms). 
590 See Jurgen Brauer, The US Firearms Industry: Production and Supply, at 45 (Small Arms 
Survey, Working Paper No. 14, 2013) (estimating U.S. domestic non-military supply based on 
government data). 
591 See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK 
REGULATION 5 (1993) (reporting a risk of dying equal to 0.1 in 100,000 for persons who take one trip 
via airliner in a given year and a rate of 0.5 in 100,000 for persons who take 5 trips in a year, allowing 
one to extrapolate that 2 flights in a year equates roughly to a 0.2 in 100,000 mortality risk). 
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Accidental non-transport-related drownings facilitate far more child 
fatalities than firearms accidents.592  Indeed, swimming pool accidents 
account for more deaths of children under 10 years of age than all forms of 
death by firearm (accident, homicide, and suicide) combined: “The 
likelihood of death by pool (1 in 11,000) versus death by gun (1 in 1 
million-plus) isn’t even close.”593   
b.  Don’t More Guns Just Equal More Gun Crime? 
The modern orthodoxy says that easier access to guns explains the 
exceptionally high rate of homicide in some black communities.594  But 
that defies the reality. The fact is that urban areas where disproportionate 
Black murder rates center—have stricter gun laws, fewer guns, and more 
gun crime than rural areas where there are far more guns, easier access to 
guns, and less gun crime.595  Among young black males, the gun homicide 
and victimization rates are higher in urban areas (where gun regulation is 
stricter and gun ownership is lower) than in rural areas (where gun 
regulation is looser and gun ownership is higher).  Kates and Mauser distill 
the details 
Per capita, African-American murder rates are much higher 
than the murder rate for whites. . . .  [O]ne might assume gun 
ownership is higher among African-Americans than among 
whites, but in fact African-American gun ownership is 
markedly lower than white gun ownership. . . . 
Per capita, rural African-Americans are much more likely to 
own firearms than are urban African-Americans.  Yet, 
despite their greater access to guns, the firearm murder rate 
of young rural black males is a small fraction of the firearm 
murder rate of young urban black males.  [The murder rate of 
young urban African Americans is roughly 600% higher than 
that of their rural counterparts.] 
These facts are only anomalous in relation to the mantra that 
more guns equal more death and fewer guns equal less death.  
                                                                                                                          
592 NAT’L SAFETY COUNCIL, INJURY FACTS 20, 143 (stating that 739 children aged 0- to 14-years-
old died in unintentional drownings in 2007, versus 65 that died from unintentional firearms incidents 
over the same year).  
593 LEVITT & DUBNER, supra note 543, at 149−50. 
594 Recall, though, that Marvin Wolfgang’s early Philadelphia study found that knives were the 
dominant instrument of Black murderers during the four-year period of the study.  WOLFGANG, supra 
note 526, at 84. 
595 David Sherfinski, States’ Crime Rates Show Scant Linkage to Gun Laws, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 
25, 2013, at A1 (citing analysis of the effects of gun-control laws on crime rates by Kleck and 
Patterson, which concluded that such laws generally do not result in a pattern of discernable impact on 
crime rates).  
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In contrast, these facts accord with the earlier point regarding 
the aberrance of murderers.  Whatever their race, ordinary 
people simply do not murder.  Thus preventing law-abiding, 
responsible African-Americans from owning guns does 
nothing at all to reduce murderers, because they are not the 
ones who are doing the killing.  The murderers are a small 
minority of extreme antisocial aberrants who manage to 
obtain guns whatever the level of gun ownership in the 
African American community. 
Indeed, murderers generally fall into a group some 
criminologists have called “violent predators,” sharply 
differentiating them not only from the overall population but 
from other criminals as well.  Surveys of imprisoned felons 
indicate that when not imprisoned the ordinary felon 
averages perhaps 12 crimes per year.  In contrast, “violent 
predators” spend much or most of their time committing 
crimes, averaging at least 5 assaults, 63 robberies, and 172 
burglaries annually.  A National Institute of Justice survey of 
2,000 felons in 10 state prisons, which focused on gun crime, 
said of these types of respondents: “[T]he men we have 
labeled Predators were clearly omnibus felons . . . 
[committing] more or less any crime they had the opportunity 
to commit . . . .  Thus, when we talk about ‘controlling crime’ 
in the United States today, we are talking largely about 
controlling the behavior of these men.”  
The point is not just that demographic patterns of homicide 
and gun ownership in the African-American community do 
not support the more guns equal more death mantra.  More 
importantly, those patterns refute the logic of fewer guns 
equal less death.  The reason fewer guns among ordinary 
African-Americans does not lead to fewer murders is because 
that paucity does not translate to fewer guns for the aberrant 
minority who do murder.  The correlation of very high 
murder rates with low gun ownership in African-American 
communities simply does not bear out the notion that 
disarming the populace as a whole will disarm and prevent 
murder by potential murderers.596 
The general data on violent crime and the gun inventory also refute the 
more-guns-equals-more-gun-crime thesis.  Over the last seventy-five years, 
the number of guns per 100,000 of population has grown from about 
                                                                                                                          
596 Kates & Mauser, supra note 565, at 676−78 & n.95 (citations omitted). 
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34,000 per 100,000 to 100,000 per 100,000.  Over the same period, the gun 
homicide rate per 100,000 has oscillated from around three per 100,000 to 
highs of around 6 per 100,000.  Over the last decade, with gun ownership 
at record levels, gun homicide has been trending down.  It was 3.7 per 
100,000 in 1999.  In recent years, the gun crime rate and violent crime rate 
have declined consistently.597  Over this same period, the number of guns 
in the civilian inventory has continued to grow to its now record level of 
approximately 323 million firearms.598 
There is also a telling rebuke to the more-guns-equals-more-gun-crime 
thesis in the debate about concealed carry of firearms in public discussed in 
more detail below.  The core dispute in that debate centers on the studies 
by John Lott and other economists concluding that concealed carry laws 
cause reductions in crime, yielding billions of dollars of benefits in avoided 
costs.599  A variety of researchers have attempted to refute Lott’s claims 
about the benefits of guns in the public space.600  But the striking thing is 
that the more guns more crime thesis is not even on the table.601  This is a 
far cry from the starting objections that concealed carry laws would lead to 
carnage in the streets, with otherwise law-abiding people suddenly 
becoming murderers.602   
2.  Benefits 
a.  Armed Citizens as a Disincentive  
Several measures show the benefits of firearms ownership.  A national 
study of gun use against burglaries was conducted in 1994 by the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).603  This study concluded that 
over the previous twelve months, there were nearly 1,900,000 episodes 
                                                                                                                          
597 See ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & JOEL WALLMAN, THE CRIME DROP IN AMERICA 13, 67−69 (2006) 
(highlighting data that says the homicide rate peaked in 1991, before declining markedly to a level 
lower than any annual rate since 1967, and that both the aggravated assault with a firearm and armed 
robbery rates have followed a very similar pattern). 
598 JOHNSON ET AL., FIREARMS LAW AND THE SECOND AMENDMENT, supra note 450.  
599 JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME: UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN CONTROL 
LAWS 276 (3d ed. 2010). 
600 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & John J. Donohue III, Shooting Down the “More Guns, Less Crime” 
Hypothesis, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1296 (2003) (arguing that expansion to the data set used by Lott 
results in evidence that cannot plausibly support that concealed carry laws are likely to reduce crime). 
601 See Nicholas J. Johnson, A Second Amendment Moment: The Constitutional Politics of Gun 
Control, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 715, 751−54, 762–63 (2005) (discussing the recent wave of state 
legislation mandating nondiscretionary licenses to carry concealed firearms within the historical 
context of such laws to show that the United States is generally no longer seriously considering 
banning handguns). 
602 Id. at 752, 757−61 (aggregating positive responses to the enactment of concealed carry laws in 
various states to show that “the nightmare scenario” of gunfights erupting between otherwise peaceful 
civilians for petty reasons has not been a reality). 
603 Robin M. Ikeda et al., Estimating Intruder-Related Firearms Retrievals in U.S. Households, 
1994, 12 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 363 (1997). 
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where someone in the home retrieved a firearm but did not see an 
intruder.604  There were roughly 500,000 episodes where the armed 
householder actually saw the invader and, in roughly 98% of those 
episodes, the householder believed the gun was instrumental in chasing 
away the intruder.605 
Only 13% of U.S. residential burglaries from 1973 to 1982 were 
classified as “hot” burglaries, meaning the attempt was made against an 
occupied residence.606  The avoidance of hot burglaries and the tilt toward 
daytime invasions is generally attributed to criminals’ fear of confronting 
an armed resident.607 
In a study of 105 active burglars, researchers found that “[o]ne of the 
most serious risks faced by residential burglars is the possibility of being 
injured or killed by the occupants of a target.  Many of the offenders we 
spoke to reported that this was far and away their greatest fear.”608  
The story is different outside the U.S.  Burglars in other nations seem 
to be operating under different incentives.  For one thing, there seem to be 
more hot burglaries, as indicated by a 1982 British survey reporting a hot 
burglary rate of 59% of attempted burglaries.609  The Wall Street Journal 
summarizes: 
Compared with London, New York is downright safe in one 
category: burglary.  In London, where many homes have 
been burglarized half a dozen times, and where psychologists 
specialize in treating children traumatized by such thefts, the 
rate is nearly twice as high as in the Big Apple.  And burglars 
here increasingly prefer striking when occupants are home, 
since alarms and locks tend to be disengaged and intruders 
have little to fear from unarmed residents.610 
In the U.S., home invaders are more at risk of being shot in the act than 
of going to prison, and it is reasonable to expect that being shot is a 
                                                                                                                          
604 Id. at 367. 
605 Id.  
606 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY 4 (1985). 
607 GEORGE RENGERT & JOHN WASILCHICK, SUBURBAN BURGLARY: A TALE OF TWO SUBURBS 
33 (2d ed. 2000) (finding that late night burglaries were unpopular because it was too difficult to tell if 
anyone was home and most burglars avoid confrontation with residents of homes they break into at all 
costs); see also JOHN E. CONKLIN, ROBBERY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 85 (1972) (reporting 
from a study of Massachusetts inmates that some gave up burglary because of “the risk of being 
trapped in the house by the police or an armed occupant”). 
608 RICHARD T. WRIGHT & SCOTT H. DECKER, BURGLARS ON THE JOB: STREETLIFE AND 
RESIDENTIAL BREAK-INS 112 (1994). 
609 PAT MAYHEW, RESIDENTIAL BURGLARY: A COMPARISON OF THE UNITED STATES, CANADA 
AND ENGLAND AND WALES (1987). 
610 Kevin Helliker, Pistol-Whipped: As Gun Crimes Rise, Britain Is Considering Cutting Legal 
Arsenal, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 1994, at Al. 
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stronger deterrent than being incarcerated.611 
Hot burglaries also carry an elevated risk of assault.  In 1985, the U.S. 
rate of hot burglaries was 13%, compared with an average of 45% in three 
low gun-ownership nations.612  Criminologist Gary Kleck estimates the 
number of assaults would increase by 545,713 if U.S. burglars were 
equally likely to enter occupied premises.613  This would raise the overall 
American violent crime rate 9.4%.614  David Kopel argues that because 
burglars do not know which homes have a gun, people who do not own 
guns enjoy substantial free-rider benefits because of the deterrent effect of 
the knowledge that many people have guns.615 
In a survey of convicted felons conducted by James Wright and Peter 
Rossi for the National Institute of Justice, 34% of the felons reported 
personally being “scared off, shot at, wounded, or captured by an armed 
victim.”616  Nearly 40% had refrained from attempting a crime because 
they thought the victim might have a gun.617  Fifty-six percent said that 
they would not attack some one they knew was armed and 74% agreed that 
“[o]ne reason burglars avoid houses when people are at home is that they 
fear being shot.”618 
Wright and Rossi concluded, “the highest concern about 
confronting an armed victim was registered by felons from 
states with the greatest relative number of privately owned 
firearms.”619 the major effects of partial or total handgun bans 
would fall more on the shoulders of the ordinary gun-owning 
public than on the felonious gun abuser of the sort studied 
here. . . .  [I]t is therefore also possible that one side 
consequence of such measures would be some loss in the 
                                                                                                                          
611 JAMES D. WRIGHT ET AL., UNDER THE GUN: WEAPONS, CRIME, AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 
14 (1983); see also Kleck, supra note 576, at 12. 
612 KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 575, at 140. 
613 Id. 
614 Id. 
615 David B. Kopel, Lawyers, Guns, and Burglars, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 345, 363–66 (2001); see also 
David B Kopel, Comment to Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns & Burglary, in EVALUATING GUN 
POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 109, 109–16 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) 
(responding to criticism of the theory that guns provide a deterrence to burglary).  Contra Philip J. 
Cook & Jens Ludwig, Guns & Burglary, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND 
VIOLENCE 74, 104 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003) (arguing that the “[p]revious evidence 
[suggesting that gun ownership deters burglars] is indirect, anecdotal, or based on flawed data . . . [and 
concluding that a] hot-burglary victimization rate tends to increase with gun prevalence”). 
616 JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF 
FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 155 (expanded ed. 1994). 
617 Id.   
618 Id. at 146. 
619 Id. at 151. 
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crime-thwarting effects of civilian firearms ownership.620 
There is other evidence of firearms benefits in the consequences of 
targeted firearms policy.  In October 1966, the Orlando, Florida Police 
Department started a highly publicized firearms safety training for 
women.621  Women in the city had been buying guns at an increased rate 
after a dramatic increase in sexual assaults.622  The police department did 
not discourage them, but wanted to help them be safe and proficient.  Over 
the next year, the incidence of rape dropped by 88%.623  Burglary fell by 
22%.624  There is no evidence that any of the women in the program was 
involved in a shooting.   Researchers concluded “[i]t cannot be claimed that 
this was merely part of a general downward trend in rape, since the 
national rate was increasing at the time.  No other U.S. city with a 
population over 100,000 experienced so large a percentage decrease in the 
number of rapes from 1966 to 1967 . . . .”625  That same year, rape 
increased by 5% in Florida and by 7% nationally.626  
Economist John Lott argues that one of the most substantial drivers of 
crime reduction is the proliferation of shall issue concealed carry licenses 
to law-abiding people.  More guns in the hands of honest people in public 
spaces, says Lott, deters criminals and generates billions of dollars of 
benefits per year in avoided costs of crime.627  Lott’s assessment matches 
the intuition that a shift in the distribution of guns in the public space 
toward more guns in the hands of the law-abiding makes criminal activity 
more risky, less profitable and less likely to occur.  Lott’s claims have 
drawn criticisms and rebuttals.  In 2004, a panel of the National Academy 
of Sciences assessed Lott’s claims.628  The majority of the panel concluded 
that the data was inadequate to conclude whether right to carry laws 
increased or decreased crime.629  One panel member, political scientist 
                                                                                                                          
620 Id. at 238. 
621 Gary Kleck & David J. Bordua, The Factual Foundation for Certain Key Assumptions of Gun 
Control, 5 LAW & POL’Y Q. 271, 284 (1983). 
622 Don B. Kates, The Value of Civilian Handgun Possession as a Deterrent to Crime or a 
Defense Against Crime, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 113, 153 (1991). 
623 Kleck & Bordua, supra note 621, at 284. 
624 Id. at 286. 
625 Id. at 284. 
626 Kates, supra note 622, at 153.  One set of commentators argued that the drop in Orlando rapes 
was statistically insignificant, as it was within the range of possible normal fluctuations.  David 
McDowall et al., General Deterrence Through Civilian Gun Ownership: An Evaluation of the Quasi-
Experimental Evidence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 541, 545–47 (1991).  However, these authors’ statistical 
model was such that even if gun-based deterrence had entirely eliminated all rapes in Orlando in 1966–
1967, the model would still have declared that result to be statistically insignificant.  KLECK, 
TARGETING GUNS, supra note 576, at 181. 
627 LOTT, JR., supra note 599, at 276, tbl.10.6. 
628 Id. at 301. 
629 Id. 
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James Q. Wilson, filed a dissent, concluding that the evidence presented by 
Lott supports the conclusion that right to carry laws drive down the murder 
rate.630  Wilson had supported gun control measures in the past,631 and 
gained fame as the originator of the “Broken Windows” theory of crime 
control.632  Wilson concluded that “the best evidence we have is that [right 
to carry laws] impose no costs but may confer benefits.”633 
b.  A Race-specific Assessment 
The studies summarized above are broad measures that do not specify 
distinct racial trends.  There is, however, a study of this issue in the 
specific context of the black community.  The Rose and McClain study 
from 1981 started with data sets about black homicides.634  It then traced 
the victims and offenders and interviewed people who knew them, people 
familiar with the episode, and the parties involved (including perpetrators 
or survivors of the altercations).635  The results show how armed self-
defense by the Parker/McDonald class could be good policy. 
In a sample of selected American cities, Rose and McClain found that 
“[r]obbery homicide is the most frequently occurring pattern among 
stranger homicides in our sample cities, where it accounts for 
approximately two-thirds of all stranger homicides.”636  But the next 
finding is surprising:  “[y]oung adult black men who are robbery homicide 
victims are more often persons described as the robber than the robbed.  
This pattern appears to prevail in each of the primary sample cities . . . .”637  
This pattern was not unbroken.  In Detroit, for example, “between 1970–72 
the majority of the victims were identified as robbers, but in 1973 and 1974 
the robbed exceeded the robbers in total annual victimizations.”638 
The next assessment is vital for our purposes: “[g]iven the higher 
percentage of robber homicide victimizations in the early years of the 
interval, one might assume that targets posing a higher homicide risk for 
                                                                                                                          
630 Id at 301–02.  
631 See James Q. Wilson, Just Take Away Their Guns, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 20, 1994, at 47 
(advocating more searches and seizures of guns illegally carried or possessed while opposing new 
restraints on legally purchased guns). 
632 George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC MAG., Mar. 1982, available at 
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465 (theorizing that maintaining 
and patrolling urban neighborhoods will reduce crime).   
633 James Q. Wilson, Dissent to NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE: A 
CRITICAL REVIEW 270 (2005). 
634 ROSE & MCCLAIN, supra note 519, at 2.  
635 Id. at 13. 
636 Id. at 115.  
637 Id. 
638 Id. at 116. 
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the offender were abandoned in favor of safer targets.”639  Note that the 
idea of hardening targets against the aggressive microculture is the core 
theme of arguments that an armed citizenry is a disincentive to crime.640  
The researchers concluded that over a six-year period in Detroit, the 
robbery homicide was nearly as likely to result in the death of the robber as 
the robbed and that “[t]he defensive efficiency of those who are successful 
in thwarting a robbery attempt probably exceeds that of the criminal justice 
system.”641 
This is difficult territory.  One can imagine why policy makers would 
not embrace these data or advance affirmative policies exploiting this 
trend.  But from the perspective of the Parker/McDonald class—people 
living in the midst of clear threats and state failure—these data are a 
welcome affirmation of the benefits of private firearms in the hands of 
good people.  The Rose and McClain study underscores that message with 
this summary:   
The previous evidence illustrating the riskiness of becoming 
a victim if choosing to engage in robbery is a point seldom 
made.  One must exhibit caution not to overstate the case, 
considering the low clearance rate for this offense.  Yet it 
appears that robbers are indeed sensitive to the risk 
associated with the choice of robbery targets.  This is evident 
in the changing ratio of commercial to non-commercial 
targets.  Young black males who are insensitive to the risks 
associated with the choice of a robbery target clearly increase 
the probability that they will become homicide victims.642 
The Rose and McClain study suggests that not only is there a distinct 
criminal microculture within the community, it also suggests that the 
criminal class responds to disincentives that make violent crime more 
risky.  Based on the broader data it is fair to believe arming the 
Parker/McDonald class is one of those disincentives.643  
                                                                                                                          
639 Id.  
640 See LOTT, JR., supra note 599, at 215 (explaining the “crime hazard model” in which potential 
criminals will respond to the actual increased risk they face from an armed citizenry).     
641 ROSE & MCCLAIN, supra note 519, at 117. 
642 Id.  
643 My claim that firearms policy in the Black community should privilege the Parker/McDonald 
class of innocents is open to at least two fair objections.  Besides the Parker/McDonald class, there is 
another important class of innocents who are put at risk by firearms externalities—things like cross fire, 
stray shots, and accidents for which self-defense is no answer.  This group actually overlaps with the 
Parker/McDonald class, but treating it separately would give the maximum credit to the claim that this 
interest is a fair counterweight to my claims about the self-defense interests of the Parker/McDonald 
class.  Balancing those interests would involve for example, comparisons between DGUs and accidents 
and a variety of other comparisons.  The DGU numbers, for example, range into the millions.  The 
accidental death numbers are in the hundreds.  People will contest exactly how those inputs should be 
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I have not attempted a comprehensive assessment of social science.  
That will require far more time and many more viewpoints.  My aim here 
is only to demonstrate the case that arms in the hands of the 
Parker/McDonald class can generate results that compete easily with the 
modern orthodoxy’s combination of promising symbolism and practical 
failure.   
VI.  CONCLUSION 
My Uncle, Howard Jefferson Crump, was President of the Greenbrier 
County, West Virginia NAACP from 1954 through 1979.644  I was around 
ten years old when he told me about using his pistol to fight off a racist 
attack.  He was proud of the institutional gains achieved by the NAACP.  
But where we lived, the modern orthodoxy never resonated.  For rural 
people, the limitations of the state tend to be more obvious.   
Those limitations were glaringly apparent in 1963, when Howard’s 
brother, my Uncle Clarence, turned up dead in the creek behind my house.   
Although I have no memory of it, my mother says that a playmate and I 
were the first to discover the body.  The culprit was never identified.  The 
open question was whether Clarence was carrying his pistol?  Was it taken 
from him?  Was the assailant someone he trusted?   
People objected when the death was ruled accidental.  But no one 
complained that the police should somehow have protected Clarence.  
Country people understand that it would be pure magic for the police to 
happen along some shady path the very same instant a violent threat 
                                                                                                                          
calculated.  And some will suggest other types of comparisons.  It is also relevant that these data are 
drawn from the general population.  It may turn out that particular black urban communities will be 
exceptional in ways that are not reflected in the overall data.  
One might also highlight that one of the negative externalities of even a virtuous armed citizenry 
is that some percentage of guns owned by good people will be stolen and sold into the black market.  I 
count in this category the arguably distinct worry about the shared access gun, owned legally, but taken 
and used by some untrustworthy member of the household.   
What these concerns dictate about policy is open for fair debate.  Some will argue that the black 
market already is full of non-perishable guns.  The more pointed question is whether the concern about 
gun theft is a justification for geographically targeted gun bans that some have urged—i.e., effectively 
a revival of the D.C. and Chicago bans.  The answer may be a practical one.  We know those bans 
failed.  We might decide that these worries are compelling arguments for sharper focus on safe storage, 
theft reporting, and innovations like frangible ammunition.  And the government interest in those things 
might be stronger in some places than others.   
These policy questions are open to fair debate.  But these points of detail only underscore the 
broader weakness of the modern orthodoxy.  The failed blunt gun bans advanced as core policy under 
the modern orthodoxy return us to the core normative question: Why should the black community 
subordinate the claims and interests of the Parker/McDonald class to an agenda that is fundamentally at 
odds with the state and the traditional stance of the community and the leadership on armed self-
defense?  As it stands, the modern orthodoxy fails to answer that question.  
644 West Virginia Civil Rights Day: Honorees 2004:, FROM WHENCE WE CAME, 
http://www.wva.state.wv.us/civilrights/pasthonorees.htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).   
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appears.  Among the preachers, teachers, deacons, and working class 
church people who populated my early life, firearms were ubiquitous.645  
They still are.  
Empirical work on the risks and utilities of gun ownership in the black 
community is incomplete.  But the glib assumption that the modern 
orthodoxy is the only authentically black viewpoint on the gun issue is 
unsustainable.  There are sound reasons in our tradition and in our current 
circumstances for blacks to pull away from the political inertia of the 
modern orthodoxy and toward an open-minded re-engagement of firearms 
policy. 
 
                                                                                                                          
645 Included in this group were my grandfather, Reverend Nathaniel Johnson, Sr., and my father 
Reverend Nathaniel Johnson, Jr.  From about age ten, my regular job on Sundays, when we visited my 
grandparents for dinner, was to reload and “test fire” the rifle that my grandmother kept behind the 
kitchen door.  When she died at the age of ninety-four, she left behind that rifle, the pistol she kept in 
her nightstand, and two shotguns.   
